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Abstract
This thesis uses individual level data to analyse the potential impacts of temporary
migration in Eastern Europe. The empirical analysis looks at: (i) the patterns of
selection into migration and return, (ii) the labour market returns to return migration
and (iii) the impact of a change in nativesattitudes on the intended duration of stay
abroad.
The analysis commences by presenting cross-country evidence on the labour mar-
ket outcomes of recent return migrants in Eastern Europe (Chapter 2). It addresses
both the income premia received by returnees and their occupational choices upon
return. The rest of the thesis goes into more details by analysing the wage earn-
ing ability and the selection of Romanian migrants and returnees (Chapters 3 and
4). The results suggest that the selection and sorting of migrants by skills is driven
by di¤erent returns in countries of destination. These ndings are consistent with a
model of rational choice in migration decisions. They imply that for a source country
like Romania relatively high rates of temporary migration might have positive long-
run e¤ects on average skills (schooling) and wages. These e¤ects crucially depend on
the magnitude and selection of return migration ows. The last part of the thesis
(Chapter 5) addresses therefore one widespread consequence of recent East-West mi-
gration in the aftermath of economic recession: the anti-immigrant backlash sweeping
across major destination countries in Europe. A widely documented crime in Italy
provides a quasi-experimental setting to identify the impact of nativesattitudes on
the return plans of Romanian migrants. Our results suggest a signicant e¤ect of
anti-immigrant attitudes on the intended duration of stay in the host country. The
impact is more pronounced for low-skilled migrants. This in turn has important con-
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1.1 Background and motivation
Recent economic studies argue that restrictions to international labour migration
represent the greatest single class of distortions in the global economy. The estimated
welfare gains from a partial elimination of various barriers to labour mobility from
poor to rich countries are in the range of up to 150 percent of world GDP (see Clemens
2011 for a survey). Gains of this magnitude by far exceed the expected gains from
lifting barriers to trade or capital ows.
Both empirical research (e.g. Prichett 2006) and theoretical models (e.g. Ben-
habib and Jovanovic 2012) suggest that migration is potentially an important and
rather neglected mechanism for reducing world inequality. From this perspective,
international migration could become even more relevant given the limited e¤ective-
ness of public foreign aid (Easterly 2006) and the failure of private capital ows to
equalise di¤erences in factor prices which originate in di¤erent human-capital endow-
ments (Lucas 1990).
An extensive literature analyses the e¤ects of migration for receiving countries
and for migrants themselves. Yet there is little empirical evidence on the economic
impacts of migration on sending countries. Most of the applied research in the eco-
nomics of migration uses various sources of data and quasi-experimental situations to
identify the relation between migration-induced labour supply shifts and wages (see
e.g. Card et al 2012, Manacorda et al. 2012, Ottaviano and Peri 2012). However, the
corresponding e¤ects for the sending economies have received relatively little atten-
tion (the only exceptions are Mishra 2007 for Mexico, Elsner 2013 for Lithuania and
Dustmann et al. 2015 for Poland). One reason for this is the lack of appropriate data
which could be used to quantify the economic implications of large labour outows
on the countries of origin.
In this context, the considerable migration ows from Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (CEE) and the associated changes in migration policy regimes due to the EU-
enlargement, provide an opportunity to address these questions in an almost exper-
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Country of origin 1990 2000 2010
Albania 0.162 0.190 0.450
Bulgaria 0.060 0.080 0.160
Croatia 0.123 0.140 0.171
Czech Republic 0.021 0.027 0.035
Estonia 0.028 0.054 0.126
Hungary 0.042 0.041 0.046
Latvia 0.020 0.033 0.122
Lithuania 0.057 0.054 0.129
Poland 0.041 0.044 0.082
Romania 0.020 0.031 0.135
Slovakia 0.065 0.069 0.095
Slovenia 0.044 0.072 0.065
Source: own estimation based on data from World Bank 2012
and UN Population Prospects 2010.
Table 1.1: Stock of emigrants as ratio of total population in the home country
imental setting. The emigration rates from CEE grew sharply over the last decade,
and particularly with the two waves of EU enlargement (2004 and 2007). As indi-
cated in Table 1.1, for several CEE countries the stock of migrants residing abroad
is about 10% or more of the total population. This represents an even larger share
of their workforce.
Migration ows of this magnitude, often associated with a positive selection of
migrants, have been regarded as harmful for developing countries (Grubel and Scott
1966; Bhagwati 1976; Bhagwati and Hamada 1974; Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975).
However, from the perspective of migrants themselves migration is an opportunity
to improve, sometimes dramatically, their standard of living. There is evidence that
migrants e.g. from Latin America (Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett 2008), from
India (De Coulon and Wadsworth 2010) or from Eastern Europe (Budnik 2009) earn
on average two to three times more at destination than they would at home. More-
over, the migration of highly skilled may induce virtuous educational incentives in
the home country population. In the long run, this might increase the overall human
capital of the sending country. This possibility of a "brain gain" has been identied
theoretically in the past and tested empirically in recent research. Beine et al. (2001,
2008) use a cross-country approach to show that low emigration rates are positively
correlated to average schooling levels. Using individual data, Batista et al. (2007)
and Chand and Clemens (2008) nd a positive incentive e¤ect of skilled emigration
on education. A large body of work has also shown that more frequently migration
is rather temporary than permanent and return migrants often become successful
entrepreneurs or bring back highly productive skills with positive consequences for
their countries (Dustmann and Görlach 2015b). The positive impacts of return mi-
gration for the countries of origin have been analyzed theoretically i.a. by Dustmann
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(1995), Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003), Mayer and Peri (2009), Dustman, Fadlon
and Wiess (2010), Dustmann and Glitz (2011), Dustmann and Görlach (2015a,b).
There is extensive evidence that return migrants receive income premia for their
work experience abroad (Reinhold and Thom 2009; Barret and Goggin 2010, Wahba
2015)). Several recent studies have also emphasized the importance of returnees as
a source of entrepreneurship (Constant and Massey 2002; McCormick and Wahba
2001, Wahba 2015).
These aspects of migration and return are particularly relevant for the case of
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). After the opening of the borders in 1990 and
subsequently in the context of EU-enlargement, several of its professionals as well as
unskilled workers moved to Western Europe and to North America (see e.g. Kahanec
and Zimmermann 2009 for a recent overview). Over the last two decades, return
migrants also became an important and fast-growing group on the labour markets
in all CEE. Precise and comparable gures of the stock of East European migrants
who already returned to their countries of origin are still missing (see Chapter 2
for details). However, some recent research suggests that these migrants acquire
productive skills while abroad and receive signicant income premia upon return
(see e.g. Co, Gang and Yun 2000 for female return migrants in Hungary; De Coulon
and Piracha 2005 for Albanian returnees; Hazans 2008 for Latvian returnees and Iara
2009, Martin and Radu 2012 for cross-country comparisons). There is also evidence
that returnees in CEE have a higher proclivity for entrepreneurial activities or for
self-employment than non-migrants (Kilic et al. 2009; Piracha and Vadean 2010),
but are at the same time more likely not to participate in the labour market.
Will an increased mobility of Eastern Europeans due to lower mobility barriers
result in harmful consequences for their countries of origin? How does migration
and return contribute to the productivity and income of workers? What will be the
consequences of further reducing the cost of migration? Which factors will be the
main determinants of return and re-migration decisions?
The present analysis will address these questions empirically using data on mi-
gration from Romania. This is a particularly relevant and representative case study
due to the size of the population, the magnitude of emigration, but also the struc-
ture and destination of labour outows and the considerable rate of return migration
(see Chapter 2, Table 2.1 for comparative gures). Romania experienced a natural
population increase until 1991, mainly due to restrictive emigration and the forced
pronatalist policies of the communist regime. The radical change in birth control
policies in the mid 1960s had a dramatic impact on fertility rates (see gure 1.2) and
on the socioeconomic outcomes of a¤ected birth cohorts (Pop-Eleches 2006). The de-
mographic change during communism and the large migration ows from Romania
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Source: own estimation based on census, INS, Istat, INE and World Bank Data
Figure 1.1: Migration and population change in Romania 1990-2010
cant decline of the total population which, as suggested in Figure 1.1, closely mirrors
the sharp increase in the stock of migrants abroad over a relatively short period of
time. Both the population decline (from somewhat more that 22 million in 1992
to less that 20 million in 2012) and the total number of migrants residing abroad
(estimated at around 3 million in 2011) correspond to about 10 per cent of the total
population. At the same time, the estimated share of return migrants in the total
population of Romania is also around 10 per cent. As summarised in Table 2.1 this
level corresponds to an average rate of return migration among CEE countries.
This striking similarity of the three measures1 (10 per cent population decline,
10 per cent emigration rate, 10 per cent share of returnees in the total population of
Romania) and their potential socio-economic consequences provided the motivation
for the present research. The use of individual level data for the empirical analysis
was instigated primarily by the need to understand what lies beneath those intriguing
aggregate level gures.
1For reasons of population-accounting principles, the measurement of migration from census data
is notoriously imprecise and the impact of migration on population decline is not straightforward.
In theory, non-permanent migrants currently residing abroad should be at least partially captured
in the census as absentees. Even in the presence of a huge miscount, migration can a¤ect but not
fully explain the population decline.
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Figure 1.2: Fertility rates in Romania and Europe (Source: UN statistics, own rep-
resentation)
1.2 Research questions
The consequences of migration and return on the sending countries will depend cru-
cially on two aspects: the size and the selection of these ows. The larger the number
of migrants and returnees the larger are the potentials for gains and losses. Moreover,
for the countries of origin, a positive selection of migrants and returnees, in terms of
their skills, may represent both a challenge (risk of brain drain) and an opportunity
(incentives to invest in education as well as a potential increase of the human capital
stock due to skills acquired abroad by return migrants).
The aim of this thesis is therefore to address three main sets of questions.
i. Who are the migrants? Economic theory (Roy model) predicts that migrants
will not represent a random subsample of the population but a self-selected group.
The practical implication is that people with specic skills and abilities self-select into
the pool of migrants (and of returnees) and sort themselves across specic countries
of destination. We will therefore ask if these decisions were rational in the case of
CEE migrants, i.e. if they were consistent with the predictions of the human capital
(Roy 1951) model of migration (Dahl 2002). How do migrants and returnees compare
to non-migrants in the home country and to each other? Are migrants and returnees
positively or negatively selected with regard to their observed characteristics and
unobservable skills?
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ii. Do the rationality of migration and the positive selection of returnees allow us
to evaluate the aggregate (skill and wage) e¤ects of migration from Eastern Europe?
More specically, to what extent can return migration contribute to alleviate the
negative supply shock of emigration in the sending countries? What are the economic
returns to return migration? Do migrants improve their labour market performance
upon return due to skills acquired abroad? Do labour market outcomes of students
returning after studying abroad di¤er from those of returning migrant workers? Do
returnees receive signicant income premia for their work experience abroad? Are
they more likely than non-migrants to switch into self-employment or to become
entrepreneurs? How do the saving and remitting choices while abroad a¤ect the
prospects of returnees to climb up the occupational ladder? Does the exposure to
work abroad increase the propensity of migrants not to participate in the labour
market after returning?
iii. What factors a¤ect the duration of stay abroad. In particular, do changes
in nativesattitudes towards immigrants a¤ect the plans of foreign born to return
to their countries of origin? There is little evidence in the current literature to
answer this question. This is puzzling considering the economic importance of return
migration and the impact of return intentions on the integration of immigrants in
their host society. Return intentions are positively correlated with return realisations
and are driven by the same determinants (Dustmann 2003). However, none of the
models of return migration (e.g. Borjas and Bratsberg 1996, Yang 2006, Dustmann
et al. 2011) incorporates the role of nativesattitudes in the out-migration decisions
of foreign born. There is to date no empirical study on the e¤ects of nativesattitudes
on the ows of return migration. We use the case of Romanian migrants in Italy to
illustrate how a strong negative shock in attitudes of Italians towards a specic group
of foreigners impacts on their plans to return to their home country or to settle at
destination.
1.3 Methods and data sources
The contribution of the present analysis consists in addressing these questions using
individual level data from sending countries in CEE. To this end, we combine census
and large survey data which allow us to identify migrants and returnees.
The main challenge of our empirical analysis is the potential endogeneity of mi-
gration decisions in models of labour market outcomes for returnees. Correcting for
this requires credible instruments which are not easily available in standard surveys
not designed to analyse migration. Most censuses and surveys hardly collect any
information about return migrants and do not allow accurate distinctions between
return and other forms of temporary migration. Precisely such distinctions are in-
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dispensable for any analysis of the behaviour of return migrants.
For the case of Romania, we match therefore information from census data to
data from the National Demographic Survey (NDS). The NDS data were collected
by the Centre for Regional and Urban Sociology (CURS) and were designed to be
representative both at national and regional level. Our restricted sample has more
than 37,000 observations, including about 1,500 returnees (who had spells of em-
ployment abroad). It covers all relevant individual characteristics and information
on migration choices and on remittances received from household members abroad.
More information on sample characteristics and the construction of variables is pro-
vided in chapters 3 and 4. To justify our selection of destination countries, we used
administrative registers covering information for more than 100,000 migrants who left
Romania betweem 1995 and 2001. We could access individual level information on
their age, gender, education, occupation, region of origin in Romania and countries
of destination. Mode details on the data and a description of the cross-tabulations
are included in Appendix A. The data are used in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1).
The main data source for the cross-country analysis in Chapter 2 is the EU Labour
Force Survey (EU-LFS), which is based on harmonised national surveys. Despite
di¤erences in sample sizes and collection methods, the cross country comparability
of data from EU-LFS is considered to be higher that of any other employment data
set in Europe (for more details on methodology see Eurostat 2004). Two features of
the EU-LFS make it a particularly valuable source of information on return migrants.
First, it contains information on the country of residence one year before the survey
was conducted. It is thus possible to identify recent return migrants in the EU-
LFS using this information together with the information on the country of birth.
Rendall el al. (2003) show that although underestimating the aggregated level, this
way of using the EU-LFS data provides estimates of returning EU citizens which
are more reliable than those for migrants. We pool repeated cross-sections from the
EU-LFS over the period 2002-2007. Using the retrospective information on countries
of residence, we are able to identify an unweighted initial sample of more than 2,500
returnees observed in the rst year upon arrival across seven CEE countries. We
use data from the fourths and fth rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS)
for descriptive statistics. The data were collected 2007-2010 and the samples were
designed to be representative for each country. We identify return migrants as those
persons born in the country, who have been working abroad for at least 6 months over
the last 10 years - and are observed back home at the time of the survey. However,
the sample sizes per country are rather small and therefore the data are less suitable
for a more complex analysis.
The analysis of the return decisions is based on a survey of Romanian migrants in
Italy. The survey was commissioned by the Strategy Unit of the Romanian Govern-
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ment and was carried out 2007 on a country-wide representative sample of Romanian
migrants using a sampling frame conrmed by Istat. The survey contains detailed in-
formation on migration strategies, previous migration behaviour, employment status
in Italy, attitudes towards the Italian society, ties with the region of origin in Ro-
mania as well as a detailed set of questions on further migration plans, i.e. concrete
plans to return to Romania in the near future, plans to settle in Italy o a permanent
basis or to migrate to third countries.To these data we match regional indicators
extracted from Istat (regional GDP, unemployment rate, share of registered foreign-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.4 Structure of the thesis
The analysis consists of four parts. The next chapter provides cross-country evidence
on patterns of return migration in Eastern Europe. It focuses on the labour market
behaviour of returnees: their occupational status and the income premia they receive
upon return. This cross-country perspective emphasizes the importance of return
migration for the CEE labour markets. It also suggests the potentially signicant
roles of network e¤ects and social interactions on the one side, and of self-selection
mechanisms of migration on the other side, in mediating the impact of migration and
return in the regions of origin. These two aspects provide the underlying rationale
for the subsequent chapters.
In Chapter 3 we develop various measures with which to analyse the selection of
Romanian migrants and returnees as well as their sorting across countries of desti-
nation. This part of the analysis provides a picture of the relative size and relative
compositional characteristics (including wages) of migration ows from Romania over
the period 1995-2005. It covers non-migrants, returnees and migrants to three types
of destination countries, i.e. which attract either positively, neutrally or negatively
(self-)selected migrants. The characteristics of these destination countries with re-
gard to their labour market types and ranges of institutions determined the selection
of migrants not only from Romania but for other CEE countries as well.
Complementing the ndings on selection into migration and return, Chapter 4
looks specically at the income premia for migration experience and at the occupa-
tional choices of returnees in Romania. Do Romanian returnees receive signicant
income premia both from self-employment and from dependent employment? Are
these income a¤ected by correction for the endogeneity of migration and labour mar-
ket participation choices? Do remittances and savings transferred from abroad have
the same impact on occupational choices upon return? Does the work experience
abroad increase the propensity of return migrants to participate in the labour mar-
ket?
Chapter 5 looks at the determinants of return migration for the case of Romanian
migrants. It uses a quasi-experimental setting to identify the impact of native atti-
tudes on the settlement intentions of Romanian migrants.
We derive some conclusions from the main results of the thesis in chapter 6. We
also indicate some possible directions for future economic research on the key issues




evidence for Eastern Europe
This chapter provides a cross-country comparative perspective on the main features of
return migration in CEE and presents some evidence of its likely economic impacts.
It does this in three steps. First, we construct aggregate indicators to assess the
overall magnitude of return migration (ows and stocks) in selected CEE countries.
Second, we review the available evidence with a focus on the labour market situation
of return migrants in CEE. Third, we use a regression analysis based on data from
EU-LFS to characterise the labour market performance of recent returnees.
2.1 Stocks of migrants and returnees
Two types of data can be used to obtain some rst intuition on the magnitude of
migration and return for the case of Eastern Europe. First, population censuses
permit the estimation of aggregate stocks of migrants and returnees. Second, survey
data which allow the identication of return migrants can be used to assess the
signicance of return migration for the countries of origin.
Prima facie evidence on the stock of return migrants can be obtained from rep-
resentative surveys which include retrospective information on residence and labour
market status. We can use data from the fourths and the fth rounds of the European
Social Survey (ESS) to compare the share of return migrants in the total population
of CEE countries. The results summarised in Table 2.1 suggest that in most CEE
countries considered for the period around 2010 on average about 10 per cent of
the active population (aged 20-60) had spend at least six months working abroad
over the previous decade and subsequently returned1. This represents a considerable
share on the labour market and is signicantly higher for the male active population.
1One can estimate similar ratios of returnees for West European countries included in the ESS.
The gures are in general lower than for CEE countries but have a larger variation, ranging from
around 2 per cent in Switzerland to about 4 per cent in the UK, 5 percent in Ireland and Cyprus
and 6 per cent in Sweden.
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Ratio of return migrants among
All Female Male
Bulgaria 0.086 0.067 0.106
Czech Republic 0.064 0.047 0.080
Estonia 0.133 0.067 0.214
Hungary 0.075 0.048 0.104
Latvia 0.092 0.063 0.132
Poland 0.121 0.077 0.163
Romania 0.072 0.053 0.091
Slovakia 0.107 0.066 0.167
Slovenia 0.030 0.015 0.045
Notes: Own estimation using data from ESS 4th and 5th rounds: 2008-2010.
Returnees were identied as persons born in the country who spent at least
6 months working abroad over the last 10 years and subsequently retuned.
Weights were applied for all subgroups (age and gender).
Table 2.1: Rate of return migration in the active population (aged 24-60)
In Poland, Latvia and Slovakia around 12 per cent of the active age men had work
experience abroad.(Estonia is an outlier most likely due to ethnic return migration).
The lower ratio of returnees among women is likely to be the results of fewer women
returning (i.e. migrating on a short-term basis). The data on migration ows do not
allow a proper gender breakdown, but the stock of migrant women from most of the
CEE countries residing abroad is similar to that of men for any given year over the
last decade (see e.g. Brücker et al. 2013).
Precise aggregate level statistics on the stock of migrants who already returned
to their countries of origin in CEE are still missing. However, recent evidence from
other regions suggests that 20 per cent to 50 per cent of immigrants return within
ve years after migration to their home countries (OECD 2008)2. Extrapolating this
to the case of recent East-West migration means that even the most conservative
projections would yield a lower-bound estimate of more than half a million returning
migrants for the period 2004-2009 only.
We can try to assess the plausibility of these gures using data from population
censuses (or current population surveys). For years around 2000 such data have been
organized by Docquier and Marfouk (2006) into widely used data set. For a selected
group of receiving OECD countries, the United Nations (2009) has also collected long
time series on yearly gross inows of migrants by country of origin. Although these
data are fraught with various methodological problems, they provide a rst intuition
on the magnitude of migration and return from Eastern Europe. We consider the
years 1990 - 2010 for selected CEE countries that can be identied consistently. Table
1.1 already showed the stock of emigrants from each of these countries, as percentage
2OECD (2008) states that a relatively small income gap between the home and the host country








Albania 20,476 34,207 0.60
Bulgaria 24,353 42,109 0.58
Czechoslovakia 24,230 18,697 1.30
Estonia 5,859 12,099 0.48
Hungary 54,450 40,535 1.34
Lithuania 2,824 12,010 0.24
Latvia 3,053 97,135 0.31
Poland 282,984 306,842 0.92
Romania 54,197 132,312 0.41
Source: Based on Ambrosini et al. (2011) using data from UN (2009) and
Docquier and Marfouk (2006).
Table 2.2: Imputed return migration (from OECD destinations)
of their domestic population for the year 1990, 2000 and 2010. For some of these
countries, it is also possible to impute the return migrants as share of the gross
ows. We use the data on stocks from Docquier and Marfouk (2006) to obtain (by
di¤erence) the net immigration country by country between 1990 and 2000. From the
United Nation (2009) data on yearly gross ows from the same countries of origin
to the same destinations we obtain the cumulative gross ows of migrants. The
di¤erence between gross ows (from country i to j) and the net changes of people
from country i living in country j constitutes a measure of re-migration:
Return owji = Gross Flows
j
i  Migrant Stockji
Following Borjas and Bratsberg (1996), Dustmann and Weiss (2007) and OECD
(2008), we make the assumption that most of these re-migrants are returnees and
we count this di¤erence as the measure of imputed return ows3. Table 2.2 sum-
marises these results by aggregating gross and imputed return ows by source and
host country respectively.
We do the same for destination countries. We calculate the di¤erence between
the gross migration ow from all CEE counties of origin to each destination country
d and the respective change in the stock of migrants from CEE countries residing in
the destination country d:
Return owds = Gross Flows
d
s  Migrant Stockds
We aggregate these di¤erences by selected countries of destination (d). The re-
sults are presented in table 2.3 for the major destination countries of East European
3We make the assumption that all those who are not anymore included in the statistics return





































































































US 1990 - 2000 929,366 1,220,528 0.761
Notes: Own estimations using UN data on bilateral migration ows (2010 revision)
and World Bank (2011) data on bilateral estimated of migration stocks.
The Central and East European source countries considered are: Albania, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia.
Table 2.3: Imputed return migration ows to CEE
migrants. We can also compare changes in the estimated retention rates of mi-
grants from CEE across the main receiving countries for the periods 1990 2000 and
2000  2010.
Table 2.2 is a helpful complementary statistic to understand how relevant return
migration is in a period with large gross migration from Eastern Europe. It con-
rms the conclusion obtained from survey data, that for all countries considered the
imputed return migration is a substantial share of total gross migration ows. The
ratio of returnees to gross migrants can be larger than 1 since not only migrants who
arrived in this decade but also earlier migrants returned during this period. Table 2.2
shows that Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland experienced return migration close
or even larger than their gross emigration ows. This is an expected nding since
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these countries have a longer history of migration before 1989 and might experience
now a "retirement migration" of migrants who left around 1968. However, all other
East European countries have return rates between 0.3 and 0.6, very similar to the
OECD (2008) conclusion.
These aggregate gures have to be interpreted with caution. They may be biased
if, for instance, undocumented migrants are better counted in census data than in the
o¢ cial entry statistics, or if the denition of immigrants (by nationality, place of birth
or country of last residence) is not consistent between census and administrative data.
Despite such measurement problems we can certainly conclude that return migration
is not a marginal phenomenon for CEE countries. To grasp the likely impact of this
migration on the home labour markets it is important to understand the rationality of
migrants and returnees. The motivation for return may be extremely diverse ranging
from the completion of a studies abroad or the termination of xed term temporary
contracts to improved opportunities at home.
2.2 Available evidence on the impact of return mi-
gration in CEE
Many empirical studies in the eld of migration su¤er from a lack of comparable and
reliable data. This is a particularly acute problem when analysing the labour market
performance of return migrants in the CEE countries. Most previous research in this
eld4 is therefore based on (country-specic) survey data and more often that not
the sample of return migrants covered is very small. In this section, we rst give
a brief overview of papers which explicitly addressed the income e¤ects of return
migration in Eastern Europe. Additionally, we also discuss recent results related to
other aspects of return migration in the region.
Among the rst papers to analyse the impact of migration on earnings upon return
is Co et al. (2000). They examine the labour market performance of Hungarian return
migrants using data from the 1994 Hungarian Household Panel Survey5. They nd
no wage premium for men who worked abroad whereas women who have previously
worked in OECD countries earn a considerable premium over the wage of comparable
stayers. The authors argue that this gender-specic result may be due to higher
returns to skills acquired abroad for women returning to specic sectors (e.g. nancial
services).
In their study of Albanian returnees, De Coulon and Piracha (2005) use a sample
4There is a vast and growing literature on the impact of return migration to other countries. We
conne our review to studies explicitly addressing recent return migration to CEE countries.
5Out of 3145 individuals covered in this survey 167 were identied as having worked abroad (Co
et al., 2000, p. 59).
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of just under 600 individuals (around 200 return migrants and around 400 stayers).
They nd return migrants to be negatively self-selected and explain this by costs
of migration which are directly proportional with the level of skills. Nevertheless,
the predicted hourly wage of return migrants increases due to their period of work
abroad. In addition, they nd that a large proportion of the return migrants become
self-employed after their return to Albania.
Hazans (2008) uses a sample of over 10,000 persons in Latvia of which around 500
have worked abroad during the last three years before the survey. After controlling
for individual characteristics as well as for unobservable heterogeneity, he nds that
return migrants earn an average income premium of about 15%. He proposes three
complementary arguments, besides the human capital hypothesis, to explain this
income premium. First, he argues that due to their savings from working abroad
migrants can search longer for better jobs upon return. Second, he suggests that
they are more condent and therefore aim at higher positions on the occupational
ladder. Third, he argues that returnees value wages relatively higher than non-
migrants (Hazans 2008, p. 25).
The only cross-country study looking at the impact of temporary migration in
Europe on the labour market performance of CEE return migrants is Iara (2008). She
uses a subsample of young males from the Central and Eastern Youth Eurobarometer
(2003) and nds that Western European work experience results in a wage premium
for temporary migrants upon return. This is interpreted as evidence for skill transfers
taking place during the stay in the host country. Iara (2008) also nds that a higher
educational attainment signicantly enhances the wage premium.
To sum up, the few studies on return migration to the CEE countries summarized
in this section as well as in table 2.4 show a relatively homogenous picture. Return
migrants and their households tend to benet economically from temporary migra-
tion and most studies nd a signicant income premium for work experience abroad.
It is however important to keep in mind that the comparability of the results is very
problematic due to di¤erences in the country-specic samples and in the estimation
methods. In addition, some studies use very small sub-samples of returnees at di¤er-
ent points in time and hence at di¤erent stages of the transition process in the CEE
countries.
Table 2.4 shows a simplied overview of the discussed papers. All studies tried to
control for the endogeneity of return migration when estimating wage functions and
to identify thus a causal e¤ect of work abroad on wages. Most estimations included
only comparisons between return migrants and non-migrants and estimated average
income premia from work experience abroad (the income di¤erential 1 in Table 2.4)
ranging between 5% and 34%. Some studies estimate also the di¤erence in expected
earnings for return migrants before migration versus upon return (income di¤erential
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2 in Table 2.4) as being mostly around 25%.
Table 2.4 also reports the corresponding signs of the correlation between the resid-
uals of the wage equation and the return migration equation estimated in each study.
These vary across countries and time, but the reasons mentioned above - particularly
with regard to the stage of transition at which the return migrants included in the
studies initially moved and subsequently came back- make this variation plausible.
A number of recent studies looked more generally at the economic behaviour of
return migrants and its implications for the country of origin. Rather than focusing
solely on earnings, these papers address the occupational choices of returnees, their
entrepreneurial decisions, their saving and remitting behaviour, the acquisition of
skills and qualications while abroad and the transfer of knowledge upon return (see















































































































































































































































































































































































Lianos and Pseiridis (2009) use a sample of 6,120 returnees from six countries
in Eastern Europe and Asia. They analyse the individual factors determining the
acquisition of additional qualications and occupational skills while abroad. As ex-
pected, human capital investments made abroad are endogenous determinants of the
income level, both while abroad and upon return. Returnees who spent a longer
period abroad, who learnt the language of their host country as well as those who
are better educated or who acquired on-the-job skills while being abroad earn higher
incomes upon return to their home countries. The acquisition of skills and qualica-
tions in the host countries is more likely for lower skilled migrants and for those who
are employed in the same sectors before and after migration.
For the case of Moldova, Pinger (2010) shows that return migration is benecial for
economic development in the home country not only due to the repatriation of skills
but also because of higher nancial transfers from temporary migrants compared to
permanent migrants. Prospective returnees remit higher amounts and transfer more
savings than permanent migrants even if they earn lower wages in the host country.
Kilic et al. (2009) show that exposure to work abroad makes Albanian return mi-
grants more likely to own non-farm businesses compared to non-migrants. However,
their results indicate that the propensity of returnees to become business owners
depends on the host countries they are returning from: it is higher for destination
countries with higher earning potentials and might also reect di¤erences in the types
of skills accumulated abroad. Another relevant nding is that for recent returnees en-
trepreneurial decisions are not a¤ected by work abroad. Two intuitive explanations
are provided for this. First, a negative self-selection process might have a¤ected
more recent returnees compared to earlier migrants. Second, recent returnees might
be more likely not to settle permanently in Albania, but migrate again in order
to complete their migration cycles. Using the same Albanian data, Piracha and
Vadean (2009) also nd return migrants more likely to be either self-employed or non-
participants in the labour market than comparable non-migrants. They di¤erentiate
among returnees who opt for non-participation, dependent employment, own account
work and entrepreneurship. Those opting for entrepreneurship seem to be positively
selected with regard to educational attainment, language skills acquired abroad, sav-
ing behaviour before return and access to better infrastructure. With time spent
in the home country after return, non-participants and own account workers appear
to search better jobs and re-integrate in the labour market. Piracha and Vadean
(2009) further argue that the impact of return migration on the home country hinges
not only on the form of employment chosen by returnees but also on the types of
temporary migration. In a di¤erent study, Vadean and Piracha (2009) look speci-
cally at the determinants of return and circular/repeat migration. According to their
results, both return and circular migration accentuate the negative selection of the
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initial migration ows from Albania, circular migrants possessing even less skills than
permanent returnees.
Complementary to this empirical research, the theoretical model developed by
Mayr and Peri (2009) is the rst one to incorporate optimal return decisions when
analysing the impact of migration on the sending countries. Their model setup is
tailored to the case of Eastern Europe. They use the available evidence of income
premia for returnees to simulate the impact of return migration on the long-run
human capital formation and on wages in the CEE sending countries. The model
may also accommodate the rather scattered evidence on the selectivity patterns of
East European returnees. The key insights are rst, that migration creates incentives
for human capital investments and second, that income premia for work experience
abroad create incentives to return and crucially inuence the selectivity of returnees.
Even under a selective migration policy regime, these two mechanisms (human capital
investments and selective return) will more than o¤set the negative e¤ects of brain
drain.
Closely related to the quantitative literature discussed above are also some rather
qualitative studies which examine the impact of return migration in selected CEE
countries. Balaz et al. (2004) andWilliams and Balaz (2005) look at return migration
to Slovakia from the UK. They nd that the initial migration decision of returnees
is motivated not only by economic considerations but by a variety of goals including
educational objectives, investments in occupational or more general skills. Return
migrants appear to acquire considerable human capital even during relatively short
stays abroad both in terms of formal qualications and skills. Their propensity to
save is high although the total volume of savings is rather limited given the short
duration of stay for the migrants included in the study. Williams and Balaz (2008)
analyse the learning process and the knowledge transfer through return migration for
Slovak medical doctors. Drawing on in-depth interviews with returnees, they reveal
the complexity of knowledge transfers to the country of origin and, consistent with
other studies, nd that international mobility continues to be a source of signicant
and distinctive learning. Klagge et al. (2007) use both quantitative (Census) data
and qualitative evidence to look at the ways in which highly skilled return migrants
contribute to economic development in Poland. They develop a model to analyse the
interaction between returneesindividual characteristics and the characteristics of the
regions migrants are returning to. They highlight the importance of the institutional
and socio-economic context in the region of origin for the successful re-integration of
return migrants. Overall, they also support the view that return migration has the
potential to contribute to knowledge-based regional development, but this depends
on local conditions and institutions.
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2.3 Comparative analysis based on EU-LFS data
2.3.1 Data and identication of returnees
For the purpose of this comparative analysis, we pool cross-sections of individuals
observed in the ten CEE countries which recently joined the EU. To ensure compa-
rability over time and across countries we included only observations for the years
2001-2007. The denition we use for return migrants is that they have to be born
in their current country of residence but resided abroad the year before the survey.
We can di¤erentiate among the countries of residence and can also control for the
citizenship of the respondents.
We restrict our sample to persons between age 20 and 60. Overall, this restricted
EU-LFS sample includes 2,429 return migrants. We excluded observation from Bul-
garia, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia, for which less than 150 returnees are
observable in the data. Besides the descriptive statistics, the models were estimated
using observations from ve CEE countries: Czech Republic (498 observed returnees
for 2002-2007), Hungary (160 observed returnees for 2002-2007), Lithuania (729 ob-
served returnees for 2001-2007), Poland (369 observed returnees for 2004-2007) and
Romania (477 observed returnees for 2005-2007).
Apart from the retrospective information on the country of residence, the EU-LFS
data set includes individual level variables on main demographic characteristics (age,
gender, marital status, the respondents level of education and his labour market
status and main job (occupational and employment status, working time, sector).
Similar information on the labour market status is also available for the year before
the survey was conducted. The available household level characteristics include the
household size, number of children and the number of employed persons in the house-
hold.
The individual income variable measures the net monthly pay from the main job in
deciles. The corresponding lower and upper boundaries from the income distribution
are provided for each country and year. The location (region) of the place of work is
included at NUTS 2 level.
There are some important aspects that need to be highlighted regarding the use of
EU-LFS data for analysing return migration. The most important one is that re-
turnees can be identied only during the rst year upon their arrival from abroad.
It is therefore not possible to analyse the re-assimilation patterns of returnees over
a longer time span. Since the probability to be included in the LFS in the rst year
after return might be lower than afterwards, it is very likely that our sub-sample of
recent returnees underestimates the actual magnitude of return ows. We therefore
avoid any projections on the aggregated level based on this data. However, given the
relatively large sample size and the random selection, the data are highly suitable
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for an analysis of selectivity patterns and the performance of return migrants in the
rst year upon return.6
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics: who are the (recent) returnees?
Some rst evidence on the group level di¤erences between non-migrants and returnees
is presented in Table 2.5. For all comparisons, it is important to bear in mind that
these results apply only to return migrants observed in the rst year after returning.
As expected, return migrants are on average more than 7 years younger than
non-migrants. This di¤erence is higher than what similar studies nd, the reason
being precisely that we observe the returnees at the moment of their return. We also
matched our data to a cross sectional draw from the 2005 EU-LFS7 and compared
returnees with migrants residing less than 5 years abroad. The comparison conrms
that returnees are younger than both the group of migrants they are selected from
and the population in the countries they are returning to. For the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Romania, we illustrate the age distribution of the three groups
in Figure 2.1. The dotted curves are the age distribution in the non-migrant popu-
lation of each country. There is only some weak evidence of bimodality in the age
distribution of returnees for Hungary and the Czech Republic. This might also be
due to the limitations in our data and the fact that we observe returnees arriving in
their source countries only at the moment of their arrival and for a given time period
around 2002-2007.
Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Hazans 2008), returnees are more likely to
be men, signicantly less likely to be married and more likely to live in single-person
households at the moment of their return when compared to non-migrants. Figure
2.2 shows also the distribution of completed years of education for non-migrants and
returnees. Returnees have on average more years of education since, similarly with
ndings of e.g. Hazans 2008 and Iara 2008, a larger proportion of them attained
medium and higher educational levels compared to non-migrants
Immediately after their return, however, migrants are almost three times more
likely not to participate on the labour market than non-migrants. Around 20% of
the returnees were not active in the rst year upon arrival. This non-participation
rate is very similar to recent ndings on return migrants in other East European
countries (see e.g. Piracha and Vadean 2009 on Albanian returnees and Hazans 2008
on Latvian returnees).
Most previous studies nd a higher propensity to become entrepreneurs or to
switch into self-employment among return migrants than among non-migrants. Sur-
6See Rendall et.al (2003) and Marti and Rodenas (2007) for more details on the advantages and
shortcomings of using EU-LFS data for research questions related to international migration.
7Hamori (2009) uses these data to analyse the employment patterns of CEE migrants in the EU.
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Variable All sample Non-migrants Returnees t-test
(1) (2) (3) di¤. (2)-(3)
Age 38.343 38.51 31.153 7.356***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.214) (0.235)
Gender (M=1) 0.539 0.538 0.577 -.038***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.01)
Marital status 0.618 0.623 0.399 .224***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.01)
Education
Low 0.153 0.154 0.105 .048***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007)
Medium 0.674 0.673 0.707 -.033***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
High 0.172 0.171 0.186 -.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007)
Unemployed 0.051 0.049 0.122 -.072***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004)
Self-employed 0.135 0.135 0.126 0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007)
Income
Low 0.336 0.338 0.167 .170***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.023)
Medium 0.403 0.406 0.208 .197***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.019) (0.024)
High 0.259 0.254 0.623 -.368***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.021)
Sector
Agriculture 0.086 0.086 0.085 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Industry 0.316 0.315 0.352 -.036***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
Services 0.436 0.438 0.36 .078***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.010)
Part time work 0.061 0.061 0.045 .016***
(if active) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Standard errors in parentheses. *** di¤erences in means are signicant at 1%.
Own estimation, data from EU-LFS ad-hoc module (2002-2007).
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Figure 2.1: Age distribution of migrants, non-migrants and returnees
prisingly, our data suggest that without controlling for other characteristics there
are no signicant di¤erences in the average rate of self-employment between non-
migrants and recent returnees in the rst year upon arrival.
The average rate of unemployment for returnees is about three times higher than
in the total population. This average value neither take into account the sorting of
returnees across regions nor the role of individual characteristics as determinants of
unemployment.
Even during their rst year back home, returnees are much more likely to be at
the higher end of the income distribution than non-migrants. More than 60% of
return migrants are in the last three deciles of the income distribution of the total
population. One plausible explanation for these higher incomes (even compared with
results from previous studies) is the self-selection of return migrants into better jobs.
We only observe wages for returnees in the rst year after arrival and not for migrants
who returned earlier or those who didnt nd jobs matching their skills in the rst
year upon return. Returnees who are already employed immediately after arrival are
likely to have arranged their positions while being abroad (or even before migrating)
and are thus able to make better use of the skills acquired abroad. Additionally,
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Figure 2.2: Compeleted years of education: non-migrants and returnees
The sectorial distribution of employment is rather similar for returnees and non-
migrants. While both groups are equally likely to be employed in agriculture, return
migrants are more likely than non-migrants to nd employment in the industrial
sector rather than in services.
Around 50% of the migrants we observe in the data were returning from three
host countries: the UK (18%), Germany (16%) and Italy (12%). These are followed
by Spain (9%) and Ireland (8%). This distribution of destinations varies, however,
across countries of origin and appears to be changing over time. Before 2004, the
main host country of returnees was Germany (19%) followed by the UK (10%) and
then by Austria, Spain and Italy (all around 5%). After 2004, the UK became the
main host country (almost 20%) followed by Germany (13%), Italy (11%), Ireland
(10%) and Spain (9%). Polish migrants were almost equally likely to return from
the UK (26%) and from Germany (23%), followed by Ireland, Italy, France and the
Netherlands (all around 7%). In Romania, more than 40% of the returnees were from
Italy, 25% from Spain, around 5% from Germany and 3% from Greece. Overall, the
distribution of host countries for returnees mimics the composition of recent migra-
tion ows. The changes over time in the sorting across host countries of migrants
who eventually return also correspond to recent migration policy changes. The UK
granted immediately free access to its labour market for the countries joining the EU
in 2004 while Italy and Spain had various bilateral agreements and regularisation
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programmes which made them attractive for Romanian migrants8.
We consider further two types of e¤ects induced by return migration. The rst
one is related to income. Basically, the question here is whether migrantsposition
is higher on the income distribution upon return than that of similar workers who
did not move for work abroad and subsequently returned. The second e¤ect refers
to occupational choices, particularly the decision to switch into self-employment. Do
return migrants have a higher propensity to be self-employed than non-migrants and
if so, how can this be explained.9
2.3.3 Income e¤ects
The income variable in the EU-LFS data provides information about the individuals
position in the income distribution (income decile). Additionally, the upper and
lower bounds of these deciles are available in the corresponding cross-sections of the
EU-LFS after 2002.
We take into account the endogeneity of return migration in two alternative ways:
(i) using only the income deciles as categorical indicators and (ii) using also the
actual values of the boundaries of the income deciles. For the latter, we reconstruct
the income distribution with an interval regression technique and use the predicted
income in a treatment e¤ects model. For the former, we allow for endogenous return
migration in a bivariate ordered probability model. This can be derived from a latent
model with two variables determined by:
yi = 
0
iXi + mi + "inc (2.1)
mi =  iZi + "mig (2.2)
In (1) yi is the unobserved (continuous) income and i a vector of unknown para-
meters corresponding to human capital characteristics which determine the individual
income of i. The categorical income (decile) is observed such that:
yi =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if yi  b1
2 if b1 < yi  b2
...
10 if b9 < yi
; (2.3)
where the cut-o¤s bi are boundaries of the corresponding income deciles.
8See Elrick and Ciobanu (2009) on the mediated impact of bilateral agreements on recent mi-
gration between Romania ans Spain.
9See e.g. Hazans (2008), Wahba and Zenou (2008) and Tunali (1986, 1996) for a more general
discussion.
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The error terms are normally distributed and the two decisions are allowed to be
correlated: corr ("inc; "mig) = inc 6= 0
The return decision follows a latent index10 mi and we observe returnees if: and
we observe returnees if:
mi = ( iZi + "mig > 0) =
(
1 for returnees, i.e.: mi > 0
0 for non-migrants, i.e.: mi  0
; (2.4)
where  is a parameter vector corresponding to those individual characteristics
Zi which a¤ect the utility derived by individual i from working abroad and subse-
quently returning. We estimated this model as bivariate ordered probit (maximum
likelihood method).They only available variables which we can use to identify the
model are household characteristics and regional variables which do not a¤ect wages
upon return. We use the marital status and the household composition since these
variables a¤ect participation but not the level of wages (if observed). For Poland and
Romania we can also use the lagged ows of return migrants at county level cumu-
lated at county level over ve years before the time at which our data were collected.
Since migrants return mostly to their regions of origin, these lagged migration ows
are good predictors of subsequent return migration and unlikely to be correlated to
the wages of returnees.
We can also use the corresponding bounds of the income deciles to estimate
interval regressions with a dummy variable indicating the migration status. The
coe¢ cient of this dummy variable is biased since individuals do not randomly self-
select into return. In order to correct this bias we estimated two step treatment
regressions using the same exclusion restrictions as before.
Some prima facie evidence on the pecuniary returns to work experience abroad
can be obtained from ordered univariate probability models estimated using income
deciles from EU-LFS. In all specications these ordered models yield coe¢ cients of
returnee dummies which are positive and highly signicant (at the 1% level) for
all countries. Holding all other relevant characteristics constant, returnees are in a
higher income decile than comparable non-migrants.
If return migration is endogenous to the probability of being in a higher income
decile, these coe¢ cients are biased. As discussed above, we correct this bias by
estimating the joint probability distribution of the ordered income variable (deciles)
and of return migration11. In order to identify the model we use marital status, the
household composition and the lagged migration ows at county level as predictors
in the migration equation but not in the wage equation.
10 i.e. the underlying unobserved propensity to migrate and subsequently return to the home
country.
11See Sajaia (2008) for details on the Stata routine applied.
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Keeping these limitations in mind, our results conrm that the income and the return
migration equations (estimated for each country using a bivariate ordered model) are
negatively correlated ( < 0) for the two Baltic countries and positively correlated
( > 0) for the other countries.
Table 2.6 reports the results of 2SLS regressions in which we use the information
on the boundaries of income deciles available in the EU-LFS - which enables us to
run an interval regression12. As before, the only variables we can use as exclusion
restrictions are the two household characteristics (martial status and composition)
and the lagged migration ows at county level. Consistent with the estimates based
on income deciles only, the coe¢ cients of the returnee dummies are signicant and
positive for all countries. The dependent variable in the models reported in table
2.6 is the log of the observed wage for non-migrants and returnees. The magnitude
of the coe¢ cients of migration status imply that returnees earn on average a wage
premia of about 10 to 30 per cent.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The signs for both the coe¢ cients and the correlation of the wage and return
equations are similar with those in the estimation based on income deciles only:
 > 0 for Poland, Hungary and Romania, whereas  < 0 for Lithuania. In the context
of the Roy-model of self-selection, this is an indicator that in Lithuania returnees
expected wages are lowered by their unobservable characteristics. If return migrants
had decided not to move their earnings would have been lower than that of a randomly
selected non-migrant. The corrected wage premium for work experience abroad is
above 40 per cent, higher than most other results from the literature. This can be
explained by the fact than recent returnees might have much better unobservable
characteristics than migrants who returned previously. However, our data do not
allow more insights into the factors explaining this selection.
For the other countries, return migrants are positively selected in terms of unob-
servables. Since the dependent variable is log wages the coe¢ cients of the migration
dummy in the wage equation mean that returnees obtain wage premia between 10
and 40 per cent. This is in line with the range of estimates in the previous literature
and could maybe provide an indication of the lower and upper bounds of the true
e¤ect of work experience abroad on performance upon return.
2.3.4 Occupational choices
A second possible e¤ect of return migration on the labour market performance of
returnees concerns their choice between non-participation, self-employment or de-
pendent employment. In order to analyse this e¤ect we rst estimate a multinomial
model of occupational choices in which we consider return migration as a purely
exogenous decision. We introduce then the residuals from a separately estimated mi-
gration equation into the same multinomial model. Since these are signicant only
for the self-employment decision, we estimate a recursive bivariate choice model in
order to account for the simultaneity of the two decisions: i.e. to be self-employed
and to be a return migrant.
The estimated model assumes that the decision to become self-employed is follow-
ing a latent index function which includes return migration as an endogenous dummy




iXi + mi + "self (2.5)
with the rule for observing the actual decision given by:
si = (
0
iXi + mi + "self > 0) =
(
1 for self-employed, i.e.: si  0
0 for non-self-employed, i.e.: si < 0
; (2.6)
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Return migration is observed like in (4). There are thus four possible outcomes
of this decision process13: (i) the individual decides to migrate, return and be self-
employed upon return (i.e.si = 1;mi = 1), (ii) the individual decides not to migrate
but to be self-employed (i.e.si = 1;mi = 0), (iii) the individual decides to migrate
but not to be self-employed upon return (i.e.si = 0;mi = 1), and (iv) the individual
decides not to migrate and also not to be self-employed (i.e. si = 0;mi = 0).We
treat the two decisions si and mi as endogenous with E ["self ] = E ["mig] = 0 and
correlated with coe¢ cient corr ("self ; "mig) = self 6= 0.
We need to highlight two aspects related to these choices: one is the so called
"parking lot" hypothesis, the other is unemployment. For the latter, we estimate
additional probit models on the determinants of unemployment but the results do not
change. However, using the EU-LFS data we could not identify credible instruments
to adjust for the unobserved heterogeneity of return migrants. In the context of return
migration, the "parking lot" hypothesis (based on Harris-Todaro types of models)
suggests that returnees might spend only a limited time upon their return in small
scale entrepreneurial activities or (informal) self-employment before nding a way
to enter formal employment (Piracha and Vadean 2010). However, this hypothesis
cannot be tested using the EU-LFS data because we observe returnees at only one
point in time.
To obtain the e¤ects of return migration on occupational choices we estimate
multinomial logit models assuming rst that return migration is exogenous for the
choice over non-participation, self-employment, and dependent employment. The
results show that after controlling for all relevant individual characteristics return
migrants are more likely not to participate in the labour market or to be self-employed
rather than employees. We included only a dummy for being a return migrant without
controlling for the migration decision. Most other variables have the expected e¤ect:
men are more likely than women to participate in the labour market and more likely to
be self-employed rather than employees; persons with higher educational attainment
are more likely to participate in the labour market but less likely to be self-employed.
As already mentioned above, if non-migrants and returnees are di¤erent in unob-
served variables, ", as well as in the variables we observe, x, and if " a¤ects also the
occupational choices upon return, the di¤erences in occupations between migrants
and returnees cannot be attributed to the work experience abroad. The di¤erences in
x between non-migrants and returnees that cause overt bias can be removed with the
multinomial models. One way to deal with the hidden bias due to di¤erences in ", is
to use an extra regressor in the occupational choice equation. This extra regressor is
called "selection-correction term" and is a function of covariates with some exclusion
restrictions: some of its components are excluded from the response (occupational
13These are not necessarily either-or choices, but our data allows only exclusionary identication.
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choice) equation. In our case, these exclusion restrictions are not strictly necessary
since we use non linear models. But without them we cannot separate the selection
bias from the non-linear components of the regression function. This procedure is
called "control function". Using this set-up., we test for the endogeneity of migration
for occupational choices by including the residuals of the migration equation (from
2.4) in the multinomial model.14 We exclude the lagged rates of returnees at regional
(county) level from the occupational choices. As in Wahba and Zenou (2008), we ar-
gue that these past migration rates do not plausibly a¤ect individual level occupation
choices - which depend on individual migration experiences and labour market con-
ditions. The residuals from 2.4 are signicant only for the self-employment decision.
For the self-employment decision, we account for the endogeneity of migration by
estimating a bivariate probit model with the same specication. This model allows
the two decisions (return migration and self-employment) to be correlated. The self-
employment equation is identied by the information on the work status of other
household members and by excluding the lag of the return migration rate at county
level from the migration equation. Keeping the caveats of the identication strategy
in mind, we nd that after controlling for endogeneity in this way returnees are less
likely to switch into self-employment than non-migrants. This result is stable across
countries and to an alternative specication using the same exclusion restrictions but
modeling the two decisions as linear probability models.
This result is in line with the ndings of Wahba and Zenou (2008) on Egyptian
returnees. They develop a theoretical search model to accommodate the e¤ect of re-
turn migration on entrepreneurial decisions. Their main argument is that temporary
work abroad is an opportunity to accumulate human and physical capital but may
lead to a loss of social capital back home which makes it more di¢ cult to become
self-employed.
Table 2.7 reports for each country the results of two specications of multinomial
logit models estimated on the determinants of unemployment, inactivity and employ-
ment: (1) without, and (2) including regional dummies. The higher unemployment
rate among returnees is not fully explained by their individual characteristics. How-
ever, after controlling for the regions of residence, the returnee dummy turns negative
or insignicant. Migrants are thus sorted across regions where they are not able to
nd employment in the rst year after arrival. The clustering of returnees into spe-
cic regions, even though these are experiencing high unemployment rates, can be
due to specic network ties within the home communities. It also endorses the hy-
pothesis of non- pecuniary returns to work experience abroad. Our EU-LFS variables
do not allow the identication of credible instruments to adjust these results for the
unobserved heterogeneity of returnees.
14The generalized probit residuals were calculated following Gourieroux et al. (1987).
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The results indicate that, other things being equal, higher educated returnees are
less likely to be unemployed. Older recent returnees, who might have gained more
labour market experience, are also less likely to be unemployed in the rst year upon
arrival. The same holds for married compared to single migrants and for female
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter presents new evidence on how work experience abroad a¤ects the labour
market performance of return migrants in CEE countries. We focused on e¤ects for
occupational choices and for the labour income upon arrival in the home country.
Pooled cross-sections extracted from the EU-LFS allowed us to conduct the empirical
analysis from a cross-national perspective. The EU-LFS includes a question on place
of residence one year before which enabled us to identify a sample of about 2,500
recent returnees across 7 countries for the period 2002-2007.
In terms of observable characteristics we nd that return migrants are positively
selected in most countries included in our analysis. At the time of return they are
younger both compared to non-migrants and to the recent migrants still residing
abroad. Apart from Romania, all countries seem to attract returnees who attained
more years of formal education than non-migrants.
Consistent with previous (country-specic) results from the empirical literature,
our cross-country estimates show that returnees receive signicant income premia
both from self-employment and from dependent employment. At the same time the
results suggest that being exposed to work abroad increases the propensity of mi-
grants to either not participate in the labour market or to switch into self-employment
upon return.
With regard to the selectivity on unobservables the evidence is rather mixed.
While this appears to be negative when estimating the individual income e¤ects it
turns out positive for the decision to switch into self-employment.
Both results conrm other empirical and theoretical ndings on the performance
and occupational choices of return migrants. The intuition behind is that migrants
lack characteristics which are valued on the home labour market (like e.g. network
ties and specic labour market experience and local human capital) and posses others
which make them prone to become self-employed (like e.g. entrepreneurial skills and
risk proclivity).
At this point it is still very early to draw wider conclusions from the analysis.
The fact that return migrants can expect a reward for their temporary migration
decision in the form of a higher income after they return tends to make it more
attractive for potential migrants to leave their home country temporarily and to
return after a certain period abroad. In other words, it would tend to enhance the
relative attractiveness of temporary migration as opposed to permanent migration.
It would also suggest that migrants have a stronger incentive to return once the
economic outlook in the host countries worsens relative to the situation in the home
country. A thorough investigation of important issues related to return migration
such as its impact on the human capital stock of the home country and - possibly
- the enhancement of the entrepreneurial base by increasing the number of self-
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employed in the workforce would require a more detailed investigation as regards the
professional development of return migrants after their return to the home country.
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Chapter 3
Selection of migrants and
returnees: evidence from Romania
Chapter 2 presented cross-country evidence, based on both aggregate and individ-
ual level data, to attest the importance of return migration for Eastern European
countries. We found that in most CEE countries the share of return migrants in the
working age population is between 6 and 13 per cent. To grasp the likely impact of
this return migration on CEE countries it is crucial to understand the selection of
migrants and returnees. We do this for the case of Romania.
In this chapter we use census and survey data to analyse the selection of Ro-
manian migrants across destination countries as well as into return migration. We
characterise the skills of migrants to determine if their migration (and return) choices
are consistent with the predictions of the human capital (Roy) model of migration.
We construct measures of selection across skill groups and estimate the average
and the skill-specic premium for migration and return for three typical destinations
of Romanian migrants after 1990. Once we account for migration costs, we nd
evidence that the selection and sorting of migrants is driven by di¤erent returns to
skills in countries of destination. Our identication strategy for the e¤ects of work
experience abroad permits a cautious causal interpretation of the premium to return
migration. This premium increases with migrants skills and drives the positive
selection of returnees relative to non-migrants. Based on the compatibility of the
results with rationality in the migration decisions, we simulate a rational-agent model
of education, migration and return. Our results suggest that for a source country
like Romania relatively high rates of temporary migration might be associated with
positive long-run e¤ects on average skills and wages.
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3.1 Introduction
For countries of origin, a positive selection of migrants and returnees, in terms of
their skills, may represent both a challenge (risk of brain drain) and an opportunity
(incentives for learning and improvement of skills). Did the increased mobility of
Eastern Europeans in the 90s harm their countries of origin? How did migration
and return contribute to the productivity and income of workers? What will be the
consequences of further increases in labour outow due to the freedom of movement
in the EU? This chapter addresses these questions. We quantify the size and selec-
tion (on observable characteristics) of migration and return for the case of Romania
and we analyze the consequences of international mobility on its levels of wages
and productive skills. Being the second most populous country in Eastern Europe
(after Poland) and having migrants in several destination countries, Romania is an
interesting case also because of the signicant rate of return migration.
We combine census and large survey data to identify Romanian migrants in three
main destination countries (Table 1.2 in the introduction provides an overview of the
collated individual level data for this thesis). We match this information with micro-
data on non-migrants and returnees in Romania. The three destination countries are
Spain, Austria and the US. We chose these countries because, as explained in section
3.2, they span very well the di¤erent ranges of institutions and labour market types
across the favoured destinations of migrants from Romania and other CEECs. For
these countries, we use census data (2000-2001) as well as data from the EU-Survey
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for Austria and Spain, and from the
National Demographic Survey (NDS) of Romania (2003). Our data set provides a
picture of the relative size and relative characteristics (including earned wages) of the
cross-section (circa 2002) of individuals born in Romania in three di¤erent groups:
those who have always resided in Romania (non-migrants), those who migrated and
returned (returnees), and those who live abroad (migrants) specically in the US,
Austria or Spain.
Our results suggest that migration choices are responsive to economic incentives:
workers in specic skill cells (dened by education, age and gender) migrate in larger
shares to countries which pay higher wage premia for those skill cells. We observe
that Romanian migrants to the US are positively selected because the wage premium
of migrating to the US is much higher for the high skill-cells (in terms of wage earning
ability). In contrast, Romanian migrants to Spain are more likely to come from low-
skill cells, as the wage premium of migrating to Spain is larger for low skilled than
for high skilled-cells. Austria exhibits a migration premium neutral to skill level.
This rationality of migration is consistent with other ndings for CEE migrants (e.g.
Budnik 2009). Romanian returnees are positively selected on observables and this
also supports the other nding of a higher return premium for highly skilled. As we
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have a richer set of variables for returnees, we also provide evidence that selection of
returnees on unobserved characteristics seems to be negative. Hence, our estimate of
the return premium can be viewed as a lower-bound of the actual return premium.
These estimation results are consistent with rational choice. In the last section of
this chapter we use a model of schooling, migration and return, developed previously
byMayr and Peri (2009) to evaluate the aggregate (skill and wage) e¤ects of migration
for Romania. In order to quantify these e¤ects, we use the estimated return premium
and the observed scale of return-migration. We adapt the parameters to the case of
Romania to obtain the long-run impact of increased mobility, accounting both for
return migration and for the indirect e¤ects from incentives on schooling.
The next section 3.2 presents some stylized facts of migration and return for Ro-
mania and other CEECs during the early 2000s. Section 3.3 describes the individual
level data and the measures of average selection and average premium we use in the
analysis. Section 3.4 presents our estimates for selection and return premia. Section
3.5 shows empirical evidence of the relation between migration frequency and premia
across skill groups. Section 3.6 uses some of our estimates and the empirical moments
in a model to simulate the long-run e¤ects of further relaxing migration constraints
for Romania on average skills and wages. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Stylized facts of temporary migration fromRo-
mania
In the period immediately after the regime change and the opening of the borders in
1989, migration from Romania was rst characterised by mass emigration of ethnic
minorities (German and Hungarian). However, by the mid 1990s a new pattern of
labour migration to various European and overseas destinations emerged. Labour
outows increased steadily against the background of a slow pace of economic re-
structuring which resulted in a large decline in GDP, high ination, mass layo¤s,
decreasing real wages and rising unemployment (Earle and Pauna 1996, 1998). De-
industrialization led to a decrease of industrial employment by almost 3 million jobs
and particularly a¤ected younger and older workers, who were less likely to nd new
employment opportunities (Voicu 2005).
Based on evidence gathered from previous studies (e.g. Diminescu and L¼az¼aroiu
2002, Baldwin-Edwards 2007) we argue that the destination countries can be grouped
in three main categories with respect to the type of selection of Romanian migrants
compared to non-migrants1. First, a strictly positive selection seems to characterise
1We use sorting and selection in a similar way in this chapter. However, when we discuss sorting
we mainly compare migrants to specic destinations to the overall pool of migrants leaving Romania
in a given period. When we discuss the selection patterns we compare migrants from Romania with
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Figure 3.1: Sorting of Romanian migrants across destinations, by education. The
data are based individual level records from administrative registers.
migration ows to traditional immigration countries (US, Canada, Australia). These
ows were rather small but persistent and included a signicant share of young people
who migrate for educational purposes (Diminescu 2003). In the early 2000s, the US
was among the main countries from where migrants returned and settled back in
Romania (OECD 2008). A second group of destination countries were characterised
by a neutral average selection of migration from Romania. These were the continental
European countries which received most of the Eastern European migrants over the
1990s: Germany, Austria and France (Sandu et al. 2006; Diminescu 2003). Third,
particularly towards the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s, large ows of Romanian
migrants arrived in Mediterranean countries, manly in Spain and Italy, but also, to
a lesser extent, in Portugal and Greece (Sandu et al. 2006, Diminescu and L¼az¼aroiu
2002). These ows were characterised by a negative selection. Compared to non-
migrants, most migrants were less skilled, already had a longer migration history,
often involving informal or illegal employment spells, and made use of network ties
established in their communities of origin (Elrick and Ciobanu 2009; S¸erban and
Voicu 2010).
One drawback of these previous studies is that they only use aggregate data or
qualitative evidence. However, to substantiate our hypothesized typology of desti-
nation countries we exploit (besides the census and survey data described in section
3.3) also administrative data on Romanian migrants who registered a change in res-
non-migrants (stayers).
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Primary completed 0.034 0.016
No degree completed 0.015 0.039
Note: Own calculations based on micro NDS data (rst column) and
aggregate data from Docquier and Marfouk (2006) (second column).
Table 3.1: Migrants and returnees in Romania by education
idence abroad. These data cover records for more than 95,000 migrants who left
Romania in the period 1995-2001,2 including information on their individual char-
acteristics and their choice of destination. Using these data, Figure 3.1 shows the
sorting of Romanian migrants by education across the main countries of destination.
The vertical axis measures the ratio between the fraction of tertiary educated among
migrants towards specic destinations to the same fraction among non-migrants in
Romania. The results conrm the described selection pattern in terms of the typology
of destination countries for Romanian migrants.
For the period 2002-2003, we also construct a measure of the stock of Romanian
migrants in OECD countries and a measure of returnees, both as shares of the total
population in Romania. Moreover,we characterise the distribution of migrants resid-
ing in OECD countries (using data fromDocquier andMarfouk 2006) and of returnees
(using microdata from the NDS 2003) by education. These data are summarized in
Table 3.1. The results indicate that both migrants and returnees are positively se-
lected over the education variable, relative to the total population. The share of
returnees is smallest in the group of people with no degree (and for migrants among
those with primary education) while it is largest among those with tertiary education
(similarly for migrants). The selection of migrants seems even more skewed towards
the highly educated relative to returnees. However, these aggregate data hide the
already mentioned considerable variation in the selection patterns across destination
countries. Neither the administrative data, nor the evidence collated in previous
studies can be used to identify the underlying factors that explain this variation.
2Due to the data collection process, the records are reliable and representative only for this period.
We were therefore not able to include other years in our cross-tabulations based on individual level
records. We thank Mr. Dorel Gheorghiu (National Institute of Statistics, Bucharest) for providing
access and valuable insights on these data.
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Matching the NDS data to census data we are able to identify Romanian mi-
grants in three of the main destination countries: the US, Spain and Austria. These
countries span very well the type of destination countries for Romanian migrants,
each of them corresponding to one of the three selection patterns described above.
The US belongs to the group of countries receiving positively selected migrant from
Romania, being an Anglo-Saxon country with high returns to skills and relatively
unregulated labour markets. Austria is a continental-European country (similar to
Germany) with more regulation in the labour markets, lower skill compensation, re-
strictive immigration policies and receiving on average neutrally selected Romanian
migrants. Spain (along with Italy) received a large number of negatively selected Ro-
manian migrants and has a rather regulated labour market, with a high concentration
of unskilled jobs in construction and manufacturing and thus low skill premia. Our
analysis based on individual data will characterise into more detail the features of
selection for both migrants and returnees. It will relate these to skill-specic premia
in order to test if economic rationality is consistent with the observed selection and
sorting of Romanian migrants across destinations.
3.3 Data and methodology
Following the literature on selection of migrants (e.g. Chiquiar and Hanson 2005,
Fernandez-Huertas Moraga 2011) we rst characterise the distribution of non-migrants,
migrants and returnees based on their combination of observable characteristics. We
group individuals into cells to estimate their wage-earning ability and their probabil-
ity of employment (in Romania). We call the wage-earning ability the skill of that
group of workers. For each cell, we count non-migrants, returnees and migrants to
the US, Austria and Spain to determine how these groups compare to each other
in their distribution across skills. We dene the selection of migrants (positive or
negative) as the di¤erence in average skills between migrants and non-migrants. We
assess then if the likelihood of selecting oneself into a group (non-migrants, migrants
or returnees) is systematically related to skills.
Our data include wages by each skill cell, both for Romanian migrants (in the US,
Austria and Spain) and for non-migrants and returnees (in Romania). We can there-
fore calculate the average and the skill-specic premium to migrate and to return.
Using a simple regression analysis (by skill), we can relate the probability (frequency)
of migration/return to the corresponding skill-specic premium. Accounting for the
fact that the costs of migration may vary by skill, this allows us to investigate the eco-
nomic rationality of migration and return. This is a simple modication of the Roy
(1951) model to measure selection in many skill groups and to estimate the migration
premia with di¤erent selection rules, for returnees and permanent migrants.
50
We describe the individual data and the skill structure in section 3.3.1. Section
3.3.2 discusses in detail the measures of average selection on observables. In section
3.3.3 we provide some empirical evidence regarding the potential selection of returnees
on unobservables. The construction of the average and skill-specic migration and
return premium is described in section 3.3.4. Section 3.3.5 then presents the model
that we use in our econometric analysis of the determinants of selection.
3.3.1 Individual data and wage decomposition
We match information from census data (for employment) and population surveys
(for wages) to analyze the characteristics of three groups of Romanian workers around
the year 2003: non-migrants, migrants and returnees.
The data for Romania are from the National Demographic Survey (NDS 2003),
as well as from the Census 2002. The NDS data were collected by the Center for
Regional and Urban Sociology (CURS) and were designed to be representative both
at the national and regional level. Our restricted sample has more than 35,000
observations, including 1,400 returnees (dened as those who had spells of at least
six months of employment abroad), and covers all relevant individual characteristics
besides information on migration choices3. We use census and income surveys for the
three destination countries. For the US, we construct employment, population and
average monthly wage data on Romanian migrants by observable characteristics using
the 2000 Census. For Spain, we use the 2002 Census for employment and population
data on Romanian immigrants and the EU-SILC (2004) for average monthly wage
data. For Austria, we use the 2001 Census for employment and population data
on Romanian immigrants and the EU-SILC (2004) for the average monthly wage
data. We convert all wages into 2003 US$ and we consider that database as a cross
section of Romanian individuals circa 2003, either resident in Romania (non movers
or returnees) or resident in the US, Austria or Spain. We restrict our sample to
individuals between 15 and 65 years of age.
In the constructed data set we observe for each individual i a vector of charac-
teristics Xi and his migration status, i.e. non-migrant in Romania (NM), migrant
residing in a destination country c (Mc), or returnee (R) in Romania after an em-
ployment spell abroad. Following Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), the vector X includes
four relevant characteristics dened by the following categorical variables: education
(Edu), with the categories No Degree, Primary, Secondary and Tertiary; age (Age);
taking ten values from 15 to 65 in 5 years intervals; gender (Gen), with the two
categories M and F ; and family-size (Fam); with four categories: Single with no
children, Married with no children, Single with Children and Married with Children.
3The constructed dataset and the used sources are listed in Table A1 of the appendix.
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These characteristics identify the observable features of an individual in our data
set. We use the notation xi = (Edui; Agei; Geni; Fami) 2 X to denote the vector
of characteristics of individual i. We allow for the fully saturated model in observ-
able characteristics, so individuals can be put in one of 320 cells spanned by xi (=
4 education by 10 age by 2 gender by 4 family groups). Each individual also has a
"migration status" ki attached to herself as she can be a non-migrant in Romania,
a migrant residing in country c (US, Spain or Austria) or a returnee, hence ki 2
fNM;MUS;MAUT ;MSPA; Rg: Our data set also allows us to actually observe (for
Romania and US) or to impute (for Spain and Austria) based on their occupation
and industry, the wage of each individual wi4. The wages for Romanian migrants
in Austria and Spain are imputed using the information we have from EU-SILC on
native workers. For the EU-SILC, Austria uses a random sample of addresses, the
sampling units are dwellings registered in the Central Residence Register (ZMR, Zen-
trales Melderegister). All households and individuals for the sampled addresses are
interviewed. The Spanish SILC is an annual survey with a rotational-group design.
The sample comprises four independent sub-samples, each of which is drawn accord-
ing to a stratication based on Census sections. For Austria we have about 4,500
households and 8,750 individuals and for Spain 7,250 households and 16,000 individ-
uals. I also explain what we meant by using occupations and industry. If Romanian
migrants face a "wage penalty" compared to natives with similar levels of education,
our imputation might overestimate their wages. However, this does not change the
interpretation of our results. we can treat our estimated selection measures for these
countries as upper bounds and we still nd a negative and respectively a neutral
selection of Romanian migrants to Spain and Austria.
We decompose the log wage of individual i working in country j into four com-
ponents as follows:
ln(wij) = lnw(xi) + ln pj(xi) + I(ki = R)  ln rj(xi) + "ij (3.1)
The term lnw(xi) is the mapping from individual observable characteristics xi
into log wages in Romania (2003). Our measures of wage-earning abilities and the
corresponding wage premia are conceptually equivalent to those used e.g. by Borjas
(2001) and Dustmann et al (2010). But we apply them in a di¤erent context. We are
neither looking at interregional arbitrage via labour mobility nor interested in the
direction of causality between migration and wages. Assuming that the observable
4As we do not observe individual wages in the Spanish and Austrian census (and the EU-SILC is
too small to have representative wages for Romanian migrants in Austria and Spain), we attribute
the average wage based on occupation-industry (from the respective population surveys). The basic
idea is that observable characteristics a¤ect the type of occupation-industry in which a person works
and the wage is determined by those attributes. In the rest of the paper we will call individual wages
the wages constructed following this procedure for residents in Austria and Spain. For residents of
Romania and the US we have the actual individual wages.
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characteristics xi are the main determinants of wage-earning abilities of individuals,
the function lnw(xi) translates the characteristics into a wage earning potential in
Romania. The term ln pj(xi) is the migration premium (or "location" premium as
dened by Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett 2008). It represents the extra wage (in
log points) obtained by individual i from working in country j as migrant: The base
country, Romania, will be identied as j = 0 and we set, by denition, ln p0(xi) = 0.
We allow this premium to vary with individual characteristics across skill groups.
The term ln rj(xi) is the "return" premium. It is the premium (positive or negative)
from being a returnee (ki = R) relative to being a non-migrant NM . Finally, "ij are
the idiosyncratic e¤ects on the earning abilities of individual i in country j, which we
rst assume to have zero-mean in each cell xi of the setX and to be uncorrelated with
xi, E("ij=xi) = 0: Unobservable wage-earning characteristics of individuals within an
observable skill-cell x are thus assumed to be independent and identically distributed
with zero average. However, we will discuss later the possibility of non-random
unobservable characteristics and its implications for selection issues.
3.3.2 Measures of selection
Our goal is to dene two sets of concepts that are crucial to characterise the process
of migration and return and, in an economic theory of migration, should be related
to each other. The rst set of concepts are the selection of migrants (relative to
non-migrants) and the selection of returnees (relative to non-migrants) along the
wage-earning ability (skill) dimension. Are migrants (and returnees) selected, on
average, among individuals with higher earning abilities (positive selection) or lower
earning abilities (negative selection) than the average non-migrants? We will primar-
ily characterise the selection of migrants along the observable wage-earning abilities,
following the argumentation in Hartog and Winkelmann (2003) against correcting
for selectivity when the sample of migrants is small relative to the sample of non-
migrants. We will however discuss, in light of the existing literature, what may be the
selection of migrants along unobservable skills and how it may a¤ect our ndings. For
returnees, as we have a richer set of variables for them, we will use some identifying
assumptions to distinguish selection on unobservables from the return premium.
The second set of concepts to be measured are the "premia" from making a
migration decision; in particular the premium for being a "migrant" and that for
being a "returnee". For given observable characteristics (hence accounting for wage-
earning ability selection) migrants should earn more than non-migrants. This would
be needed to justify the paying of migration costs in any economically motivated
theory of migration. However, how does this premium vary with skills and country
of destination? We allow the returns to skills to vary across countries. Even more
interesting would be to know if, for given observable skills, returnees earn more or less
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than non-migrants. If there is a premium for returnees, then temporary migration
has a permanent positive e¤ect on earning abilities. Hence migration and return
can be part of a strategy to increase the living standards and returnees are not, on
average, those who failed abroad. Like for the migration premium, it is also very
relevant to understand whether the return premium depends (and how) on skills.
Let us dene, in turn, the formulas to obtain each of these terms: the average
selection of migrants and returnees on observables and the average premium for
migrants and returnees, as well as their dependence on observable skill. We assume
throughout this chapter that migrants make the decision to migrate and return at
the start of the process and dont change their mind once they are in the destination
country.
Average Selection
The average (logarithmic) wage-earning ability of a non-migrant (NM) with ob-
servable characteristics x; call it ln bw(x); is summarized by the average individ-




lnwi;NM where NMx is the observed total employment in cell x: The
variable ln bw(x) can be called (wage-earning) skill of group x. The average observed
skill of the non-migrants in Romania ("country 0"), corresponds therefore to their





The term fNM(x) = NMx=
X
z2X
NMz is the observed relative frequency of non-
migrant workers, NM in cell x: If, conditional on x; the idiosyncratic wage residuals




p ! 0; then with a large enough
sample, such as the census, the value ln bw(x) calculated from the sample would con-
verge to lnw(xi). In order to identify how migrants compare to non-migrants in their
observable skills (wage earning abilities) we construct the counter-factual wage dis-
tribution based on the observable characteristics of migrants and the corresponding
observed wage of non-migrants for each cell x. In particular we dene the average





The term fMc(x) =Mcx=
X
z2X
Mcz is the relative frequency of migrants to country
c, Mc; observed from the census of country c: This method accounts in a fully non
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parametric way for the fact that migrants are non-randomly selected from the original
population and uses the relative frequencies of migrants to non-migrants in each skill-
cell to correct for this. Moreover, the di¤erences in wage earning abilities (skills)
between migrants and non-migrants are evaluated at home wages, assigning thus to
each skill its domestic price (in Romania).
Similarly, to identify how returnees to Romania compare to non-migrants we
construct the average wage-earning ability of returnees, based on the observable





Analogous to (3.3) the term fR(x) = Rx=
X
z2X
Rz is the relative frequency of
returnees in skill cell x. Given the denitions provided above, we dene the average
"selection"(S) based on observables (O) of migrants to country c, relative to non-
migrants as:
OSMc;NM = lnwMc;0   lnwNM;0 (3.5)
If expression (3.5) is positive, migrants to country c are selected on average with
wage-earning observable characteristics above the average for non-migrants. This
is exactly the denition of positive selection. Vice-versa, if it is negative, migrants
to country c are selected, on average, below the average wage-earning ability of
non-migrants. Moreover, quantitatively, as the expression is in log di¤erences, it
approximates the di¤erence in wage earning abilities as a percentage of the average
non-migrant wage. Similarly, we dene the selection of returnees (on observables)
relative to non-migrants as:
OSR;NM = lnwR;0   lnwNM;0 (3.6)
Like above, a value of OSR;NM > 0 implies a positive selection of returnees relative
to people who did not migrate.
There are two issues that may bias the selection of migrants and returnees accord-
ing to observable characteristics, produced by (3.5)-(3.6). Those biases may produce
the appearance of positive or negative selection when there is none or vice versa. The
rst issue is that for given observable characteristics participation rates into employ-
ment in Romania may be systematically di¤erent from participation in the labour
market of country c: The second is that there may be unobserved characteristics cor-
related with the x (hence not random and not zero-mean within group x) and those
may di¤er between migrants and non-migrants. We will discuss them in turn.
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Participation into employment and observable characteristics
The rate of participation into employment for a group with characteristics x can
be di¤erent at home and abroad. It is easy to think that if a skill group x is paid
a higher wage in a country this may attract workers of that skill and push a larger
fraction of them to work. This may a¤ect the calculated skill selection, if we base our
evaluation of formulas (3.5) to (3.6) on employment data. For instance, if migrants
to country c have characteristics that are identical to non-migrants but, once in the
labour market of country c, their participation to employment is relatively larger
in the high wage-potential groups compared to their participation in Romania, the
method above will produce the appearance of positive selection, when there is in
fact no selection. Had those migrants stayed in Romania, they would have earned,
on average, as much as non-migrants. To avoid this problem, we should correct
the relative frequency of migrants in constructing their average wage earning ability
lnwMc;0: In particular, rather than the frequency of characteristic x in employment
we should use its frequency in the population of migrants and correct those population
frequencies by the participation rates of each group x in Romania. Such correction
allows us to compare the average wage-earning ability of migrants, had they stayed
in Romania, with that of non-movers. Formally we can dene the "participation-




ln bw(x)fPARTOMc (x) (3.7)











x is the total population
(rather than workers only) with characteristic x who migrated to country c, while
0x is the employment-population ratio for workers of characteristic x in Romania
(0x = NMx=NM
POP
x ): We will use the empirical participation rate of non-migrants
in each cell from the Romanian Census 2002 as a non-parametric estimate of 0x,
and the data on the population McPOPx of migrants in group x in country c from
the Census of country c: The "double selection" into migration and into employment
that is considered in many recent papers (e.g. Chiquiar and Hanson 2005, Fernandez-
Huerta Moraga 2008, Piracha and Vadean 2009) is addressed here in a completely
non-parametric way. Assuming that we have identied the relevant observable char-
acteristics that determine the probability of migrating and of participating into the
labour force, we use a fully non-parametric relation between those and the migration
probability, and between those and participation at home, to identify the selection
on wage-earning abilities. In particular, the variable:
OSPART0Mc;NM = lnw
PART0
Mc;0   lnwNM;0 (3.8)
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identies the di¤erence in wage-earning ability of migrants had they remained at
home relative to the wage-earning abilities of non-migrants. This is the cleanest
comparison possible to identify the type of migrant selection on observable wage-
earning abilities. Similarly, we can correct the skill selection of returnees by imputing
to them the employment-population ratio of non-migrants.
Unobservable characteristics
The unobservable individual characteristics denoted as "ij in expression (3.1) have
been assumed to be uncorrelated with x so that E("ij=x) = 0: However, it is possible
that some unobservable characteristics are correlated with x so that E("ij=x) = g(x):
For instance, if unobserved wage-earning abilities are larger, on average, for groups
with larger observable wage earning ability, then g(x) can be systematically positively




converge in probability to 0 and hence cannot be approximated to 0 using the Census
sample. In fact, if di¤erent selection processes operate on the unobservable charac-
teristics it may even be possible that: E("Mcio =x) = g
Mc(x) 6= E("NMio =x) = gNM(x)
which means the conditional average of unobservable wage earning ability for a group
x is di¤erent between migrants and non-migrants.
This departure from the original assumptions implies that the total average skill
selection indicator SMc;NM will equal:
SMc;NM = OSMc;NM + USMc;NM = (3.9)







where the term OSMc;NM is constructed as in expression (3.5) and is the se-





gMc(x)fMc(x) is capturing the selection of migrants over the unobserved wage
earning abilities. The term USMc;NM cannot be constructed with our data. To do
this one would need information on the wage paid to migrants in Romania before
they migrated. Some recent studies on Mexican data (Fernandez-Huertas Moraga
2011, Kaestner and Malamud 2010) have used data on pre-migration wages and have
evaluated such a term for Mexican migrants. Clemens et al. (2008) also evaluate
this for the Philippines, South Africa and Mexico. These are countries not too far
from the income level of Romania, hence we can look at the average selection of
migrants on unobservable skills there, especially relative to selection on observables,
to gather an idea of how large that phenomenon could be. While it is hard to have a
clear theoretical expectation on the sign and magnitude of the selection on unobserv-
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ables, one consideration may help. A country that rewards wage-earning skills would
attract more skilled workers along the observable and unobservable dimension. In
accordance with this intuition most of the existing estimates of observable and un-
observable selection either nd no relevant selection on unobservables (Kaestner and
Malamud 2010) or nd selection on unobservables of the same sign and smaller scale
than selection on observables (Budnik 2009, Fernandez Huertas-Moraga 2011 and
the relevant cases in Clemens et al. 2008). It is likely, therefore, that selection on
unobservable is in the same direction and smaller than selection on observables.
3.3.3 Selection bias and return migration
The selection problem is somewhat di¤erent for the case of return migrants. Our
main concern is that a considerable part of the observed returns to work experience
abroad might result from the fact that return migrants are not randomly selected
with regard to their unobservable characteristics. Unlike the evidence on the selection
of migrants, for returnees the literature provides no clear relationship between the
types of selection generated in observed and unobserved characteristics (Borjas 1987,
Borjas and Bratsberg 1996): positive selection in observables might well coincide
with negative selection in unobserved characteristics, or vice versa.
If being a return migrant is endogenous in the wage function, i.e. if the return
migrant status is correlated with the wage residuals in (3.1), the selection bias might
completely mask the e¤ect of work experience abroad. However, here the richer data
we have available on non-migrants and returnees from NDS allow us to characterise
the selection bias under some identifying assumptions.
Our identication strategy uses the variation in migration choices across di¤erent
religious groups as well as due to the availability of migrant network ties. Network
ties are dened by the presence of family members or friends abroad while reli-
gious groups are constructed using the self-reported religious a¢ liation. The iden-
tifying assumption behind is that having connections to family members or friends
abroad signicantly increases the propensity to migrate temporarily (relatively to
no-migration) without a¤ecting individual wages (our measure of earnings excludes
remittances from family members abroad). The same holds true for being a¢ liated
to a minority religious group. Sociological research (e.g. Sandu 2005) already doc-
umented the fact that members of protestant communities (Baptists, Pentecostals,
Adventists) have a much higher propensity to migrate than the Orthodox majority.
Cross-border community networks established around these churches (an estimated
20 per cent of Romanian migrants in the US and Spain are neo-protestants, compared
to just about 5 per cent among non-migrants reported both in the 2002 census and in
our data) play an important role in facilitating temporary migration for work abroad.
Members of the other main minority religious groups (Catholic and Protestant) also
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have a higher propensity to migrate and return compared to non-migrants. Overall,
in our sample just under 10 per cent of non-migrants belong to a minority religious
group, compared to more than 21 per cent among returnees5. Using this strategy,
we estimate various models to make sure that we obtain the right direction of the
selection on unobservable characteristics for return migrants compared to stayers.
5While those variables may also a¤ect selection of permanent migrants relative to non-migrants
we do not have them available for Romanians who live abroad. Hence we cannot do the same












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.2 reports the estimates of the return to work experience abroad. Columns
1 and 2 provide intuition for the raw (uncontrolled) di¤erences in mean wages be-
tween non-migrants and returnees. The OLS estimates in column 3 add controls
for age, gender, education and family characteristics. In order to account for the
endogeneity of return migration we estimate rst a full maximum likelihood model
(Maddala 1983) in which we add some structure by explicitly considering the binary
nature of the return migrant status in a rst-stage Probit model. We use the two vari-
ables indicating the availability of migrant network ties and the religious a¢ liation as
instruments in the rst stage. Both act in the same way, i.e. they seem to facilitate
temporary migration and do not otherwise impact on wages. The estimated corrected
return premium shown in column 4 is signicantly higher than the OLS estimate in-
dicating that returnees are negatively selected in terms of unobserved characteristics.
This negative selection is conrmed by the IV 2SLS regression reported in column
5 which uses the same two variables to instrument for the endogeneity of return
migration. Under all specications of the IV model, the rst-stage F-statistics are
high (above 20) and both network ties and religious a¢ liation are strong predictors
of migration and return. Column 6 shows the matching estimates based on common
support by the same variables as the covariates in the other models.
The conclusion from these models is that, if at all, return migrants are likely
to be negatively selected on unobserved characteristics. This is also in line with
ndings of other studies on return migration in Eastern Europe (e.g. Hazans 2008,
De Coulon and Piracha 2005, Co et al. 2000) who usually nd returnees to be
negatively selected on unobserved characteristics. Hence we can safely assume that
our uncorrected estimates represent a lower bound for the return premium.
3.3.4 Income premia and selectivity patterns of migration
A non-parametric method similar to the one used for the selection of (return) mi-
grants can be used to identify, under some assumptions, the average premia, both for
migrants and for returnees. Consider the counter-factual wage (3.4) that returnees
would earn if they were paid as non-migrants, with the same characteristic x, and
the di¤erence between this and their actual average wage. This di¤erence represents
exactly the average premium to returnees (call it "PRR;0") plus a term representing









ln r(x)fR(x) + USR;NM = (3.10)
= PRR;0 + USR;NM
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The term ln r(x) (from the decomposition of individual wages in expression 3.1)
is the "return" premium for being a returnee and may depend on x: In addition,
if returnees di¤ered systematically on unobservables from non-migrants, then there
would be an extra term USR;NM capturing the selection on unobservables. If this
term is negative as indicated by our results in the previous section, then the di¤erence
in average log wages represents a lower bound of the true return premium.
Finally, we can compute the wage premium that the average migrant to country c
will receive relative to what she would have earned at home. This is the "migration"
or "location" premium, i.e. the fact that the receiving country pays more for given
observable characteristics than the home country Romania. The average premium to
migrate to country c (plus the selection on unobserved characteristics) is calculated









[ln pc(x)] fMc(x) + USMc;NM =
(3.11)
PRM;c + USMc;NM
Notice that the term lnwcM(x) is the wage earned in country c by Romanian
immigrants of skill x. Using the individual wage denition in (3.1), the di¤erence in
the wage of an individual with characteristic x earned at home 0 or abroad c is the sum
of the individual location (migration) premium ln pc(x) weighted by the frequency
of Romanian migrants to country c plus the unobserved selection of migrants to
country c; USMc;NM : Given the lack of information on USMc;NM we will consider it
as relatively small, vis-a-vis PRM;c so that we can neglect it and the expression 3.11
will be considered as identifying the average migration premium.
3.3.5 Skill premium and skill selection
Above we dened some aggregate statistics to capture the selection and the premium
for migrants and returnees. Being based on the partition of the population into
cells x 2 X; this method denes also the selection and the premium for each value
x. Even more conveniently, as the function ln bw(x) transforms the multidimensional
set of characteristics X into a unidimensional skill, lnw, we can invert the map-
ping (x 1(lnw)) and dene selection and premia for each level of the skill variable
lnw: In particular, using the notation introduced in section 3.3.4, the selection of
migrants relative to non-migrants is measured as a function of the wage level by the
relative density: (fMc(x 1(lnw)=fNM(x 1(lnw)): For instance, a value of this rela-
tive frequency for a cell equal to 1.3 implies that in this cell people are 30% more
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likely to migrate relative to staying, than in the average cell. A value of 1 implies
that in the cell people have the average probability of migrating to c. Similarly, the
selection of returnees relative to non-migrants over the skill spectrum lnw is given
by: (fR(x 1(lnw)=fNM(x 1(lnw)): The logarithmic premium for migrants at each
level of skill can be written as: PRMc(x 1(lnw)) = lnwcM   lnwNM and, similarly,
PRR0(x
 1(lnw)) = lnwR  lnwNM where the wage di¤erences are taken for workers
of the same skill x:
The representation of selection (relative frequency) as a function of skills is helpful
to illustrate the whole prole (estimated kernel density) of each group (non-migrants,
migrants and returnees). Similarly, the characterization of the premia as a function
of skills lnw allows us to analyze more systematically how they are related.
In a very simple theory of migration, however, it is also useful to consider each
skill cell x 2 X as an observation on a group of workers (whose number is equal
to population in the cell) who have specic characteristics. Assuming each group
as having a random distribution of migration costs to each country and a common
return from migration to country c which is given by the common linear premium
LPRMc(x) = wcM(x)   wNM(x) under general assumptions on the distribution of
costs, the odds of migrating to that country relative to not migrating are an increasing
function of the linear premium. Allowing for a measurement error u(x) in the relative
frequencies, this can be approximated by the following linear relation:
fMc(x)=fNM(x) = a(x) + b  LPRMc(x) + u(x) for x 2 X (3.12)
The relative selection in group x indicates by how much the migrants are over
(>1) or under (<1) represented in that skill group relative to non-migrants. Two
qualications are needed. First, under the assumption of idiosyncratic costs distrib-
uted as an extreme value Gumbull distribution the standard utility maximization in
the Logit model implies that there is a linear relation between log odds and wage dif-
ferentials (see for instance Ortega and Peri 2009). Expression (3.12) is simply a linear
approximation of that exact equation: Second, the coe¢ cient b captures whether the
selection, consistently with utility maximization, would be increasing in the linear
returns to migration. The term a(x) introduces the possibility that the selection
is a¤ected also by migration costs that are systematically di¤erent by skill group.
Regression (3.12) will be estimated for each country of destination to see if the im-
plication that b > 0; derived from a model of rational migration, is supported in the
data. In testing the equation for each country of destination we are assuming inde-
pendence from irrelevant alternatives. Similarly, as we have an independent measure
of the return premium LPRR(x) = wR(x) wNM(x) for each skill group, we can test
whether the data support a theory of return motivated by economic benets. We
will run the regression:
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fR(x)=fNM(x) = (x) +   LPRR(x) + v(x) for x 2 X (3.13)
and test for  > 0: People need not return to a wage equal to that of similar
non-migrants. In this perspective migration and return can be the optimal choice,
even with no uncertainty (or unexpected shocks) for some people, as we will see in
section 3.6.
3.4 Evidence on selection and premia
To analyse the evidence on selection and premia for Romanian individuals in the
year 2003, we rst show some simple graphs of selection for migrants and returnees
over education and age. We will then present the values of the average skill selection
on observables as well as the whole distribution of skills for migrants and returnees
relative to non-migrants. Finally, we will show the average migration and return
premium and their distribution by skill for migrants and returnees.
3.4.1 Simple selection on education and age
Figures 3.1-3 in this chapter present in a very simple form some evidence on the
selection of returnees and migrants to each of the three destination countries over
education and age groups. We already saw in gure 3.1 the trend in education
levels of Romanian migrants to main destinations over 1995-2001. The US, Austria
and Spain were typical destination countries for migrants of high, medium and low
education levels, respectively, over the whole period.
In Figure 3.2, each panel shows the distribution of non-migrants and one other
group (in turn returnees and migrants) in the form of histograms over four education
groups (no degree, primary, secondary and tertiary). The wider bars represent the
distribution of non-migrants, always the comparison group, and the thinner ones the
distribution of the other group. Figure 3 does the same for the distribution across age
groups. In both Figures 3.2 and 3.3, Panel 1 reports the comparison with returnees,
Panel 2 with migrants to the US, Panel 3 with migrants to Austria and Panel 4 with
migrants to Spain. In each panel the distribution, which is relative to working indi-
viduals (male and female), has been constructed using census data. Some tendencies
are clear from these gures and anticipate some of the regularities that we will unveil
later. First, returnees are clearly positively selected among education groups vis-a-vis
non-migrants. Their relative distribution is much more skewed towards workers with
tertiary education at the expenses of workers in any other education group
In terms of age, returnees are much less di¤erentiated from non-migrants, however
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Figure 3.2: Selection over education
rather than among young workers (below 25). Migrants to the US tend to be better
educated as well as older relative to non-movers. Both features may add to their
earning abilities. The largest share of migrants to the US is among workers with
secondary schooling and above, and they are signicantly over-represented among
workers older than 50. Migrants to Austria seem the group with the more "average"
selection relative to non-movers. Their education distribution is not very di¤erent
from that of non-movers (except for a slightly larger share of secondary educated
and a smaller share of those with no degree). The age distribution is only slightly
more concentrated in the group 30 to 50 relative to non-migrants. Finally, migrants
to Spain show a clear negative selection, being much more concentrated than non-
migrants among workers with only a primary degree (across education groups). Also,
they are over-represented in the groups of less than 30 years of age (among age
groups).
To summarize, the observable features of returnees look similar to those of mi-
grants to the US, who show the strongest educational distribution. Migrants to
Austria, on the other hand, are the most similar to non-movers and show a concen-
tration in intermediate education and age groups. Finally, migrants to Spain seem
the group with lowest earning potential skills, as they are concentrated among low







































Return migrants in Romania




























Migrants to the US (US census)








































Migrants to Austria (Austrian census)



























Migrants to Spain (Spanish census)
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Figure 3.3: Selection over age
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whether these stylized facts match the more structural measures of average selection.
3.4.2 Selection on observable wage-earning skills
Table 3.3 shows the values of the average skill selection of returnees and migrants
to the US, Austria and Spain relative to non-migrants. The entries in Column (1)
of Table 3.3 are (respectively from the rst to the last row) the statistics OSR;NM ,
OSMUS;NM , OSMAut;NM , OSMSpa;NM dened as in section 3.3.2. In column (1)
we construct the frequencies for the group of non-migrants fNM(x) using the Cen-
sus 2002 data. In column (2) we evaluate the same statistics when the frequencies
fNM(x) are measured using the NDS 2003. Column (3) shows the average selection
statistics obtained when we correct for participation in the destination country using
the observed participation in Romania. Column (4) shows the statistics obtained
using only employment and wages of male workers. Column (5) removes from the
Romanian sample the ethnic minorities (Roma, Hungarian) who may be signicantly
di¤erent in their wage earning ability from the ethnic Romanian. The values can be
interpreted as percentage di¤erences in the average wage earning skill of the group





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The statistics obtained using di¤erent methods and samples show only rather
small variation. This reinforces the idea that the features of selection that we found
are quite robust and stable. First, the group of returnees exhibits a positive average
selection between 12 and 14%. This means that when compared to non-movers,
returnees have observable skills that allows them to earn domestic (monthly) wages
higher by 12-14%. This is a signicant positive selection. To give some point of
comparison, the Mincerian returns to schooling that we estimated on the Romanian
NDS data give a return of around 0.06-0.07 per year of schooling. Hence, the average
di¤erence in skills between non-migrants and returnees is equivalent to 2 years of
schooling. This value is not very sensitive to the corrections. Importantly, the number
obtained when using the NDS employment data and the number obtained when using
employment from the Census are very similar, implying that as far as the selection
of returnees is concerned the two data sets produce compatible results.
Moving to the average selection of migrants to the US we also nd a large and
economically signicant positive selection ranging between 0.13 and 0.20. The only
correction that makes some di¤erence is the one for participation which actually
increases the selection, implying that the selection of individuals who migrate to the
US is even more positive that the selection of working individuals. This may be
due to a lower participation of more educated women to employment in the US if
they move e.g. with their highly educated working husband. Again, the pure skill
selection among these migrants makes them equivalent to workers with 2-3 more years
of schooling than the average non-migrant. Conrming the rst impression from the
education and age data, the selection of migrants to Austria is essentially zero. The
statistic is small implying at most a 2-3% positive selection. Migrants to Austria
are selected in a way that is not much correlated with their wage-earning skills.
Correcting for participation in Romania and using the NDS rather than the Census
data to construct employment frequencies does not make much di¤erence. Finally,
the migrants to Spain exhibit indeed a signicant negative selection. Conrming
the evidence from the education and age data, their average skill selection ranges
from -0.07 to -0.13. Using participation rates in Romania (column 3) reduces slightly
the negative selection, which implies that Romanian migrants to Spain also have
lower employment participation in higher skill groups. Migrants to Spain have skills
equivalent to one to two fewer years of schooling relative to Romanian non-migrants.
The average values of the selection variable conceal a whole distribution of skills
for each group relative to non-migrants. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the comparison for
the whole density distribution of non-migrants and other groups. Figure 3.4 shows
the comparison between non-migrants and returnees. We show the distribution of
the two groups by skill (logarithmic monthly wages). Two di¤erences are clear even
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Figure 3.4: Kernel density over earning skills
in the skill range corresponding to 400$ to 1000$ (monthly). On the other hand,
the density of returnees is larger for wages above 1000$ and has a particular peak
of density around 1600$. These workers are likely to be the college educated in
some intermediate age groups. Overall we can reject the hypothesis that the two
distributions are equal by doing a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which rejects equality
at 0.1% signicance.
Figure 3.5 shows the kernel density estimator for non-migrants and migrants in
each of the three destinations using both employment distribution by skill (Panel
1) and population distribution (Panel 2). The solid line represents non-migrants,
the short dashed line is for migrants to Austria, the long dashed line for migrants
to Spain and the dotted line for migrants to the US. As expected, relative to the
non-migrants the distribution of migrants to Spain shows a signicant density mass
below the average skill level of non-migrants (about 882$) with a peak near 700$.
On the other hand the distribution of migrants to the US shows a signicant mass
of density above the average of non-migrants reaching high and very high wages (up
to 1800$). The density of migrants to Austria is not too di¤erent from that of non-
migrants. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of distributional equality between non-movers
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Figure 3.5: Kernel density of migrants and non-migrants over skill, Census 2002
Overall the average skill selection on observables ranges from -13% for migrants
to Spain to +20% for migrants to the US averaging around 0 for migrants to Austria.
There could also be selection on unobservables. Our results on returnees indicate
that they may be negatively selected on unobservables. Any estimate of a return
premium based on observables would, therefore, represent a lower bound of the true
return premium. Regarding migrants, Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2011) estimates
negative selection for migrants from Mexico to the US and reports that selection on
unobservables is also negative and about 30% of the one on observables. Kaestner
and Malamud (2010) do not nd any signicant selection either on observables or on
unobservables for the same Mexican migrants to the US. Clemens et al. (2008) report
a selection on unobservables for migrants from the Philippines equal to 8% and for
South Africa they report an even more positive selection on unobservables (around
20%). The few other estimates available are for much poorer countries. In general,
previous studies have either found an average selection on unobservables of the same
sign as the selection of observables but much smaller or no selection at all. With
this caveat in mind, we interpret the average observed selection as a correct measure
of the skill selection of migrants and a possibly upward biased measure of the skill
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Figure 3.6: Wages in the destination country and counterfactual wages in Romania
3.4.3 Migration and return premium
The largest economic benet of international migration is in form of a "migration
premium" for migrants. Individuals with given skill characteristics increase substan-
tially their wage and income by moving to countries where their skills are paid much
more. The average wage premium for migrants varies across countries of destination,
but so does the skill-prole of migrants, which depends on how the labour market
at destination prices their skills. In general, for a given average wage di¤erential,
the inuential Roy (1951) model (applied for instance in Borjas 1987 and Borjas
and Bratsberg 1996) implies that countries with large skill compensation (namely
larger than in the country of origin) attract more skilled workers. Those countries
typically exhibit larger wage inequality driven by skill di¤erences. To the contrary,
given average wage di¤erentials, countries with low skill compensation (lower than
in the country of origin) would attract instead less skilled workers. Such di¤erential
behavior essentially depends on the fact that in the rst case the migration premium
is increasing, while in the second case it is decreasing with skills.
A simple way of characterizing such migration premia across skills is to report
the distribution of the log wages earned by migrants abroad and those they would
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receive at home. We impute these distributions using the predicted values from a
regression of log earnings on education, age, gender and family size.. Averaging those
two distribution using the density of skills of migrants and taking their di¤erence
would generate the average migration premium. The distributions of wages in the
country of emigration together with what those individuals would earn in Romania is
shown in Figure 3.6. The di¤erence in the average skills between the two distributions
represents the average migration premium and is reported in 2003 US$ below each
panel. Panel 1 reports the wage distribution for migrants in the US and their counter-
factual distribution had they worked in Romania. Panel 2 shows the same comparison
for migrants to Austria and Panel 3 for migrants to Spain. Two regularities are
apparent. First, relative to their wage distribution in Romania, migrants have a
wider wage dispersion in the US, an intermediate one in Austria and the smallest
one in Spain (smaller than in Romania). This is an indication that returns to skills
are highest in the US and lowest in Spain. Second, while signicant in each case, the
average migration premium is much more substantial for migrants to the US (990$
per month) than for migrants to Spain (300$ per month). This is consistent with
the large migration ows to the US, and it partly compensates for the large costs
of migration. More interestingly, however, is the fact that for migrants to Spain the
gure suggests that the largest benets would accrue to those who are likely to be in
the long left tail of the counter-factual Romanian wage distribution (hence the low
skilled). To the contrary, for the migrants to the US, the more likely to gain are those
from the right tail of the wage distribution. A more systematic analysis of premium
and skills is needed here, although the simple wage distribution already indicates the
main driver of migration incentives between these countries.
3.5 Migration and return driven by skill-specic
premia
In this section we analyze whether di¤erential migration rates to specic countries (or
return rates) across skill cells are consistent with a rational response to wage premia.
Table 3.4 shows the estimates of coe¢ cients b and  from equations (3.12) and (3.13)
in its rst three rows. A positive value of the estimated coe¢ cient implies that that
migrants and returnees respond to larger premium by migrating (returning) in larger

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Each cell in Table 3.4 corresponds to the estimates of the parameter  (column
1) or b (columns 2, 3 and 4) from a di¤erent regression. In the rst row we measure
migration and return rates including total population in the cells, in the second row
including only workers in each cell. In the third row we include in regressions (3.12)
and (3.13) dummies to control for age groups and for family type (married or not
and with children or not) meant to capture di¤erential migration and return costs for
individuals of di¤erent age groups and di¤erent family structure. Young, unmarried
individuals with no children are the most mobile, hence one can expect that in these
groups we observe the most migrants and returnees beyond the e¤ects of a wage
premium. This would be due to a systematic di¤erence in costs rather than in the
return to migration. The estimated b and  coe¢ cients are positive and signicant
in 11 cases out of 12. Their values range between 0.1 and 0.6 with most estimates
between 0.2 and 0.4. Taking 0.25 as the median estimate, this coe¢ cient implies that
an increase in the migration premium for a skill group by 1,000$ per month would
increase the frequency of migrants relative to non-migrants in that skill group by
25%. The stability of the coe¢ cient across countries and even between migrants and
returnees implies that we can think of a common explanation for the skill selection of
migrants and returnees, namely their response to the wage premium, i.e. to economic
incentives. The di¤erent skill composition of migration to di¤erent countries and the
skills of returnees can, therefore, be explained simply by the common tendency to
migrate where and to return when the premium is larger. This common response
to incentives is consistent with a positive skill-selection for returnees and migrants
to the US (where premia are higher for highly skilled), with a negative selection for
migrants to Spain (where premia are higher for less skilled), but also with the random
selection of migrants to Austria. These migrants too respond to wage premia, only
those premia do not have a clear correlation with skills.
3.6 Long-run simulated e¤ects on wages and school-
ing
The empirical analysis implies that return migrants to Romania are positively selected
on observable characteristics relative to non-migrants. As their positive selection is
similar to the selection of migrants to the US, which are among the most skilled
of migrants, returnees are likely to be positively selected also among migrants over-
all. It also shows that returnees earn wages signicantly higher than non-migrants
and this di¤erence increases with their skills. Interpreting the wage premium as a
productivity di¤erence due to skills accumulated abroad, there are two potentially
important e¤ects of migration and return for the sending country. First, this process
may increase the expected overall returns to skills, possibly inducing the positive
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brain gain incentives emphasized by Docquier and Rapoport (2008). Second, it may
increase the productivity of returnees (who have learned new skills and enhanced
their human capital) with positive e¤ects for the domestic economy.
In this section we use the simulation results of the model developed in Mayr
and Peri (2009) to summarise the long run implications of emigration and return
on average years of schooling and wages in Romania. We also use the results from
Ambrosisni et al. (2015) to look at the e¤ects of relaxing migration constraints for
Romanian workers post EU enlargement.
Mayr and Peri (2009) identify the selection of migrants and returnees, in terms
of their schooling (and an underlying skill parameter). Their model produces some
"threshold" skill levels for emigration and return. Like in Docquier and Rapoport
(2008), the returns to migrating are higher for the highly educated if the return
to education abroad is su¢ ciently large compared to the return to education at
home. All workers with skills above a given threshold will opt to emigrate and only a
fraction p of them will succeed. But if the return premium is su¢ ciently large, then
the returns to returning are even higher for the highly educated. Therefore the most
educated of all choose to migrate and return. In particular, there will be a higher
schooling threshold above which all individuals, if they migrated in the rst period,
would return in the second period. Those with intermediate schooling (between the
two thresholds) choose to migrate and stay abroad (if they succeed to migrate), and
the least educated (below the lowest threshold) stay at home. The model has one
important implication. If the probability of migrating p increases under positive skill
selection of migrants (as observed), more intermediate and highly skilled will migrate.
However, two e¤ects may balance this brain drain. First, as education is a choice,
more individuals will choose higher education as the expected returns to schooling
increase. A higher probability to migrate (and return) increases the expected returns
to education and induces more individuals to get higher education.6 Second, more
migrants means more returnees and each one of them will benet from the extra-
productivity (wage) e¤ect due to the accumulated skills abroad. These two positive
e¤ects on skills and wages can o¤set the negative e¤ect of a positive selection of
migrants.
Our results complement other empirical ndings on the e¤ects of labour supply
shocks in countries of origin in Eastern Europe. Dustmann et al. (2012) nd a
positive e¤ect of emigration from Poland on Polish wages. For the case of Lithuania,
where the rate of emigration following the EU-enlargement was similar to that from
Romania (around 9%), Elsner (2013) nds that emigration increased the wages of
young non-migrant workers by 6%, while it had no e¤ect on the wages of old workers
6The response of education depends on the assumed costs of education and distribution of skills
that we set to match the initial distribution of Romanian population by schooling level (from the
Barro-Lee 2000 data).
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who stayed in the home country.
Table 3.5 fromAmbrosini et al. (2015) provides the simulated e¤ects of emigration
and return on average years of schooling and wages in Romania, using parameters
and averages calculated for Romania. The parameters for the returns to schooling
at home and abroad are estimated using a Mincerian equation for Romania (around
0.06) and for the average European country (around 0.08). The return premium
is chosen to match the return premium obtained by college educated returnees in
section 3.4.3 (around 28% above non-migrants). The wages for no schooling are set
at the level observed from our Romanian data and the average of the three migration
countries. The migration and return costs are set to match the share of returnees
in total (always measured to be around 0.4-0.5).7 It shows that the relaxation of
migration constraints increases average schooling and wages in Romania (i.e., the
net e¤ect of emigration is positive). The table also distinguishes between the net
e¤ects by education and age, and shows that the highly educated in their second
period of life benet the most.
The Mayr and Peri (2009) model and the simulation results from Ambrosini et al.
(2015) provide also the possible implications of changes in migration policy regimes
for migration, return and wages in Romania.
They imply that a decrease in the migration costs related to residing abroad (e.g.
due to reducing transportation and communication costs or a better integration of the
labour markets) imply higher migration ows, lower return ows and also stronger
incentives to invest in schooling. Based on the Mayr and Peri (2009) model, and
using the results presented in this chapter, Ambrosini et al. (2015) nd that a 20 per
cent rise in migration costs from Romania would decrease average wages and average
years of schooling in Romania by 1 per cent.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































They also nd that an increase in the wage premium for highly educated Roma-
nians who move abroad would generate two opposite e¤ects. Since emigrants have
larger expected returns to skills in the receiving country, there will stronger education
incentives in Romania which will increase average schooling for younger generations.
But since fewer migrants would return the schooling level of older generation in Ro-
mania decreases. Ambrosini et al. (2015) nd that for an increase in the returns to
schooling from 8% to 8.3% in the receiving country, the two e¤ects will produce a
2% wage and schooling increase in Romania due to higher education of the young.
Amborisini et al. (2015) nd also the e¤ect scal incentive for highly skilled
returnees. For a scal incentive that increases by 30% the premium of returnees,
proportionally to their schooling, the percentage of returnees would double. This
incentives to train, migrate and return would increase the share of those investing in
higher education - which in turn increases average wages by 1-2 per cent.
3.7 Conclusions
Return migration is an important compensation mechanism for the potentially nega-
tive e¤ects of the large labour outows experienced by many East European countries
around the year 2000. Recently re-evaluated evidence on the magnitude of return
migration during the age of mass migration (Bandeira et al. 2013) reinforces the
importance of return ows for the economic convergence between sending and desti-
nation countries. This sheds new light on the likely benets that accrue to sending
countries if migrants return with foreign qualications, occupational skills, nancial
capital and attitudes which contribute to economic and institutional development.
However, these benecial e¤ects of temporary migration will depend crucially on
the nature of selection into migration and return.
The novelty of our study lies in uncovering the magnitude and the selection of
migration and return ows for the case of Romania. We use these estimates in
a model of education and temporary migration to simulate the long-run e¤ects of
migration and return on the level of skills and wages.
Consistent with other nding in the literature, our results conrm the signicance
of return migration suggesting that, over less than a decade, about half of the people
who migrate eventually return. Romanian return migrants are strongly positively
selected on observables and negatively selected on unobserved characteristics, relative
to non-migrants. In line with the qualitative evidence of previous sociological studies
as well as with the predictions of standard economic theory, our microdata imply
that the selection of migrants depends on the country of destination. It is positive
for the US and negative for Spain. Moreover, Romanian returnees are selected in a
similar way as migrants to the countries with the highest skill premium (i.e. the US)
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and hence are positively selected among migrants overall. Both rounds of selection
(rst into migration and second into return) are consistent with the idea that workers
move in accordance with the wage premium they receive. Decisions to return may
therefore be part of an optimal strategy to maximize lifetime income.
In this chapter we also tried to assess the long-run implications of temporary
migration for the sending country. Using the model introduced in Mayr and Peri
(2009), we simulate the e¤ects likely to occur due to the increased migration after
the introduction of free movement of labour in the context of EU enlargement (for the
case of Romania after 2007). Our results suggest that at the end of the migration cycle
the large outows of labour will be followed by signicant ows of return migration.
Despite the strong positive selection into the initial migration, our results imply
an increase in average wages and levels of schooling in the Romanian population
through incentives to invest in education and due to the enhanced wage-productivity
of return migrants. Various economic and political developments in Europe are likely
to mediate the impact of migration on CEE sending countries. However, over the
long-run, an increase in labour mobility is likely to have a positive contribution of
economic convergence via return migration.
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Chapter 4
Labour market returns to return
migration in Romania
In the previous chapter we analysed the selection of both migrants and returnees
from Romania based on observable characteristics. Our aim was to outline potential
implications of migration and return for wages and skills in the sending country. In
this chapter we look in more detail at the labour market outcomes of migrants upon
their return to Romania. We rst compare wages for: non-migrants versus returnees,
before migration versus upon return, work abroad versus study abroad. We then
address the occupational choices of migrants upon return. Do returnees change their
employment status after returning home compared to before they left? Are they
likely to experience an upwards mobility in their jobs? Does their propensity to
become (nascent) entrepreneurs increase upon return?
4.1 The selection problem(s)
We need to address two selection issues to estimate accurately the labour market
returns to return migration. The rst one arises due to the self-selective nature of
migration: with regard to both observable and unobservable characteristics, migrants
are not a random sample of the population. Migrants rst self-select from the total
population of the home country. This selection is based on both observable and
unobservable characteristics. Upon return, migrants decide whether or not to work.
Depending on their reservation wages returnees might choose e.g. not to participate
in the labour market. This decision is in turn based on characteristics which can be
either observed or unobserved in our data. Returnees can di¤er from non-migrants
also in their labour market participation decisions.
The question of how migrants self-select from the population of the source coun-
try has been widely analysed in empirical studies (see e.g. Borjas 2014 for a sur-











Figure 4.1: Decision tree for the labour market participation of return migrants
(double selection)
migration) and showed that the estimates of labour market models are biased by
non-random out-migration (see e.g. the survey article by Dustmann and Görlach
2015b and chapter 5 for more details).
From the perspective of the country of origin, an interpretation of the self-selection
of returnees is not trivial. Since we observe migrants who return but not those who
stay abroad we do not have enough information to infer separately the selection at
the two stages. The selection of returnees from the population is di¤erent from the
selection into the initial migration. Return migrants actually take two decisions (see
gure 4.1): they decide whether to migrate or not and, while abroad (or already
prior migration), they decide wether and when to return (or not). If returnees are
e.g. a positively self-selected group from the total population, we cannot imply that
only the best of the migrants also self-select into returning. Those who migrate
can be initially positively selected from the total population while return migrants
are randomly or even negatively selected from the pool of migrants abroad. Wahba
(2015) is the only available study on return migration which accounts for the double
selectivity in migration and return. She founds that migrants are positively selected
relative to non-migrants, but returnees are negatively selected among migrants. In
such a case, not accounting for both levels of selection would overestimate the impact
of return migration on the wage premium of returnees. The selection into labour force
participation is comparatively straightforward: it involves only one switching level
for both returnees and non-migrants. While the decision tree in gure 4.1 reects
the choices of potential migrants and returnees, it does not reect the structure of
our observational data. We are unable to di¤erentiate the migration and the return
decisions of returnees since we do not observe migrants who do not return. The
structure of the data is better reected by a tree with only two levels instead of three
- this is what we imply with the dashed lines circumscribing the migration/return
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decision and the participation decision.
The challenge of our empirical analysis is precisely to nd an identication strat-
egy to deal with both selection problems. The decision to be a returnee (i.e. to
migrate and then return) and the decision to participate in the labour force upon
return are likely to be endogenous. Ignoring this leads to omitted variables bias. Our
estimated wage equations would be inconsistent and the predicted causal e¤ect of
return migration on wages inaccurate. We can adjust for the selection bias in two
ways: by treating it either as an endogeneity problem or as a sample selection prob-
lem. Choosing the appropriate model hinges on the way in which return migration
is believed to a¤ect wages upon return.
If we assume that work experience abroad has only an intercept e¤ect on wages,
i.e. merely a parallel shift of the wage proles, we can deal with it as an endogeneity
problem. This means that we treat the migration status as a right-hand-side variable
and pool returnees and non-migrants together in a single wage equation of the type:
ln y = 0X +  D + ; (4.1)
where y are the earnings, X a vector of personal characteristics and D a dummy
variable indicating the migration status. A signicant  > 0 means e.g. that return
migration results in an upwards shift of the wage function for returnees. Under this
model, the s are restricted to be the same for returnees and for non-migrants. Since
returnees are a self-selected group, estimating (4.1) by means of an OLS will produce
inconsistent results. We can remove the omitted variable bias only if all variables
which determine return and participation decisions and are correlated with wages
are known, quantied and included in the regression. Co, Gang, and Yun (2000)
treat return and participation decisions as endogenous to analyse the e¤ect of return
migration on wages in Hungary. The question in this case becomes: Conditional on
the individual characteristics (X), what is the mean e¤ect on earnings of having had
work experience abroad?. Co, Gang, and Yun (2000) correct the coe¢ cients of (4.1)
for the OVB induced jointly due to return migration and labour force participation.
Alternatively, we can treat the identication of the return migration premium as
a sample selection problem. Return migration will not only have an intercept e¤ect
but also a slope e¤ect. The returns to individual characteristics in the labour market
are not the same for migrants and non-migrants. We therefore need two earnings
functions, one for returnees:
ln ymig = migXmig + "mig; (4.2)
where Xmig refer to the characteristics of return migrants and mig to the rewards to
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this characteristics and a second one for non-migrants:
ln ysed = sedXsed + "sed; (4.3)
where Xsed refer to the characteristics of non-migrants and sed to the rewards to
this characteristics. This method is applied by de Coulon and Piracha (2005) in their
study on Albanian returnees. They assume that returnees and non-migrants obtain
di¤erent returns to their individual characteristics.
We assume in our estimation that migration and return decisions follow a latent
index function:
mi = iZi + u; (4.4)
where Zi are characteristics of individual i which inuence his utility maximisation
problem in the migration decision. The decision to participate follows:
pi = jQj + v; (4.5)
where Qj are characteristics of individual j which determine his reservation wage.
The individual will migrate only if his net gain in utility from moving is positive
(mi  0). The individual will participate in the labour force if the market wage will
exceed his reservation wage (pi  0). However, mi and pi are not observed in our
data. We use two dummy variables available in the survey for the migration status:




for returnees, i.e. :




and for the participation in the larbour force:




for participants, i.e. :




There are four possible outcomes of the decision process: (1) the individual decides
to migrate and to participate in the labour market (i.e. pi = 1; mi = 1), (2) the
individual decides not to migrate but to participate (i.e. pi = 1; mi = 0), (3) the
individual decides to migrate but not to participate in the labour market upon return
(i.e. pi = 0; mi = 1), and (4) the individual decides not to migrate and also not to
participate in the labour market (i.e. pi = 0; mi = 0). The last two outcomes are not








for returnees, i.e. :
for non-migrants, i.e. :
for non-participants, i.e. :
pi = 1; mi = 1
pi = 1; mi = 0
pi = 0; 8 mi:
(4.8)
The two selection rules, migration (mi ) and participation (p

i ), are not indepen-
dent. We allow the two to be correlated: corr(u; v) =  6= 0, where the two error
terms of (4.4) and(4.5) are: u; v  N(0; 1):
The conditional distributions of the error terms in equations (4.2/4.3),(4.4), and(4.5)
for the entire population is (u; v; ")  N(0;). We assume a joint multinormal dis-
tribution, and the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms will be:







We correct the predicted wages jointly for the two rules. Since wages are observed
only for those participating in the labour market, the conditional mean of the error
term in the wage equation for the selected sample will not be zero, i.e. E(" j p) 6= 0.
The selection rules are correlated, i.e. corr(u; v) =  6= 0. Like in Co, Gang and Yun
(2000), 2u and 
2
v are normalised to 1.The adjusted wages for returnees will be given
by: bwmig = E(ln ymig j mi = 1) = migXmig + "mig"migu (iZi)(iZi) ; (4.10)
and those of the non-migrants by:






In (4.10) and (4.11) "mig and "sed are the variances of the error terms from the wage
equations of migrants and, respectively of stayers, "migu and "sedu the correlations
between the error terms of the migration decision and those of the wages for migrants
and, respectively for stayers. (iZi) and (iZi) are the standard normal density
and, respectively, cumulative function.
We predict actual and counterfactual wages (like de Coulon and Piracha 2005)
for both migrants and returnees. We apply the coe¢ cients obtained for one group
to the characteristics from the other group. Had returnees decided to stay and not
to work abroad (and return), they would predictably obtain wages corresponding to
their characteristics:
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E(ln ymig j mi = 0) = bsedXmig + "mig"migu   (iZi)1  (iZi)

: (4.12)
Had the non-migrants choose to work a certain period abroad and return, their
wages would be given by:
E(ln ysed j mi = 1) = bmigXsed + "sed"sedu (iZi)(iZi) (4.13)
in (4.12) "mig is the variance of the error term for the wage equation of migrants
(4.2)and "migu is the correlation coe¢ cient between the error terms of the migrants
wages and that of the migration decision rule (4.4). In (4.13) "stay is the variance
of the error term in the wage equation estimated for stayers (4.3) and 
"stayu
is
the correlation coe¢ cient between the error terms of stayerswages and that of the
migration decision (4.4). In (4.12) and (4.13) (iZi) and (iZi) are the standard
normal density and, respectively, cumulative function.
We predict two types of income di¤erentials. First, the overall sample selection
adjusted income di¤erentials between returnees and non-migrants is given by:
inc = bwmig   bwsed: (4.14)
Second, we also estimate the hypothetical wage di¤erential between the actual and
the counterfactual wages for individuals of the two groups. This di¤erential will be
imputed for non-migrants out of the di¤erence between their counterfactual wages
(had they decided to migrate and return) and their adjusted actual wages:
hypinc = E(ln ysed j mi = 1)  bwsed: (4.15)
For returnees the hypothetical wage di¤erential is the di¤erence between their ad-
justed wages and their counterfactuals (had they decided to stay):
hypinc = bwmig   E(ln ymig j mi = 0): (4.16)
We average (4.14) for specic groups of the population, like e.g. men / women,
employee / self-employed, age, level of education, occupations. The hypothetical
wage di¤erentials predicted by (4.15) and (4.16) can be used to analyse selection
patterns. Had they decided to migrate and return, would non-migrants be performing
better than actual returnees do? Or would returnees perform better than stayers,
had they decided to stay and not to migrate for work abroad?
86
4.2 Data and empirical strategy
4.2.1 Data sets and choice of the variables
We estimate the wage di¤erentials described above using two data sets. The rst one
was already described in the chapter 3: the National Demographic Survey (NDS)
collected by the Centre for Urban and Regional Sociology (CURS) in 2003. The
second one is a survey carried out by the same institution in 2005 on a sample of
1,500 return migrants (from now on Returnees Survey). The migrants were inter-
viewed in Romania upon their return from spells of work abroad. To assure regional
representativity, they used a multiple-stage sampling procedure The sampling frame
identied rst the regions were migrants return to. Subsequently, repeated eldwork
was carried out in these regions to capture seasonal migrants. In both data sets, the
denition used to identify return migrants was to have at least six months of work
experience abroad after 1990.
The NDS contains variables depicting three types of information about return
migration: (i) if the person has been working abroad, and how many trips for work
abroad the person undertook after 1990, (ii) intentions to migrate again and if so, if
permanent or temporary (an indication of circular or repeat migration for returnees),
(iii) if the respondent studied or currently studies towards a degree abroad. We also
have information about other members of the household currently working abroad,
and if the household receives remittances. The survey contains battery of questions
on the personal background of the respondent, as well as about the household. Some
retrospective questions cover their occupational mobility, the internal migration, and
changes in the employment status or job location of the individual over the last
decade. It also includes information on parental background, i.e. parents education
and occupation before 1989.
The Returnees Survey was designed specically to capture information on the
preferences and behaviour of return migrants. The questionnaire contains three sec-
tions: one covering the period before migration, the second covering the period spent
abroad, and the third one asking questions about the experience in Romania upon
return. The rst section contains information on the whole employment biography
prior to labour migration: labour force participation, employment status, occupa-
tion, sector of employment, monthly income, savings and disposable income as well
as assets owned by the household. The section on work abroad distinguishes between
the rst movement abroad and the last or the present one - which is the case for
circular migrants who are just visiting their home towns and were captured in the
survey. The work experience abroad is covered both in terms of labour market perfor-
mance and of elicit beliefs about new human capital acquired (e.g. foreign languages,
occupational skills, formal certicates) or about the loss of skills (e.g. due to jobs
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bellow their qualications) while abroad. The information on employment abroad
covers also the possibility of informal work and of moonlighting (i.e. having multiple
jobs at the same time, of which some could be informal).
We restrict our sub-samples from the two surveys to respondents between 25 and
55 years of age to exclude students and migrants who return into retirement. This
leaves us with about 25,000 full observations from the NDS and about 1,100 full
observations from the Returnees Survey.
4.2.2 Descriptive statistics
Our estimated ratio of return migrants (persons who spent at least half a year working
abroad) in the population is consistent with similar estimates from other data sets
(2002-census and the BOP-Public Opinion Barometer, a popular yearly opinion poll
in Romania). In both data sets the proportion of returnees in the working age
population is about 5% (5.6% of the individuals included in the restricted sample of
the NDS are return migrants). In the NDS the returnees appear to be younger than
non-migrants (on average about 4 years), better educated (about one more year of
schooling), and predominantly men (about 75% of returnees are male as compared
to 45% among the non-migrants). Most of the descriptive statistics are consistent
with theoretical predictions: the returnees are less likely to own land or to be home
owners, are located in areas with high levels of emigration and a high prevalence
rate of circular migration and, more often than not, come from urban areas. They do
return to regions with lower levels of unemployment and slightly higher wages. Three
time more households with a member who is a return migrant receive remittances
from abroad, compared to households without returning members. About four times
more returnees have relatives and friends abroad as compared to non-migrants.
Return migrants have a signicantly higher propensity to migrate again for work
abroad than non-migrants. This is true for intentions to migrate again on a temporary
basis (circulate) as well as for plans to migrate on a permanent basis (emigrate). In
the NDS survey, more than two times more non-migrants than returnees declare
their intention to stay in Romania, while about three times more return migrants
than non-migrants plan to migrate again for work on a temporary basis (20% non-
migrants, 60% return migrants) and, respectively, on a permanent basis (3% non-
migrants compared to about 9% among the returnees). In the restricted sample of
the Returnees Survey, the average age of return migrants is 35 years. Since the
average time spent back in Romania is three years, we predict the average age at































































































































































Note: The null hypothesis tested refers to mean(non-migrants)-mean(migrants)=0.
*** indicates a .01 level of signicance for t-tests.
Source: own calculation, NDS data.































Note: own estimation with restricted sample drawn from the
NDS 2003
Table 4.2: Migration plans for non-migrants versus returnees
4.3 Wage premia to work experience abroad
4.3.1 Wages of returnees versus non-migrants
Our rst question is if returnees perform di¤erently than non-migrants on the labour
market and if this di¤erence is caused by their work experience abroad.
We rst estimate standard OLS regressions with a single sample and a dummy
variable indicating if the individual is a return migrant or not. The coe¢ cients are
like predicted by the human capital model. Men earn 20% more than women, one
more year of education leads to about 8.9% higher earnings, each subsequent year
of age gives approximately a 8.5% increase in earnings and the age-earnings prole
is concave. Working in an urban area signicantly increases wages with about 20%,
while having a job in the agricultural sector decreases the wages with about 20%.
A job in the state sector earnes higher wages, although this seems to be more
important for women than for men. Co, Yun and, Gang (2000) also found that
persons working for rms owned partly by the government earn about 12% more
than those employed by fully privately owned rms. Our results suggest that women
working in rms fully or partly owned by the state earn about 8% more than those
employed by rms totally in private hands. One can argue that, particularly during
transition, enterprises with governmental participation take more advantage from
business networks with other similar enterprise than do new private rms. Such newly
established rms function in a fully competitive environment and have no access to
state funding, tax cuts, or subsidies. Several studies showed that, during transition,
gender imbalances are smaller in public sector employment than in private rms.
Paternostro and Sahn (1999) found that gender discrimination in Romania is more
pronounced at lower levels of education and in rural areas. The returns to education
are higher in the public sector particularly at the lower end of the skills distribution.
Women employed in the public sector seem less likely to be discriminated against
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all sample men women
variable coe¢ cient p>jtj coe¢ cient p>jtj coe¢ cient p>jtj
sex .235 .000 - -
age(10) .363 .000 .247 .000 .473 .000
age2 -.040 .000 -.025 .000 -.054 .000
schooling .089 .000 .082 .000 .094 .000
state sector .059 .013 .041 .129 .080 .001
urban area .193 .000 .181 .000 .206 .000
agriculture -.255 .000 -.204 .001 -.312 .000
low skilled .159 .000 .158 .001 .151 .000
blue collar .290 .000 .326 .000 .248 .000
high skilled .343 .000 .363 .000 .327 .000
manager .615 .000 .672 .000 .580 .000
entrepreneur .485 .000 .562 .000 .402 .000
regional FDI .070 .000 .073 .000 .069 .000
returnee .061 .032 .076 .017 .044 .429
constant -1.20 .000 -.695 .000 -1.44 .000
adj. R2 0.386 0.305 0.426
N 20007 9886 10121
Note: Estimation with NDS 2003.
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering into counties.
Table 4.3: OLS estimates of wage equations
and receive higher returns than in the private sector.
In all specications we estimated, the coe¢ cient for return migration stays pos-
itive and signicant. After controlling for other individual characteristics, returnees
earn on average about 6% more than non-migrants. The income premia estimated
with standard OLS regressions are very similar to other results from the literature.
Barrett and OConnell (2001) obtained an equivalent 5% wage premium for Irish
returnees. They too used OLS regressions without corrections for selectivity. Us-
ing standard OLS also without corrections, Co, Yun, and Gang (2000) estimated an
income premium for Hungarian return migrants of a similar magnitude, i.e. about
4%.
After returning, men appear to benet more from the work experience acquired
abroad than do women. The wage premium for men return migrants is about 7.5%,
while women who return do not earn signicantly more than women who stayed in
Romania. This might be related to di¤erences in the nature of selection on unobserv-
able characteristics between men and women who decide to migrate and to return.
Similar gender di¤erences for the returns to return migration have been detected
by Barrett and OConnell (2001) for Irish returnees. In their estimations only men
received a signicant income premium for being a returnee. For women the e¤ect of
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having work experience abroad was not signicant1.
We apply the same method as Co et al. (2000) to account for endogenous return
migration and participation decisions. We estimate maximum likelihood models with
two decision rules (treatments) captured by the dummies for return status and labour
force participation. For the rst selection rule, concerning the migration decision, we
included the gender, the age, the type of locality of residence (i.e. rural or urban), a
dummy variable indicating the presence of kin or friends abroad (used as a proxy for
access to migrant networks) and a variable capturing the prevalence rate of migration
from the local area - as a measure of social interactions (learning, peer e¤ects) in the
dynamics of migration decision2. We used two types of measures to account for
historical migration experience at local level: cumulated lagged outows at county
level (for the 42 counties) and the local rate of migration at community level (for all
the 3,200 administrative units). The data for these measures are extracted from the
Migration Census 2001 (Diminescu and Lazaroiu 2001 discuss the method and the
data in more detail).
These measures of migration networks (both at individual and community level)
along with minority religion (catholic, neoprotestant or Muslim) are controls and
exclusion restrictions for the migration decision in our model. We discussed some of
the arguments in chapter 3. The identifying assumption is that migration networks
and minority religion are nor correlated with wages and participation when we ob-
serve migrants back in Romania (at the time of the survey). The main intuition for
the relevance of this type of networks or peer e¤ectscomes from the dynamics of
migration as a cumulative process: past migration in a community provides resources
and information which lower the costs and risks associated with a move abroad for
potential new migrants. These can be planed as temporary moves from the beginning
or return might be decided while abroad. But at least for the Romanian case higher
lagged rates of migration are highly correlated with high rates of return migration.
We use several measures for this community level migration in addition to the control
for direct network ties (which are family members or friends abroad). Our measure
captures the cumulated outows from a municipality up to ve years before the time
of the survey. We consider therefore return migration as a function of past migra-
tion ows observed at the smallest possible regional level, that of municipalities.
There should be no direct e¤ect from this past migration at community level on
the current labour market performance of returnees. The labour market outcomes
of return migrants depend on current economic conditions, on their human capital
and on their individual migration experience. However, all results based on selection
1As already mentioned, Co, Gang, and Yun (2000) nd di¤erent gender e¤ects for returnees: the
wage premium of work experience abroad was signicant only for women and not for men. Their
results should be treated with caution given the small size of their sample.
2The regional di¤erences in migration and return patterns are illustrated in Appendix B.
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all sample men women
variable coe¢ cient p>jtj coe¢ cient p>jtj coe¢ cient p>jtj
men .230 .000 - -
age(10) .361 .000 .259 .000 .473 .000
age2 -.039 .000 -.026 .000 -.054 .000
schooling .090 .000 .082 .000 .094 .000
state sector .059 .000 .040 .000 .080 .000
urban area .200 .000 .178 .000 .206 .000
agriculture -.257 .000 -.203 .000 -.312 .000
low skilled .160 .000 .160 .000 .151 .000
blue collar .289 .000 .328 .000 .248 .000
high skilled .343 .000 .364 .000 .327 .000
manager .623 .000 .672 .000 .580 .000
entrepreneur .482 .000 .563 .000 .402 .000
regional FDI .070 .000 .071 .000 .068 .000
returnee .137 .000 .252 .000 .096 .424
constant -1.22 .000 -.742 .000 -1.44 .000
selection equation for return migration
sex .726 .000 - -
age(10) -.174 .000 -.195 .000 -.122 .000
urban .098 .010 .110 .010 .090 .206
kin abroad .805 .000 .873 .000 .668 .000
peer e¤ects .020 .000 .015 .010 .029 .000
constant -1.67 .000 -.870 .000 -1.86 .000
selection equation for labour force participation
sex .439 .000 - -
age .239 .000 .271 .000 .205 .000
family size -.093 .000 -.042 .000 -.108 .000
kids .113 .000 .268 .000 .010 .679
constant .089 .056 .213 .000 .274 .000
"u -.09* -.156* -.038
"v -.001 .001 -.31*
uv -.04* -.07* -.03*
" .576 .593 .557
N 20007 9886 10121
Note: Estimation with NDS data.
Table 4.4: MLE estimates of wage equations
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models should be treated with caution given that we cannot test the validity of the
identication strategy.
For the second selection rule, the decision to participate in the labour force, the
baseline specication included the gender, the age, and the size of the family. All
coe¢ cients are signicant at 1% and have the expected sign. The availability of other
sources of income in larger households functions as a safety net during transition: due
to the households subsistence strategies, members of larger families can rely upon
other sources of income in case of unemployment. they might have therefore higher
reservation wages than people living alone. Dummies controlling for other sources
of income in the household were not included in the selection rule due to their high
level of correlation to the individual wages. As expected, the presence of children in
the household is a highly signicant predictor of labour force participation. This is
particularly the case for men, while womens labour force participation is likely to be
conditional on the age of the children but we cannot control for it. The e¤ects of all
the other regressors included in the wage equation do not signicantly change in the
MLE estimation compared to the standard OLS results.
The NDS data contain no information on migrantsduration of stay abroad or
the time they spent upon return in Romania. Both durations can inuence the
participation decision as well as the occupational choices of migrants. We address
the latter aspect in next section using the 2005 Returnees Survey which contains
indications of the duration of stay abroad and the time of return to Romania.
The OLS estimates of wage premia for return migration appear to be biased
downwards. As the correlation coe¢ cient "u between return migration decisions
and wages indicates, return decisions are negatively correlated to the error term
of the wage equation. Unobserved characteristics which make an individual more
likely to be a returnee, have a negative impact on the individuals earnings capacity
after returning to Romania. In other words, for given characteristics, the expected
earnings of returnees may be lower than that of a random person from the population.
For women, the correlation coe¢ cient between the unobserved characteristics in the
earnings and the migration equation is not signicant. However, women appear to
be negatively self-selected into participation. Unlike men3, women display signicant
and negative correlations between the error term in the earnings function and the one
in the participation decision ("v). Women randomly self-select into return migration
but they are negatively selected into labour force participation. Therefore simple OLS
regressions underestimate their wages. The corrected coe¢ cient for return migration
in the ML estimation, although higher than in the OLS, is still not signicant.
The correlation coe¢ cient between the error terms in the selection equations for
3For all the specications estimated, there is no evidence of selectivity into labour force partici-
pation by men. This nding is consistent with many empirical studies on employment participation
in Eastern Europe. See e.g. Paternostro and Sahn (1999).
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all sample non-migrants returnees
variable coe¢ cient p>jtj coe¢ cient p>jtj coe¢ cient p>jtj
men .246 .000 .242 .000 .187 .007
age(10) .036 .000 .037 .000 .026 .108
age2 -.001 .000 -.001 .000 .000 .104
schooling .090 .000 .090 .000 .085 .000
state sector .060 .000 .048 .000 .234 .000
urban area .193 .000 192 .000 .197 .000
agriculture -.255 .000 -.248 .000 -.289 .024
low skilled .155 .000 .168 .000 -.006 .956
blue collar .272 .000 .277 .000 .233 .000
high skilled .326 .000 .321 .000 .457 .000
manager .629 .000 .622 .000 .785 .000
entrepreneur .493 .000 .456 .000 .789 .000
constant -1.185 .000 -1.20 .000 -.872 .031
selection equation for labour force participation
sex .419 .000 .431 .000 .437 .000
age .024 .000 .024 .000 .028 .000
family size -.002 .030 -.002 .055 -.007 .205
kids .113 .000 .124 .000 -.011 .900
constant -.385 .000 -.376 .000 -.600 .002
"v .013 .014 -.023
N 24167 23047 1120
censored 4653 4398 255
uncensored 19514 18649 865
Note: Estimation with NDS data.
Table 4.5: MLE estimates of wage equations
migration and for participation (uv) is negative and signicant in all estimations.
This means that unobservable characteristics which would push a person into migra-
tion (and subsequent return) also pull her out of the labour force after returning to
Romania.
Separate wage equations for non-migrants and returnees conrm these observed
patterns. There are some di¤erences in the estimated coe¢ cients of labour force par-
ticipation equations. Unlike for non-migrants, for returnees the family size and the
presence of children in the household seem to have no e¤ect on reservation wages. In
the wage equation, apart from age becoming not signicant for returnees, there are
also no signicant returns from having only a low level of occupational skills. This
is consistent with low skilled migrants often working in informal jobs while abroad
and thus having less possibilities to acquire (unobserved) skills which could be valu-
able upon returning on the Romanian labour market. This nding for lower skilled
migrants is in line with a signalling approach to explain the wage determination of
returnees, as opposed to the human capital model. Employers could take the return
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predicted actual mean 1.102 .969
conterfactual mean 1.032 .983
with correction
for participation
predicted actual mean 1.112 1.063
counterfactual mean 1.117 1.005
with joint correction
for participation and migration
predicted actual mean 1.677 1.566
counterfactual mean 1.565 1.457
Note: Estimation with NDS data. The control variables are the same as
in the discussed regressions. Actual wages are estimated as in
equations (4.10) and (4.11), counterfactual as in (4.12) and (4.13)
Table 4.6: Predicted mean (log) wages for non-migrants and returnees
migration of lower skilled workers as a signal of lower productivity. If they believe
that these returnees are failed migrants they will not be willing to pay a premium to
hire them, but rather value their skills less.
We also estimate the counterfactual wages for migrants and returnees. We can
look at selection not only in relation to (un)observable characteristics but to the
actual and hypothetical performance of individuals on the Romanian labour market
(see Tunali 1996 for a discussion of selection in this context). The results are reported
in Table 4.6. Returnees appear to be positively self-selected: their actual predicted
wages are higher than the counterfactual wages of stayers, i.e. returnees earn more
than would non-migrants do had they decided to migrate and return. The results
are in line with the rationality of migration choices discussed in chapter 3.
As the results in table 4.6 indicate, returneespredicted actual wages (E(ln ymig j
mi = 1) = bmigXmig) are on average higher than their counterfactuals (E(ln ymig j
mi = 0) = bsedXmig). Non-migrants earn higher conditional wages (E(ln ysed j
mi = 0) = bsedXsed) than they would had they decided to migrate and return
(E(ln ysed j mi = 1) = bmigXsed). The corrected mean conditional wage of re-
turn migrants is higher than the predicted counterfactual wage of non-migrants
(E(ln ymig j mi = 1) > E(ln ysed j mi = 1)). There are no di¤erences between
the performance of return migrants had they stayed and the actual performance of
those who stayed in Romania. This means the overall selection is in the end neutral.
Return migrants are rst negatively selected from the total population with regard
to their unobservable characteristics but positively with regard to observable charac-
teristics. Return migrants outperform those who stayed in Romania both in actual
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and in counterfactual terms. Had the non-migrants decided to migrate and return,
they would still do worse on the labour market than return migrants actually do.
However, there is no di¤erence between the counterfactual performance of returnees,
i.e. had they decided to stay, and the actual performance of stayers. This indicates
that the positive selection of returnees in terms of observable characteristics compen-
sates their negative selection with regard to unobservables. A potential explanation
could involve a positive selection of migrants with regard to their unobserved abil-
ity to acquire skills while abroad. However, our results suggest that returnees seem
unable to make productive use of these skills acquired abroad after they return to
Romania. Or it might be again a case of di¤erent types of selection into migration
and return something that we are not able to address with the NDS survey data:
migrants might be positively selected with regard to their ability to acquire human
capital while abroad but returnees are negatively selected from the pool of migrants
residing abroad. Those more able to invest in skills while abroad do not return. Such
an explanation would be consistent with our ndings. As before, we need to treat
these results with caution given the assumptions we made for the validity of our
identication strategy. However, the sign of the correction for endogeneity remains
stable in all estimated models under di¤erent specications of the selection rule.
4.3.2 Wages before migration versus upon return
The data of the 2005 Returnees Survey allow a closer look at the determinants of
wages for return migrants. As already mentioned in section 4.2.1, this survey contains
separate batteries of questions covering: the experience of migrants while abroad,
retrospective information on what they did in Romania prior to migration, and their
experiences and migration plans upon return. One main advantage of these data
is that we can compare the outcomes of migrants before their initial move to those
outcomes after they return and are observed in the survey. We also know more details
about their saving/remitting behaviour which we include in the selection equation
(these variables refer to the type of transfers and not the level of remittances which
would clearly be endogenous in income equations) as well as some information about
the duration of stay abroad, the countries of destination and the length of time upon
their return to Romania. These variables are included in the specications from table
4.7. They are important to explain the determinants of labour market outcomes and
incorporate an additional dimension by allowing a before after comparison.
The results show that both the age at migration and the duration of stay abroad
had no signicant e¤ects on the wages of return migrants. This is relevant in so far
as it conrms the hypothesis that the level of income in the home country can have
two types of e¤ects on the duration of stay abroad - equivalent to a substitution and
an income e¤ect - and these e¤ects might outweigh each other in the estimation.
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all sample men women
variable coe¢ cient p>jtj coe¢ cient p>jtj coe¢ cient p>jtj
sex .037 0.535
age -.001 .522 -.001 .855 -.004 .275
education_2 .278 .006 .154 .230 .431 .004
education_3 .404 .000 .234 .074 .646 .000
education_4 .328 .017 .223 .234 .461 .011
education_5 .761 .000 .632 .011 .950 .000
education_6 .787 .000 .639 .000 1.04 .000
education_7 .848 .000 .670 .008 - -
time back .022 .004 .017 .052 .042 .007
time abroad .001 .300 .001 .496 .002 .241
language .119 .020 .145 .026 .061 .416
constant 4.952 .000 5.178 .000 4.705 .000
selection rule for participation
sex .124 .122
age .003 .434 -.000 .952 .006 .321
married .286 .001 .421 .000 -.055 .691
child -.089 .010 -.083 .026 -.145 .064
remittances -.005 .327 -.004 .428 .000 .967
savings -.010 .081 -.005 .420 -.056 .005
temporary .166 .033 .093 .999 .398 .005
freq. remit .025 .006 .041 .000 .009 .633
family mig. -.193 .008 -.180 .035 -.071 .602
constant -.379 .048 -.175 .449 -.554 .081
 -.689 -.776 -.572
 .654 .731 .498
 -.451 -.567 -.285
N 1174 787 387
censored 664 432 232
uncensored 510 355 155
Note: Estimation using data from the 2005 Returnees Survey.










low skilled 0 +25%
highly skilled +35% +30%
entrepreneurs +50% +25%
Table 4.8: Overview of income premia upon return
For those who optimise their migration choices over the life-cycle, higher earnings in
the home country mean also higher consumption possibilities and imply therefore a
shortening of the periods spent for work abroad. A di¤erent rationale might apply
for target savers if the purchasing power parities of their savings abroad are taken
into account. We consider only nominal wages, which might be associated with a
higher price index. The optimal strategy for a target saver might be to lengthen the
duration of stay abroad to save more in real terms. Temporary migrants who de-
cided to migrate in order to accumulate human capital and skills might also consider
prolonging their stay abroad. If they accumulate more skills by staying longer and
the returns to these skills are rising in the home country, their optimal duration of
stay might be longer since their life-incomes upon return would increase.
The length of time after returning to Romania is signicant and robust for all
sub-groups. This is the equivalent of the standard years since migrationvariable in
assimilation studies. Returnees have problems to re-integrate in the labour market
immediately after return but they catch-up fast afterwards. As the estimates from
table 4.7 suggest, the re-assimilation prole is steeper for women with migration
experience than it is for men. The estimated selection equation reported in table 4.7,
remittances do not have any impact on participation decisions but the total amount
of savings repatriated from abroad sends returnees out of the labour market. The
savings are however signicant only for women who return after working abroad.
We summarise the results of our analysis of wages in table 4.8. We look at the
conditional mean income di¤erentials between migrants and returnees (column 1)
and for returnees after return versus before migration (column 2).
The e¤ect of return migration is not signicant for women. For men on the other
side, the conditional income premium for being a returnee is on average about 25%.
The income premium for return migration is not signicant for low skilled workers,
but highly skilled receive on average about 35% higher wages if they accumulated
work experience abroad. This nding is consistent with the observed migration pat-
terns discussed in chapter 3. Low skilled temporary migrants work abroad in occupa-
tions with low skill requirements - often informal jobs - and have no opportunity to
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upgrade their skills. Higher skilled migrants have more opportunities to accumulate
skills during their spells of work abroad. Those who take the highest advantage from
having work experience abroad appear to be the returnees who decided to become en-
trepreneurs. Entrepreneurs who have been working abroad possess better observable
and unobservable characteristics and know better than non-migrant entrepreneurs
how to make use of them.
4.3.3 Trained or drained: returns to foreign education?
In this section, we look at the productivity of Romanian graduates who return after
studying abroad. This will shed some more light on the way in which temporary
migration a¤ects transition economies. The NDS data allow a comparison between
returnees who come back after a spell of work abroad and those who return after
studying abroad towards a degree. Despite the dramatic rise in international student
mobility from Eastern Europe, there is no systematic evidence on the impact of
foreign-educated returnees on economic development and institutional change in their
countries of origin. This is because of data availability hardly any of the surveys of
return migrants include questions about studying abroad. And if they do, the sample
sizes are too small to allow meaningful comparisons. Our sample is large enough for
a tentative analysis of returns to foreign education.
Do foreign-educated returnees have better chances on the labour market of their
home countries compared to those who did not study abroad? Recent research nds
a positive impact of foreign education on decisions to work abroad after gradua-
tion (Rodrigues 2013, Di Pietro 2012, Parey and Waldinger 2011, Oosterbeek and
Webbink 2011). Studying abroad allows students to gain language skills, knowledge
about labour markets abroad, contacts to employers and in particular to acquire in-
ternationally recognised qualications. Apart from this brain drain channel induced
by foreign education, there is almost no evidence on the e¤ects of foreign education
from the perspective of the home country. Spilimbergo (2009) analyses the e¤ects
of foreign education on democratisation from a cross-country perspective. He nds
evidence that foreign-educated returnees can foster democracy in their home coun-
tries when their education has been acquired in democratic countries4. Besley and
Reynal-Querol (2011) document that in democracies political leaders are 12 per cent
more likely to have studied abroad than in autocratic countries.
Messner and Wolter (2007) use mothers education as an instrument for partici-
pation in exchange programmes and nd no e¤ect of student exchange programmes
4Post-1989 transition economies are outliers in his study and should have been excluded from
the analysis. During the period investigated, in these countries Soviet-style authoritarian regimes
collapsed and the borders opened after the fall of the Berlin wall. See Figure A4 in Spilimbergo
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Figure 4.2: Studentsoutbound mobility ratio in CEE (students abroad over total
number of students, UN data)
on the salaries of Swiss university graduates upon return.
But the case of post-communist transition economies is likely to be di¤erent. Both
the motivation for leaving to study abroad5 and the reasons for returning to work
back home are di¤erent than in more advanced economies. Informal networks play
a much more pronounced role during transition (see Lehmann and Tatsiramos, ed.
2012). Personal connections and informal practices played a critical role in business
development during the early stages of transition. Access to networks and resources
a¤ected the opportunities to study abroad, the decision to return after graduation
and the labour market choices upon return.
For all CEE countries, the outbound mobility ratio of students choosing to enrol
abroad compared to nationals enrolled at home grew steadily after 1989. Figure 4.2
depicts this ratio (in percentages) for selected CEE countries around the 2000s. The
European average for this period is 3.3 per cent. The majority of CEE countries is
just below this average with the exceptions of Bulgaria and Slovakia, both having a
ratio of students enrolled abroad to those studying at home above 10 per cent. We
can treat these gures as lower boundaries because o¢ cial registers underestimate
the number of foreign students. Romania is about average with 2.7 per cent of the
students enrolled abroad, just above Poland (2 per cent) and Hungary (2.1 per cent)
and similar e.g. to the Czech Republic (2.5 per cent) or The Netherlands (2.6 per
cent). Table 4.9 lists the main destination countries of Romanian students at the time
5See Beine et al. (2012) for a survey on the determinants of international mobility of students.
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Rank Country Absolute %
1 Germany 3,695 19.3
2 France 3,642 19
3 United States 3,407 17.8
4 Hungary 3,147 16.4
5 Italy 908 4.7
6 Moldova 734 3.8
7 Spain 623 3.2
8 Switzerland 452 2.4
9 Austria 451 2.4
10 United Kingdom 447 2.3
Top ten countries 17,506 91.3
Table 4.9: Main destination countries of Romanian students 2003
we observe those returning home in our the survey. This period is relevant for our
analysis because it is before Romania joined the EU. It was not yet part of European
student exchange programmes, like ERASMUS. There were other programmes in
place designed to support higher education in (at that time) EU-partner countries
in Eastern Europe (like TEMPUS). But their numbers were limited and Romanian
students could not easily obtain other EU grants or student loans abroad. They
needed to nance their studies abroad themselves or through their families. The
ranking of the top destination countries is di¤erent for students enrolled abroad
than for migrants employed abroad. Besides the costs and opportunities for studies,
traditional academic links (e.g. with France and Germany) and distance and ethnic-
linguistic ties (e.g. with Hungary and Moldova) explain part of these di¤erences.
We present a st comparison between return migrant workers and foreign edu-
cated returnees in table 4.10. The rst striking results of our descriptive analysis is
that the two groups are perfectly disjunct: almost none of the return migrants who
worked abroad also studied abroad and vice versa, none of those who studied abroad
gained work experience abroad.
This is surprising because the questions are explicitly kept separate in the ques-
tionnaire and both choices allowed. The sampling frame and the sample size of
the NDS data ensure representativity not only geographically but between di¤erent
strata of the population. On account of this, the nding simplies our identication
problem for the comparison between returns to foreign education and to work ex-
perience abroad. It also has a simple explanation based on a compelling (selection)
story: those who study abroad do not (self-select into) return but remain abroad if
they nd a job there after graduation. Those who study abroad and return do this
probably for good reasons. At the time when their student visa expires they might
have (informal) networks, family or personal connections in the home country which













Age 41.09 37.77 36.04 0.00
Women 0.551 0.232 0.528 0.00
(log) Wage 1.165 1.343 1.645 0.00
State employee 0.215 0.132 0.422 0.00
Entrepreneur 0.084 0.159 0.199 0.00
State employee + rm 0.073 0.136 0.228 0.00
Father high educ. 0.052 0.056 0.402 0.00
Father high occup 1989 0.067 0.065 0.381 0.00
Minority religion 0.104 0.196 0.258 0.00
Migrant network ties 0.109 0.399 0.246 0.00
Number of children 1.120 1.071 0.621 0.00
In good health 0.539 0.655 0.737 0.00
Nr. of observations 22,706 1,279 256
Notes: The table shows the weighted means of variables by migration status.
The p-value in the last column is for the F-test of equality of variable means across
all three groups. Entrepreneurs are business owners. State employees with rm are
either themselves or a household member business owners .Father high education
is a dummy indicating if the respondents father received tertiary education.
Father high occupation is a dummy indicating if the respondents
father had a managerial or highly skilled position (while active).
Table 4.10: Descriptives for work abroad versus study abroad
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The descriptive analysis presented in table 4.10 supports our argument about
the selection of foreign educated students on characteristics related to the family
background and informal networks. The results di¤er in part from those presented
in section 4.2.2 because the weights applied to subgroups are slightly di¤erent. As
expected, those who studied abroad and returned home are on average younger,
more likely to be women, more likely to become entrepreneurs upon return, have
less children and are in better health than both returning migrant workers and non-
migrants. Less expected is the high proportion of foreign educated return migrants
who are state employees. It contrasts with the lower probability of migrant workers
to be employed in the state sector after returning. Even more intriguing is the three
times higher likelihood of returning former students compared to non-migrants to
be at the same time employed by the state and to own a business. This is a well
documented strategy in transition economies to use informal practices and networks
in the operation of private businesses by accessing public resources and lucrative
contracts (see e.g. Ledeneva 1998). In line with our selection hypothesis, foreign
educated returnees are almost eight times more likely to have university educated
parents than non-migrants or returning migrant workers. The fathers of those who
studied abroad and returned are about six times more likely to have held high ranking
position in the centrally planned economy, in the army or the communist party
nomenklatura before 1989, compared to the fathers of non-migrants or returning
migrant workers.
It is therefore no surprise to nd that for studying abroad, access to migrant
network ties is less important than for working abroad. The use of migrant networks
is a reaction of common individuals to economic constraints during the "transforma-
tional recession" (Kornai 1994). They provide information about work opportunities
in other countries and support, trust and resources while abroad. But they do not
help migrants to nd better employment upon return. In contrast, representatives of
the upper echelons of the former communist bureaucracy and their relatives did not
face similar constraints during transition. They had better starting conditions in the
immediate aftermath of communism being close to a strong and well connected ap-
paratus (Brucan 1998). It is this type of connections and informal networks - not the
migrant networks - which increases the likelihood of descendants of the former elite
to study abroad, the probability that they return, and their chances of high-yielding
occupations back home.
Our ndings are similar to qualitative evidence from sociological research on the
(re)formation of business and political elites during post-communist transition. In
this literature, the dominant view of elites in Easter Europe after 1989 is one of
reproduction: the changes of regime did not fundamentally alter the social compo-
sition of elites (for the Romanian case see e.g. Brucan 1998, Culic 2002, S¸tefan 2004).
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The alternative, elite circulation, would imply that transition to post-communism
produced a break in the structure of the elite and new people were recruited at the
top of the hierarchy. None of the available studies addressed the role of international
mobility and foreign education in the formation of post-communist elites. East-West
migration is considered only in terms of skills but not in terms of elites. (see Solimano
and Avanzini 2012 for a survey).
This persistence and reproduction of elites in Romania has direct implications for
our analysis. It suggests intergenerational continuity before and after 1989. Before
1989, the only people allowed to study abroad were descendants of nomenklatura
members. After 1989, borders opened and more people could study abroad. But our
selection argument kicks in when those who went to study abroad after 1990 decide
whether to return or not.
If the unobserved characteristics which drive the decision to study abroad (and
return) are correlated with employment opportunities at home, simple estimates of
the payo¤ to foreign education will su¤er from selection bias. This omitted variables
bias will a¤ect naive comparisons of wages for non-migrants, returnees who worked
abroad and those who studied abroad. Table 4.11 reports the means of log earnings
for the three groups (column 1) and the di¤erences-in-means between non-migrants
and returnee wages in column 2. The results for return migrant workers are the same
as those reported in chapter 3. Returnees who worked abroad earn on average 16
per cent more than non-migrants, while those who studies abroad have 46 per cent
higher wages than non-migrants. Column 3 shows regression estimates of the e¤ect of
return migration / foreign education status on wages, controlling for a set of covariates
that include individual and family characteristics. Controlling for covariates reduces
the di¤erence between non-migrants and foreign educated returnees by more than
65 per cent. For those who studied abroad, most of the correction comes from
the variation in parental characteristics - which was our argument in the previous
discussion. If all variables that determine the selection into working / studying
abroad (and returning) would be observable and included in the regression equations,
we would obtain unbiased estimates of the wage returns to work abroad and to study
abroad. But the selection on observables characteristics is unlikely to hold. We use
the same set of covariates from the regression to construct matching estimates and
report them in column 6. They are similar to the regression results just but inference
relies on common support and does not depend on functional form assumptions.
However, unobserved characteristics might still bias the estimated wage di¤erentials




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We deal with this possibility by tting two additional models: a maximum like-
lihood treatment-e¤ects model (Maddala 1983, see also section 3.2) and a 2SLS
instrumental-variables regression. We use for both the same exclusion restrictions
as in section 4.2, the measures of network ties: family members abroad, prevalence
rate of migration at local (community level) and the a¢ liation to minority religious
groups (we discussed the arguments in favour of these restrictions in chapter 3). For
participating in foreign education, we used in addition the fathers level of education.
The instruments are relevant because the variables are strong predictors of the migra-
tion status and of participation in foreign education (rst stage F-statistics are both
large). The credibility of our exclusion restrictions hinges upon the channels through
which our measures of network ties and the fathers education a¤ect wages upon re-
turn. The assumption we make is that neither migrant network ties nor the fathers
education a¤ect labour market outcomes upon return in any other way except via
correlation with migration status or with participating in foreign education. Under
these conditions, both models present a broadly similar picture. The results are re-
ported in columns (4) and(5) in Table 4.11. They suggest that the OLS estimates
of returns to work experience abroad are biased downwards and those of returns to
foreign education are biased upwards. Return migrants are negatively selected while
those who studied abroad (and returned) are positively selected on unobservables
which determine wages upon return.
As a robustness check, we estimated the same specication on the sub-group of
graduates (returnees and non-migrants). None of the results changes qualitatively.
The e¤ect of studying abroad (rather than in the home country) on the observed
earnings in Romania has a smaller magnitude but the same sign and signicance
level. Since we are not ultimately interested in the magnitude of the e¤ect given all
the limitations of the data and of our identication strategy this does not alter the
interpretation of our ndings. However, we have to treat these results with caution.
But even if we only use them to set lower and upper bounds for the potential returns
to return migration, they provide useful insights for the e¤ects of temporary migra-
tion. They mean that work experience abroad has a positive impact on productivity
upon return, while studying abroad is only positively associated but not causally
linked to high productivity on the home labour market. This nding mimics closely
the cross-country results in Rodrigues (2013), who nds no statistically signicant
e¤ects for participating in foreign education for the East European countries included
in the study. It is also consistent with evidence from China (Sun 2013) which sug-
gests a mismatch between the skills of foreign educated returnees and the demands
of the Chinese market.
The broader implication of our analysis relates to the ambiguous role of elite mi-
gration for the prospects of institutional change in the sending countries. In contrast
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to other results (e.g. Spilimbergo 2009), for some CEE countries foreign education
contributes to the reproduction and persistence of elites (as in Acemoglu and Robin-
son 2008) rather than their circulation.
4.4 Occupational choices upon return
In this section we summarise results from models estimated to analise the occupa-
tional choices of return migrants in Romania. It provides additional insights on the
re-integration of returnees in the home labour market after spells of work abroad. Oc-
cupational mobility is particularly relevant in the case of transition from a centrally
planned economy. The structural composition of the (post-)socialist labour force was
not matching the requests of a functioning labour market in terms of occupations
and skills.6
Most studies address the entrepreneurial choices of returnees and only to a lesser
extent their occupational upgrades in terms of employment status or skill content of
jobs. We address rst the determinants of labour market participation and of job
switches after return compared to before migration. Occupational switches during
transition are determined by many factors7: industrial decline and restructuring,
occupational mismatches, individual characteristics determining career paths, etc...
How do return migrants fare in this context? Both the individual and the aggre-
gated impact of return migration will eventually depend on the job type and the
employment status migrants choose upon re-entering the Romanian labour market.
Do returnees change their employment status after returning? Compared to the jobs
they had before migration, are returnees climbing up the occupational ladder?
We use the 2005 Returnees Survey to look at occupational mobility upon re-
turn versus before migration. We identify switches between participation, non-
participation, and self-employment using retrospective information on employment
biographies prior migration. A returnee has three options when back in Romania: to
stay in the same employment status, to switch from not-employed to employee or self
employed, or from employee to self-employed (dened as an upgrade8), or the switch
6A detailed survey of labour market related issues in the context of transition is provided by
Svejnar (1999) and Boeri and Terrell (2002). Blanchard (1997) is an excellent textbook treatment
of the underlying basic mechanisms of labour reallocation during transition.
7Earle (2012) analyses both the magnitude and the determinants of labour market ows in
Romania in the early years of transition.
8This is used just as a matter of denition, to simplify the comparison with occupational upgrades
based on the skill content of jobs. It also alludes to a more productive use of skills acquired abroad.
The main issue which we cannot properly address with the 2005 Returnee Survey data is the
distinction between entrepreneurs who own a business and self employed who are only temporarily
in some form of informal employment the so called parking lothypothesis discussed in chapter 2.
But we assume that self-employment allows a more productive use of skills and resources acquired
while working abroad this is in part reinforced by the ndings in the previous section that returnees










































Note: data from the 2005 Returnees Survey.
Table 4.12: Transition matrix for employment status
from self-employment into non-employment or salaried work, or from salaried work
to non-employment (dened as downgrade).
We use the rened categories of the variables depicting the occupation of returnees
prior migration and after return. These variables are consistently constructed for
the two periods and classify the occupations into 15 categories. These categories are
ordinal. They rank the occupations according to their skill content (e.g. highly skilled
and managers, skilled technical workers, skilled agricultural workers, medium skilled,
unskilled, not-employed, etc...). We compare the occupations before migration to
those after return and construct three groups for the post-migration job switches of
returnees: staying in the same category, upgrading, or downgrading.
The transition matrix depicted in Table 4.12 shows that most returnees maintain
their labour force status when they return compared to before migration: about 53
per cent stay in the "same" employment status. The groups under the diagonal of
the transition matrix correspond to those whom we dened as upgrading their
employment status, i.e. about 28 per cent of the returnees switched either from
non-employment to salaried work or self-employment, or from salaried work to self-
employment. The categories above the diagonal of the transition matrix correspond
to those who, in our denition, downgradetheir employment status upon return:
i.e. about 19 per cent of the returnees switched into non-participation or gave up
their entrepreneurial activities.
Our gures are in line with other results from the literature. In their analysis
of Turkish return migrants, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) found that 42,72 per
cent of the returnees were not participating in the labour force after returning to
Turkey. Using data from the Hungarian Household Panel Survey (1993/1994), Co,
Yun and Gang (2000) estimated that about 47 per cent of the Hungarian returnees
were not participating in the labour market upon return. This corresponds to a

























Note: own estimation with the 2005 Returnees
Survey
Table 4.13: Occupational switches after return
non-participation rate of 50 per cent estimated for return migrants with the 2005
Returnees Survey and of 37 per cent estimated with the NDS data. Similarly, about
10 per cent of the return migrants in the NDS 2003 and about 15 per cent of those
from the 2005 Returnees Survey are self-employed. This is lower than the gure
estimated by Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) for Turkish returnees, but very close
to the result obtained for Hungarian return migrants by Co, Yun and Gang (2002),
i.e. about 10 per cent.
Based on these classications, we estimate two (maximum-likelihood multinomial
logit) regressions: one for occupational status and one for the skill content of occu-
pations. The dependent variables are dened by comparing the employment status
and, respectively, the skill content of the jobs prior migration and after return. We
use the three groups dened above in the transition matrices: same(for no change
after returning versus prior migration), upgrade(for all the transitions below the
diagonal of the transition matrix), and downgrade(for all switches located above
the diagonal).
Table 4.14 presents the results for switches in the employment status. All co-
e¢ cients are measured relative to the base outcome which is staying in the same
employment status after returning as before migration. Older returnees are more
likely to not participate (downgrade), maybe also due to early retirement. Com-
pared to women, men with work experience abroad are more likely to upgrade
their status as before migration. The time spent in Romania since returning from
abroad, the years since (return) migration (ysm), is signicantly and negatively re-
lated to downgradesand positively related to upgradingthe employment status.
The longer a returnees is back from work abroad, the higher the chances that he is
active either as employee or as self-employed. Returnees who are only temporarily
back in Romania and plan to re-migrate have a di¤erent labour market behaviour
than those who are permanently back. Returnees who did not manage to improve
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variable coe¢ cient p > jzj dY
dX
p > jzj X
downgrade
age .049 .000 .011 .001 35.733
man .182 .233 .011 .702 .670
ysm -.212 .013 -.058 .000 1.801
ysm2 .012 .076 .003 .007 10.848
re-migration .729 .000 .177 .000 .443
remittances .596 .020 .105 .029 .153
savings -.001 .871 -.001 .579 2.906
upgrade
age -.035 .000 -.006 .000 35.733
man .647 .001 .071 .001 .670
ysm .398 .000 .060 .000 1.801
ysm2 -.028 .000 -.004 .000 10.848
re-migration -.784 .000 -.127 .000 .443
remittances .298 .343 .013 .720 .153
savings .017 .095 .002 .069 2.906
N 1,174
Note: 2005 Returnees Survey. dY
dX
for discrete change of dummy
variables from 0 to 1. Outcome sameis the reference group.
Table 4.14: Multinomial logit for occupational status
their occupational status after returning might be more determined to plan a new
migration precisely because of this failure.
As already mentioned, we can distinguish between savings transferred home by
migrants when they return and the remittances they sent while abroad. The amount
of remittances sent from abroad has a large and signicant e¤ect on the probabil-
ity that the returnee will not participate in the labour market upon return. This
result conrms our earlier estimations of labour force participation with the NDS
data. Receiving remittances signicantly predicted leaving the labour force - for
both returnees and non-migrants.
In contrast, the total amount of savings accumulated while abroad is positively
related to upgrades in the employment status after return: i.e. changes from non-
employment or into self-employment. These results are consistent with the hypothesis
from the literature that savings accumulated while abroad are used by returnees to
overcome liquidity constraints or capital market imperfections in their regions of
origin.9
We obtain almost identical results from models based on changes in the skill
content of the jobs migrants took after returning to Romania10. As in the case
9See e.g. Mesnard (2004).
10The ordinal structure of the variable capturing the changes in the skill content of jobs can be
used to estimate ordered logit models. The resutls are similar and we wanted to keep the model
reported in Table 4.15 comparable to that from Table 4.14.
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variable coe¢ cient p > jzj dY
dX
p > jzj X
downgrade
age .029 .000 .008 .000 35.733
man .339 .019 .071 .021 .670
ysm -.028 .721 -.020 .215 1.801
ysm2 .003 .575 .001 .001 10.848
re-migration .488 .001 .132 .000 .443
freq. remitt. -.049 .003 -.009 .008 6.793
constant -1.24 .000
upgrade
age -.013 .128 -.004 .000 35.733
sex .103 .542 -.009 .713 .670
ysm .174 .041 .030 .013 1.801
ysm2 -.005 .471 -.001 .259 10.848
re-migration -.204 .257 -.072 .240 .443
freq. remitt. -.028 .148 -.000 .799 .120
constant -.221 .565
N 1,174
Note: 2005 Returnees Survey. dY
dX
for change of dummy
variables from 0 to 1. Outcome sameis the reference group.
Table 4.15: Multinomial logit for job switches (skills)
of participation, the mobility on the occupational ladder is also inuenced by the
remitting behaviour of migrants. We include in our model the frequency of remitting
money during the stay abroad. Results are reported in table 4.15. Remittances sent
more frequently might indicate a stronger involvement of migrants in the activities of
their families and communities in the home country. Sociological studies11 highlighted
the role of remittances in maintaining and strengthening this relationship. Upon
return, such networks can provide returnees with relevant information about job
opportunities or prevent them from loosing the positions they hold before leaving.
This might explain why returnees who sent remittances more frequently while abroad
are more likely to stay in the same position on the occupational ladder as before
migration.
Our earlier results on the wage e¤ects of return migration suggest that self-
employed persons are proting more from their work experience abroad than do
returnees who work as employees. The models of the returneesoccupational switches
also show that savings accumulated while abroad increase the propensity to become
an entrepreneur after returning to Romania. Comparing both non-migrantswith
returneesand pre-migration with post-return occupational choices reveals that work
experience abroad substantially increases the propensity to engage in an entrepre-
neurial behaviour or to prefer self-employment over waged employment.
11See e.g. Portes (1997).
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Other studies observed that return migrants exhibit higher rates of entrepreneur-
ship than non-migrants.12 Most of them test the e¤ects of overseas savings and the
duration of stay abroad on the decision to become an entrepreneur after returning.
The theoretical motivation revolves around the importance of savings transferred
from abroad in overcoming credit constrain for. Further arguments are related to
the role of skills accumulated while abroad for decisions over entrepreneurial activi-
ties upon return13. The intuition behind is that migrants might learn how to run a
business while working in a developed market economy and therefore be more prone
to set up their own business upon return.
4.5 Conclusions
The main implication of our results using Romanian data is that migrant workers
improve their labour market performance after returning to the home country. Be-
cause of their work experience abroad, they receive positive wage premia upon return
compared both to non-migrants and to themselves before migration. Compared to
non-migrants, returnees are positively self-selected on observable characteristics and
negatively on unobservables. The role played by networks in migration decisions sug-
gests a possible explanation for the type of selection. Unobserved to the researcher,
network ties facilitate the ow of information about opportunities abroad but do not
improve the employment prospects after return. Longer spells of work abroad keep
migrants out of sight, out of mind(Wahba and Zenou 2008) so that their social
capital, which would otherwise provide job opportunities in the country of origin,
depreciates. The type of selection seems to be di¤erent for those who study abroad
and return to work in the home country. Foreign educated returnees are positively
selected on unobservables, which means studies abroad are associated with but do
not cause better labour market outcomes upon return.
Return migrants are less likely to participate on the labour market than non-
migrants. They are more likely to switch into self-employment or to become entre-
preneurs. We also nd that remittances and repatriated savings a¤ect occupational
choices of returnees. In particular, more frequently sent remittances from abroad
improve the chances that migrant workers climb up the occupational ladder upon
return. This could conrm the importance of networks: more frequent transfers from
abroad maintain ties in region of origin which can help with the job search after
return.
The results we discuss throughout this chapter must be treated with caution.
They depend on the nature of selection in migration and return. It is therefore
12See e.g. Ilahi (1999), McCormick and Wahba (2001), Piracha and Vadean (2010).
13E.g. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002).
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important to understand what determines return decision. They might be part of
a strategy to move abroad temporarily to acquire skills, accumulate savings, send
remittances and use these in productive ways after returning. The next chapter





This chapter addresses the link between native attitudes and return migration. We
exploit the variation in xenophobia using information on media consumption by mi-
grants in Italy.
A widely documented crime provides a quasi-experimental setting to identify the
impact of Italian attitudes on migrantssettlement intentions. Our results suggest a
signicant e¤ect of anti-immigrant attitudes on the intended duration of stay in the
host country. The impact is more pronounced for low-skilled migrants, which has
consequences for how migration a¤ects the long run convergence between sending
and destination countries.
5.1 Introduction
Do changes in nativesattitudes towards immigrants a¤ect the plans of foreign born
to return to their countries of origin? There is little evidence in the current litera-
ture to answer this question. This is puzzling considering the economic importance
of return migration and the impact of return intentions on the integration of immi-
grants in their host society. The self-selection of return migrants leads to important
compositional changes in the cohorts of foreign born who remain in their destination
country compositional changes have major consequences for labour markets in the
host countries as well as for economic development in the sending (often transition
or developing) countries. Return intentions are positively correlated with return re-
alisations and are driven by the same determinants (e.g. Borjas and Bratsberg 1996,
Yang 2006, Dustmann et al. 2011) incorporates the role of nativesattitudes in the
out-migration decisions of foreign born. There is to date no empirical study of the
e¤ects of nativesattitudes on the ows of return migration. The formation of public
attitudes towards migration and their interaction with migration policy making have
been the subject of considerable research in economics (Facchini and Mayda 2008,
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Hanson et al. 2009, Facchini et al. 2013, Gang et al. 2013). In this paper we address
precisely the missing link between explaining public attitudes towards migration and
assessing their impact on return migration.
We use the case of Romanian migrants in Italy to demonstrate how a sharp neg-
ative shock in attitudes of Italians towards a specic group of foreigners impacts on
their plans to return to their home country or to settle at destination. Specically, we
compare migrants with and without previous exposure to anti-immigrant stereotypes
before and after a strong negative shock in nativesattitudes. The shock developed
as a response to a crime committed by a Romanian migrant in October 2007. The
extensive media coverage of this event and the duopolistic nature of Italian television
provide us with a quasi-experimental setting to identify the impact of nativesatti-
tudes on return intentions. We nd a signicant impact of the change in attitudes
on migrantsplans to stay in Italy. Moreover, unskilled migrants seem to be a¤ected
more by the shock than highly skilled migrants.
The paper most related to ours in spirit is Friebel et al. (2013). They use a
similar set-up to analyse the impact of xenophobic attacks in the host country on
emigration from the source country. For the case of Mozambique, they identify a
signicant reduction in emigration intentions after a series of xenophobic attacks
targeting immigrants in the regions of destination, in South Africa. Our ndings also
complement the results of Gorinas and Pyltlicova (2013) who analyse the link between
native attitudes and migration ows in a cross-country setting. They conclude that
nativeshostility, measured by the extent of potential labour market discrimination,
reduces migration inows. Several other studies conrm the importance of migration
intentions and their role in predicting actual migration (e.g. Burda et al. 1998,
Gordon and Molho 1995)
Our paper provides, to our knowledge, the rst empirical evidence linking natives
attitudes to return intentions. In this context, the case of Romanian migration to
Italy is particularly relevant. Starting from the turn of the century in 2000, Romanian
migrants became the largest group of foreign born in Italy. Italy is by far the most
important destination country for emigrants leaving Romania. The overall share of
the foreign-born residents in Italy grew dramatically from 0.8 per cent in 1990 to
more than 7 per cent in 2010. This sharp increase in a short period of time was
accompanied by raising anti-immigrant attitudes among the native population. For
example, in 2007, Italians were overwhelmingly considering immigration as a worrying
problem in their country. Migrants from the Middle East, North Africa and Eastern
Europe were perceived as having a detrimental impact on Italy (Horowitz 2010).
The immigration-crime nexus has been a salient issue of the Italian media land-
scape. It is historically highly polarized (Hallin and Mancini 2004)and characterised
by partisan bias (Durante and Knight 2012). Television is the most popular in-
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formation medium for a large proportion of the Italian population (DAvanzo 2007,
CENSIS 2007). Italian TV is dominated by two networks - RAI, the state broadcaster
and Mediaset, the largest commercial media company in Italy, controlled by Silvio
Berlusconi. The RAI channels subscribe to a public service mission and attempt to
cover in a balanced way themes around race, immigration and diversity. In contrast,
Mediaset news programmes in particular devoted much more prime transmission time
than RAI programmes to crime and security issues (Durante and Knight 2012) often
linked to crimes committed by immigrants or to illegal immigration (Diamanti 2008).
We use this contrast in the presentation of immigrants between RAI and Mediaset
to account for di¤erences in immigrantsexposure to stereotyping and negative at-
titudes towards their community. The shock in attitudes and media coverage from
October 2007 allows us to construct a di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) model in which
we exploit the increased exposure to anti-immigrant attitudes for migrants who have
been using RAI channels as main source of information.
A number of recent studies have stressed the role of media exposure in shaping
migration choices and attitudes. Farré and Fasani (2013) uncover a causal nega-
tive relationship between TV exposure and internal migration decisions in Indonesia.
They attribute this link to imperfect information suggesting that TV exposure mit-
igates the individual valuation of gains to migration. Facchini et al. (2009) nd
evidence supporting the correlation between media exposure and attitudes towards
illegal migration in the US. Héricourt and Spielvogel (2014) demonstrate that media
is a crucial explanatory factor in the formation of beliefs about the economic impact
of immigration. In Italy, Mai (2001, 2004) describes how the media, especially tele-
vision, had a major impact on the expectations, perceptions and overall migration
experience of Albanian migrants.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents relevant
stylised facts on the ows and stocks of Romanian migrants in Italy. It also introduces
the particular context of the analysis. Section 5.3 presents the data, some descriptive
evidence and the method applied for the estimation. Section 5.4 discusses the results
and the limitations of our approach. In Section 5.5 we present additional results and
falsication tests. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Background and motivation
5.2.1 Stylized facts on Romanian migration to Italy
According to the World Bank - Migration Factbook 2011, international migration
ows between Romania and Italy form one of the top ten European "migration
corridors". While these ows started by the mid 1990s, they developed continuously
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Figure 5.1: Main countries of origin of migrants in Italy 2011 (stocks in thousands;
Source: Istat)
until Romanias EU accession in 2007. Between 1992 and 2007, Romanians together
with Albanians were the two nationality groups experiencing the largest increase
among the foreign born population in Italy (Bettin 2011).
However, during this period, Romanians became the largest immigrant commu-
nity in Italy. Figure 5.1 illustrates the stocks of migrants in Italy by country of origin
at the level of 2011. The incidence of Romanian migrants rose by more than 15 times,
while the overall foreign population in Italy rose in the decade preceding the year
2008 by around 400 per cent.
Over the same period of time, Italy represented by far the most important desti-
nation country for Romanian migrants. Data from the 2011 Romanian census suggest
that almost 50 per cent of the Romanian migrants identied as being abroad in the
census year were residing in Italy (see Figure 5.2). These very large ows were accom-
panied by temporary back and forth movements and return migration (Anghel 2013).
Both micro-level evidence from surveys (Martin and Radu 2012) and aggregate data
(Ambrosini et al. 2013), suggest that for Romania as well as other East and Central
European countries, return migration is a substantial share of total gross migration
ows. In Romania at the level of 2008, the share of returnees in the total working
age population was about 10 per cent (Martin and Radu 2012).
The Romanian migration to Italy was characterised by a negative selection: most
migrants were less skilled, already had a longer migration history, often involving
informal or illegal employment spells, and made use of network ties established in
their communities of origin (Anghel 2013; Elrick and Ciobanu 2009). There were
notable peaks over the last decade. Most of these correspond to past regularization
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Figure 5.2: Romanian migrants abroad at the level of 2011 (Source: INS census
data). West Europe includes: France, Belgium, Portugal, Austria. North Europe includes:
Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Ireland. N=363,000 valid observations.
programmes. Fasani (2010) uses an NGO database to analyze the main features of
undocumented migration in Italy1. Figure 5.3 indicates that the year 2007 was also
a peek year in term of net migration, with registered ows double in size compared
to the year before. The stock of Romanians in Italy grew thus by about 100 per
cent in 2007 only (according to OECD SOPEMI 2009 gures, 760,000 Romanian
citizens resided in Italy by 2008). An increase of this magnitude is most probably
cased mainly by statistical reasons: Romanian migrants who resided in Italy before
January 2007 could regularize their status under the free movement of labour in
the EU after Romania joined the EU. However, due to its sheer magnitude and its
visibility in statistics and public debates, this sharp increase in the o¢ cial number
of Romanian migrants is likely to have led to strong anti-immigration sentiments.
5.2.2 Media, attitudes and immigration in Italy
Between 1990 and 2010 the overall share of the foreign-born residents in Italy grew
dramatically, from 0.8% in 1990 to more than 7% in 2010. This strong increase in a
relative short period of time was accompanied by fears and anti-immigrant attitudes
among the native population. In 2007, Italians where overwhelmingly considering
immigration as a big problem in their country and that migrants from both the
Middle East and North African and from Eastern Europe were having a bad impact
on their country (Horowitz 2010). Data from the PEW Global Attitudes Survey
1See also Reyneri (1998) for a discussion of previous regularisation programmes in Italy.
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Figure 5.3: Net migration to Italy (Source: Istat)
suggest that at the level of 2007 (the data were collected before the events upon
which we focus in this paper) Italians were on average the strongest supporters of
tightening immigration controls among all European countries (Figure 5.4): 87 per
cent were in favour of tightening migration controls, compared to "only" 77 per cent
in Spain and 75 per cent in the UK, the other two countries which received massive
inows of labour migrants from Eastern Europe.
Our own estimates based on data from the Flash Eurobarometer 257/2009 (see
Figure 5.5), support this nding indicating that Italians consider migration (free
movement of persons) to be one of the most problematic issues when it comes to
(future) EU enlargements. This strong opinion on migration in relation to EU en-
largement is shared with citizens of the UK, another main destination country of
migration ows from Eastern Europe after the Eastern enlargement of the EU. The
same holds true when it comes to opinions on the relationship of migration and crime.
According to the gures of the Transatlantic Trend Survey on Immigration in 2008,
about one third of the respondents in UK and Italy agreed strongly to the statement
that immigration in general will increase crime in their society. On average, only
22 per cent of European and 25 per cent of US respondents shared this pessimistic
view. In addition to this the gures of the Transatlantic survey suggest, that the
broad majority of Italians (68 per cent) think that most immigrants are residing il-
legally in Italy. For comparison, only 15 per cent of the German and 34 per cent UK
respondents think in a similar way about the migrants in their country.
Against this background, it is easy to understand how a widely publicised crime
committed by a Romanian migrant can fuel a national press campaign and trigger a
public outrage against Romanian migrants living in Italy.
The immigration-crime nexus is a contentious issue in the Italian media. During
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Figure 5.4: Attitudes towards tighter immigration controls (Source: PEW Global
Attitudes Survey, 2007)
the period around 2007, 60 per cent of news related to any form of crime had an
immigrant as protagonist (Morcellini coord. 2009). The coverage of immigration was
related in 36 percent of the news to terrorism and criminality and in other 36 per cent
to illegal migration (Morcellini coord. 2009). The TV is the most used medium and
represents the exclusive source of information for a large proportion of the population
(DAvanzo 2007, CENSIS 2007). The media in Italy is historically highly polarised
(Hallin and Mancini 2004) and characterised by partisan bias (Durante and Knight
2012). The Italian TV was characterised by a duopoly between the public service
broadcaster RAI and the media network controlled by former prime-minister Silvio
Berlusconi. Particularly during the period around 2007, the two networks di¤ered
considerably in the way they represented immigration in Italy. During this period,
the Prodi II Cabinet (2006-2008) governed Italy supported by coalition of the entire
parliamentary left wing. Berlusconi did not control the public broadcaster RAI,
like he did after his return to o¢ ce in May 2008. Matrorocco and Minale (2015)
provide an excellent analysis of the impact of media on crime perception in Italy
after 2007. They do not distinguish between Mediaset and Rai in their study and
cover mainly the representation of crime not the crime-migration nexus. But they
suggest implicitly that during our period of interest around 2007, compared to the
periods immediately before and after, the two networks were more likely to di¤er in
the representation of crime - precisely because Berlusconi had less inuence over the
Rai network during this period.
The RAI channels (Rai1, Rai2, Rai3) abide to a public service mission and at-
tempted to cover themes around race, immigration and diversity in a balanced way.
Themes around diversity or addressing problems from the perspective of migrants
hardly featured in any Mediaset programmes. These are more leaning towards the
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Figure 5.5: Attitudes towards immigration and EU enlargement (Source: own pre-
sentation, data from Flash Eurobarometer 257/2009)
ideological right and use a more pronounced stereotyping perspective on immigration.
Only RAI channels devoted transmission time to immigration specic programmes:
93 percent of this time was on Rai2 and 7 percent of it on Rai3 (Morcellini coord.
2009). The Mediaset channels (Rettequattro, Canale cinque, Italia Uno) devoted
two times more prime transmission time than RAI to crime and security issues (Du-
rante and Knight 2012) often linked to crimes committed by immigrants or to illegal
immigration (Diamanti 2008). The Mediaset news programmes telegiornali(TG4,
TG5 and Studio Aperto) covered 60 percent more news on crime and migration than
their RAI counterparts taken together (TG1, TG2 and TG3). Our empirical analysis
conrms this divide between RAI and Mediaset. Romanian migrants using Medi-
aset channels for information on Italy are signicantly more likely to consider media
reports on immigration as tendentious, compared to those watching RAI channels
(we present our data in Section 5.3.1 and the comparison for the variable "Media
tendentious" in Table 5.1 ).
5.2.3 The "Tor di Quinto" events
Compared to the rst semester of 2007, the number of news on migration and crime
increased dramatically on both networks. On RAI news programmes it almost dou-
bled, from 888 to 1400 (Diamanti 2008). The reason for this was a crime committed
on October the 30th 2007 by a Romanian migrant of Roma origin. He robbed and
savagely beat an Italian woman, the wife of a navy o¢ cer who was returning home
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along a poorly lit road in the Tor di Quinto periphery of Rome. The victim subse-
quently died in hospital.
This incident appeared to be the nal straw that resulted in an explosive debate
on safety and security in Italy, coinciding with the presentation by the government
of its Security Package on 30 October(Sartori 2008). The case spurred an unprece-
dented negative public reaction against Romanian immigrants. At the same time,
the media reaction went well beyond the specic case both in Italy (generating a
debate around the so called Romanian emergency) as well as in Romania, having
European wide echoes in the press (not only via the TV but also in the print media
e.g. the headline of Corriere della Sera: The spectre of monsters from Europe: Is
the Romanian bogeyman destined to become Italiansnightmare?).2
Only three weeks later, the Italian government passed a decree to allow the police
and judiciary to expel immigrants who are deemed to be a threat to public order.
Then opposition leader Silvio Berlusconi urged Italy to close its borders to Romanian
workers and his conservative ally called for the expulsion of tens of thousands of
immigrants. The crisis brought at that time the Romanian Prime Minister to Rome
for an emergency meeting with his Italian counterpart.
What singled out this decree and shocked the public opinion was that it aimed
so openly at Romanians leading to the "securitization" (Boswell 2007) of the debate
on Romanian migrants in Italy. Its preamble claimed that the proportion of crimes
committed by foreigners has increased, and those who commit most crimes are the
Romanians.Newspapers reported this to be true only in absolute terms, Romanians
being the most numerous group of migrants in Italy, but not in relative terms. La
Stampas own analysis nds that the proportion of Romanians reported to, or arrested
by, the police in 2006 was lower than in most other foreign groups.
There were some voices raised against the decree. These included the Pope warn-
ing against racism and paranoia in Italy and the head of Italys criminal lawyers
association who initiated a protest against the emergency decree. The number of ac-
tual deportations is not available, but during the month following the Tor di Quinto
events, less than 200 deportations were reported, in contrast to the 200,000 demanded
by Fini and the 20,000 promised by the government. While the policy reaction re-
mained at the level of rhetoric, the public reaction via discourses, media and general
attitudes was massive. Since the at that time suspect was of Roma origin and resided
2Specically dealing with the Tor di Quinto events and their aftermath, some selected headlines
from across the major international press include:
Italy starts deporting Romanians, BBC-News, 05.11.2007
Italian womans murder prompts expulsion threat to Romanians, The Guardian, 02.11.2007
Brutal Attack in Rome: Italy Cracks Down on Immigrant Crime Wave, Der Spiegel, 02.11.2007
Rome veut durgence expulser les immigrés délinquants, Le Figaro, 05.11.2007
Italy: Prodi Defends Expulsions of Romanians, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 06.11.2007
Italy and immigration: Disharmony and tension, The Economist, 08.11.2007
Romanian Premier Tries to Calm Italy After a Killing, The New York Times, 08.11.2007
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in a temporary Roma camp, the wave of hatred was target against this group, but
also led to a backlash against Romanians in general.
In these circumstances, it seems worth while to try to analyse the impact of
such a shock in public attitudes on the return intentions of Romanian migrants. We
use in our motivation the shock as it was reected by the media. But there was a
remarkable change in individual attitudes over this period depicted in the repeated
survey of the Fondazione Unipolis, Demos and Pi on security issues and perceived
threats in the population. The second semester of 2007 is the single period in which
negative attitudes on immigration in Italy ("immigration poses threat to public order
and security") prevail over the perceived positive e¤ects of migration and diversity
("the presence of migrants enriches the cultural development of Italy") while the
opposite is the case for all waves before and after this period (Diamanti 2008).
In these circumstances, it seems worth while to try to analyse the impact of
such a shock in public attitudes on the return intentions of Romanian migrants. We
use in our motivation the shock as it was reected by the media. But there was a
remarkable change in individual attitudes over this period depicted in the repeated
survey of the Fondazione Unipolis, Demos and Pi on security issues and perceived
threats in the population. The second semester of 2007 is the single period in which
negative attitudes on immigration in Italy ("immigration poses threat to public order
and security") prevail over the perceived positive e¤ects of migration and diversity
("the presence of migrants enriches the cultural development of Italy") while the
opposite is the case for all waves before and after this period (ncite{dia2008}).
5.3 Data and method
5.3.1 The RCI survey
Our analysis relies on data from a broad-purpose survey covering the Romanian Com-
munity in Italy (RCI). The survey was commissioned by the Romanian government
through the Agency for Government Strategies ("Agen¸tia pentru Strategii Guverna-
mentale"). It aimed to gather accurate and detailed information on the situation
of Romanian migrants residing in Italy after Romania joined the EU. A single wave
of interviews was carried out in the period 20 November to 15 December 2007 on a
country wide representative sample of about 1,100 Romanian migrants (over 18 years
of age and excluding short term seasonal migrants and tourists).
For the RCI survey, a two-stage sample design was used to select regions and four
types of local administrative units ("comuni") based on the number of Romanian
migrants. This sampling frame was constructed using Istat data on the distribution
of Romanian migrants across Italian regions, localities and neighborhoods. Regions
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with a very small number of Romanian migrants were not sampled3, questionnaires
being eventually distributed in fteen regions and sixty "comuni". The majority
of migrants were sampled from the main destination regions of Romanian migrants
in Italy: Lazio (28 per cent), Lombardy (18 per cent), Veneto (17 per cent) and
Piedmont (11 per cent). The rest were split among the other regions according to the
Istat data on the ratio of Romanian migrants. About 25 per cent of the interviewed
migrants resided in big cities: Rome (10.5 per cent), Torino (8.5 per cent) and Milano
(6 per cent). The other were evenly distributed among medium sized, smaller towns
and rural areas. Within neighbourhoods, blocks of buildings and households were
selected randomly and the persons interviewed were sampled using a date of birth
criterion. No more than ve persons were included from the same street and no more
than two from the same block.
The RCI survey gathered detailed information on socio-demographic characteris-
tics, migration biographies, employment in Italy, ties to the region of origin in Ro-
mania, social interactions in the Romanian community and with the Italian society,
general life satisfaction, and several questions covering migration plans. These in-
clude: settlement plans in Italy, intentions to return to Romania or to move onwards
to a third destination country.
Fortunately for the purpose of our study, the RCI survey was carried out 3 to
5 weeks after the "Tor di Quinto" events, after the peak of the media scandal and
after the debates around the emergency decree for the immediate expulsion of cit-
izens of other European Union countries. It was therefore possible to include an
additional battery of questions in the RCI survey to cover the perception of and
reaction to recent developments in the aftermath of the "Tor di Quinto" events. In
particular, the RCI survey contains retrospective information on the perception of the
socio-economic situation in Italy and Romania as well as on outmigration intentions.
With respect to the latter, we make use of a question which asks whether the partic-
ipant revised his/her settlement intention following the "Tor di Quinto" events.4 We
combined this measure of revised settlement intentions with a question on current
settlement plans5 to construct a time varying measure of settlement intentions. The
fact that the "Tor di Quinto" events happened only 3 to 5 weeks before the interview
should foster a good perception of current and past settlements intentions. In other
words, the recall bias should be very limited. The corresponding variable is a dummy
coded as one if a respondent plans to settle in Italy on a long term basis and has
no concrete plans to either return to Romania or move to a third destination. This
3These are: Basilicata, Calabria, Molise, Puglia, Valle DAosta.
4The exact question is: "Did you revise your settlement intention as a result of the Tor di
Quintoevents"?
5"Do you intend to settle in Italy on a long term basis without migration plans in the next two
years?".
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allows us to identify changes in migration plans by comparing settlement intentions
before and after the "Tor di Quinto" events.6
A similar approach has been used before by Friebel, Gallego, and Mendola (2013).
They combine survey data on current migration intentions with retrospective infor-
mation on past migration intentions (1 year earlier) to study the change in migration
intentions of Mozambicans in reaction to xenophobic violence in South Africa. The
use of retrospective information on migration has a long tradition in social science.
Among others, Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) have used a retrospective question
in the UK Labour Force Survey to identify internal migrants in the United Kingdom.
McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) have exploited retrospective information in Mexican
survey data to identify migrants to the US. A more recent example is the work of
Mezger Kveder and Beauchemin (2014) who have studied the impact of migration on
home country investment using retrospective questions to measure migration periods
of Senegalese respondents in the "Migration between Africa and Europe" survey.
What makes the RCI data particularly interesting for our research are the detailed
questions on media consumption. These include the main sources used for informa-
tion about current a¤airs in Italy, the exact names of the main TV channels and the
frequency of use. The survey allocated a special weight to this section because it
initially aimed at covering the formation of attitudes among Romanian migrants in
relation to the overwhelmingly bad press they faced in host countries across Europe.
All respondents indicate to have been using the TV as source of information on cur-
rent a¤airs in Italy. More than ninety per cent mention it as the single main source
and use the TV daily or more times a week.
These questions allow us to identify migrants who were exposed to the Mediaset
channels and those who used instead the state TV (RAI) as their source of infor-
mation about Italy before the Tor di Quinto events. The survey question we use is:
"Name the main TV channel you have been using as source of information on Italy".
The question is asked about TV habits not related to the Tor di Quinto events but
to the usual, long-term media preferences. We cannot entirely rule out that immi-
grants changed their main Italian TV-channels after the events. But this does not
a¤ect our identication strategy or the estimated impact as long as the answers do
not su¤er from systematic recall bias. Also, inertia in TV consumption patterns
observed in other studies reassure us that short-term changes in TV behaviour such
as the choice of the main channel are unlikely to bias signicantly our results. We
assign respondents into the two groups using the channel identied by respondents
as the primary source of information. Among those respondents using the state TV
channels, about 67 per cent used RAI 1, 27 per cent RAI 2 and only 6 per cent RAI
6The RCI survey includes a few additional retrospective questions related to the perceptions of
respondents when they arrived in Italy. We use the questions to test the validity of our empirical
identication strategy in Section 5.
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3. Among the Mediaset users, the majority chose Canale 5 (43 per cent) or Italia 1



















Age 33.281 (9.256) 32.060 (8.703) 1.221**
Woman 0.430 (0.496) 0.432 (0.496) 0.002
Low education 0.150 (0.357) 0.106 (0.308) 0.044**
Medium education 0.672 (0.469) 0.791 (0.406) 0.118***
High education 0.176 (0,381) 0.102 (0.303) 0.021***
Ethnic Roma 0.119 (0.324) 0.084 (0.278) 0.034*
Informally employed 0.343 (0.475) 0.235 (0.424) 0.108***
Log wage / month 5.281 (0.419) 5.342 (0.476) 0.060*
Hours work / day 8.179 (1.717) 8.342 (1.468) 0.163
HH income / month 1663.292 (1008.958) 1774.420 (1079.339) 111.128
Years in Italy 3.809 (3.162) 4.547 (3.345) 0.738***
Fluent in Italian 0.699 (0.459) 0.755 (0.431) 0.056**
Minority religion 0.166 (0.373) 0.195 (0.396) 0.028
Overall trust 4.743 (2.189) 4.802 (2.126) 0.060
Negative Roma 0.687 (0.464) 0.759 (0.428) 0.072***
Dont migrate 0.487 (0.500) 0.376 (0.485) 0.111***
Worsening opinion 0.717 (0.451) 0.681 (0.467) 0.036
Media tendentious 0.573 (0.495) 0.647 (0.479) 0.073**
Deportation justied 0.393 (0.489) 0.442 (0.497) 0.049
No Italian contacts 0.628 (0.484) 0.610 (0.488) 0.018
Poor health 0.177 (0.382) 0.139 (0.346) 0.038*
Tied migrant 0.048 (0.214) 0.066 (0.249) 0.018
Migration negative 0.641 (0.480) 0.687 (0.464) 0.046
Roma neighbor 0.156 (0.363) 0.080 (0.272) 0.075***
Annual remittances 1668.214 (2966.224) 1541.694 (2585.070) 126.521
Owns house in Ro. 0.423 (0.494) 0.396 (0.489) 0.027
Owns land in Ro. 0.320 (0.467) 0.269 (0.444) 0.051*
Share foreign born1 6.409 (1.446) 6.577 (0.931) 0.169**
Share Ro. migrants1 24.049 (10.306) 25.798 (10.041) 1.749***
Unemployment rate1 4.769 (2.167) 4.365 (1.480) 0.404***
Observations 565 498
Notes: The table reports mean values of the descriptive variables for those with and
without exposure to Mediaset controlled media. Signicance levels correspond to
two-tailed t-test of the equality of the means for the two groups.
* signigicant at 10%; ** at 5 %; and ***at 1%
1 refer to regional characteristics in Italy for 2007 provided by Istat.
Table 5.1: Characteristics of Romanian migrants in Italy
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In Table 5.1 we compare the main characteristics for respondents with and with-
out exposure to Mediaset channels. We selected these variables using the standard
framework of a human capital (return) migration model and included also some ad-
ditional regional characteristics.7 In contrast to settlement intentions, which serves
as our dependent variable, all covariates refer to the time of the interview (i.e. after
the "Tor di Quinto" events) and do not vary over time. The t-tests included in the
last two columns of Table 5.1 indicate that the two groups are not only similar in
size, but also are comparable with respect to many individual characteristics like gen-
der, household income, work e¤ort, attitudes towards the situation and perception of
Romanian migrants in the Italian society. There are also no statistically signicant
di¤erences between the two groups with regard to variables we expect to be highly
correlated with return migration: remittances, integration in Italy (having or not
Italian friends), to be or not a tied migrant (family migration decisions), religious af-
liation (documented to be a strong predictor of migration and return due to specic
network ties in Romania and abroad) and house ownership in Romania. Migrants
exposed to Mediaset channels are more likely to be younger, to have been residents in
Italy for longer periods, to be on average slightly more uent in Italian, and less likely
to be informally employed. They are also more likely to consider that the Italian me-
dia reacted in a tendentious way to the "Tor di Quinto" events. However, with regard
to the selection into media exposure based on education there is no clear pattern.
Mediaset exposed migrants are at the same time less likely to have only a low level
of education and to be highly skilled compared to migrants who were not exposed
to Mediaset channels. As a consequence they are signicantly more likely to have
a medium level of education. We will control for all these observable characteristics
in the various specications of our regression based di¤erence-in-di¤erences models.
But the otherwise rather neutral selection into media exposure is worth noting and
important for the discussion of our results.
5.3.2 The Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences approach
One reason why migrants choose either of the two types of television channels can be
due to di¤erent preferences making them more likely to consume mass media with
a specic content. However, based on the perceptions about Italy facilitated by the
media, they will also form expectations with regard to their optimal migration and
integration strategies and the constraints they might face in the host society. Given
the potential self-selection into the type of media migrants consume, we have no a
priori expectations about the correlation between the frequency of anti-immigrant
expressions in the chosen media and the intended duration of stay in the destination
7A detailed description of the variables can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.
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country. The RCI data suggest a small di¤erence between migrants exposed to Medi-
aset and those exposed to the state TV - the former being slightly less likely to have
settlement intentions in Italy (see Table 5.2), but the di¤erence is not statistically
signicant (t = 0:654).
However, we would expect migrants exposed to di¤erent media to react in di¤erent
ways to a shock in public attitudes of the magnitude reached after the Tor di Quinto
events.
Migrants who use Mediaset controlled TV channels as their main source of infor-
mation are more frequently exposed to anti-immigrant sentiments and used to the
stereotyping attitudes propagated by this media. We expect them to be therefore
less likely to react to the shock in attitudes after 30.10.2007 as their counterparts
who used other TV channels as main source of information in Italy. We dene the
group exposed to Mediaset channels as our control group. For those who did not
use Mediaset channels, the Tor di Quinto events and the reaction afterwards came
as a massive shock. They are our treatment group because they were not exposed to
negative attitudes from Italians before "Tor di Quinto". This denition of treatment
and control groups informs our baseline di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach.
By exploiting this variation in media consumption among Romanian migrants,
our intention is to establish a causal link between changes in public attitudes and
settlement intentions. The validity of our approach is based on the assumption
that, other things being equal, the trend in settlement intentions in the group of
migrants who are exposed to the Mediaset channels will be the same as among those
who are not exposed. The common trend assumption would therefore imply that
the settlement intentions in each of the two groups were moving in a parallel way
before the shock. Due to the limitations of our data, we cannot directly test for the
validity of this assumption. We do however assume that individuals in the control
group would always have slightly lower settlement intentions than individuals in our
treated group and, more importantly, that this di¤erence between treatment and
control group ( settlement) would be constant across time, e.g. at various points
in time, t  5, t  4, t  3, t  2, t  1  settlement would be the same, with t = 30
October 2007, and  1; 2. . . being months or years before.
Besides the raw di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation presented in Table 5.2 and
discussed in the next section, we also assess how robust these are to the introduction
of control variables. In order to do this we estimate a probit equation of the type:
P (settlementit = 1) = [+   Zit + 0 No mediaset exposurei (5.1)
+ 1  post"Tor di Quinto"t
+ 2  (No mediaset exposure post"Tor di Quinto")it] + "it












(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated group
Non-Mediaset .663 (.020) .463 (.021) -.200 (.029)
[N = 1; 130]
Control group
Mediaset .644 (.021) .542 (.023) -.102 (.032) -.098 (.043)
[N = 996]
Notes: The table reports mean intentions to settle in Italy of Romanian migrants.
Intention to settle equals one if migrants plan to stay in Italy on a medium to long
term asis and have no concrete plans to return during the next twelve months.
N includes two observations (one pre one post) for n=1,063 Romanian migrants.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5.2: Intentions to settle (no return plans) in Italy of Romanian migrants
dent i plans to stay in Italy at time t. Z is a vector of personal characteristics (in our
data most of them time invariant), while No mediaset exposurei is a dummy variable
taking the value one if the respondent does not use Berlusconi owned Mediaset pro-
grams as the main source of information and post"Tor di Quinto" takes the value one
for the time after 30.10.2007. The coe¢ cient for the interaction of these two dummy
variables, 2 is of interest for our analysis but its magnitude does not represent the
partial e¤ect. We therefore estimated the predicted response in settlement intentions
for those who were not exposed to Mediaset channels at the means of the covariates
and report this in the last row of Table 5.3.
5.4 Discussion of the results
We present some prima facie evidence on the impact of the "Tor di Quinto" events on
settlement intentions of Romanian migrants in Table 5.2. This includes the uncondi-
tional di¤erences in average settlement intentions in Italy before and after the events
for our treatment and control groups, as well as the simple di¤erence-in-di¤erences
(DiD).
Our treatment group are all Romanian immigrants who are following the news
through media non-a¢ liated with the Berlusconi press (non-Mediaset). As already
mentioned, our assumption is that those media channels projected a more balanced
picture of the impact of immigration on Italy. Immigrants who followed those media
were therefore not exposed to very negative views from the national media towards
themselves before the "Tor di Quinto" events. We nd that those immigrants ex-
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pressed a greater tendency to settle in Italy before the events (the p-value on the
di¤erence is 0 up to the fourth decimal point). Quite striking is the reduction in those
intentions to settle following the "Tor di Quinto" events. Around a third of immi-
grants in this group revised their intention to settle (i.e. a reduction of 20 percentage
points from .66 to .46) and expressed intentions to return in their origin country or to
move on to third destination countries. This reduction exceeds by far the reduction
in settlement intentions amongst Romanian immigrants who were used to negative
views on immigration through media (i.e. our control group). Immigrants who were
regularly using the Berlusconi media did indeed also reduce their intention to settle
but by far less than our treated sample. Only 15 per cent changed their mind after
"Tor di Quinto". One obvious interpretation of these results is that the shock caused
by the huge media coverage of the events was much greater for immigrants who were
not accustomed to being stereotyped and portrayed in non-favourable light. This is
a potentially important and interesting result showing for the rst time the size of
the impact that media can have on intentions to settle. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences
indicates a reduction of 9.8 percentage points and signicantly di¤erent from nil (p-
value= .021). The size of the corresponding impact on intentions to settle in Italy





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.3 reports the results from our probit model outlined in equation 5.1.
The rst column in Table 5.3 re-produces the coe¢ cient reported in Table 5.2. In
column 2, we add the socio-demographic controls available in our data set. We
observe that the coe¢ cient of interest tends to increase slightly and remains highly
signicant. In columns (3) to (5) we introduce more variables that can potentially
reverse or a¤ect the tendency to settle in the host country. The addition of variables
capturing links to the Italian society as well as the migrantsown perception of native
attitudes and of the media reaction (column 3) tends to increase slightly the main
coe¢ cient of interest. The same holds true if we control for additional migration
characteristics (column 4) like the type of migration (tied migrant), household links
to Romania (land and house ownership) as well as the migrantsrevealed own views
on the impact of migration. Adding regional xed e¤ects, controlling for regions
of origin in Romania and regions of residence in Italy, tend to further increase the
main coe¢ cient of interest and the corresponding predicted response in settlement
intentions. Overall, the addition of a large number of control variables does not
greatly a¤ect the value and signicance of coe¢ cients. Our preferred estimate of the
response in settlement intentions is .11 per cent, with a standard-error of .046 and
consequently a p-value of .017. This means that intentions to settle have decreased
amongst the Romanian immigrants following the media coverage of "Tor di Quinto"
by 11 percentage points with a base value of 66 per cent, i.e. an impact of almost 17
per cent.
5.5 Extensions and falsication tests
The nature of selection into return migration is of crucial importance for the long
term developmental impact of migration on the sending countries. We are there-
fore particularly interested in whether the impact of native attitudes on settlement
intentions is random or if it a¤ects the selection of return migrants.
In order to investigate this, we need to nd the partial e¤ects on sub-groups based
on education, age, Italian language uency and labour market experience proxied by
years since migration in Italy. We estimate therefore probit models similar to that
from equation 5.1 but incorporating triple interaction terms (DDD) with dummy











No mediasetpostlow educ. -.133 -.132 -.138
(.061) (.060) (.061)
No mediasetpostmed. educ. .083 .088 .093
(.097) (.102) (.105)
No mediasetposthigh educ. .016 .034 .046
(.127) (.137) (.138)
No mediasetpostlanguage .037 .041 .120
(uent in Italian) (.094) (.099) (.253)
No mediasetpostrecent mig. -.004 -.023 -.058
(in Italy less than 3 years) (.090) (.079) (.208)
No mediasetpostover 40 -.076 -.074 -.071
(older than 40) (.143) (.138) (.141)
Notes: The dependent variable is settlement intentions in Italy.
Standard errors in parentheses.
The marginal e¤ects in columns (2) and (3) are from partial interactions
in probit models using third di¤erences, calculated at means.
See also Cornelissen and Sonderhof 2009).
Table 5.4: Treatment e¤ects for subgroups
P (settleit = 1) = [+   Zit + 1 No mediaset exposurei (5.2)
+ 2  post"Tor di Quinto"t + 3  subgroupi
+ 12  (No mediaset exp. post"Tor di Quinto")it
+ 13  (No mediaset exp. subgroup)i
+ 23  (subgroupi  post"Tor di Quinto")it
+ 123  (No mediaset exp: post"Tor di Quinto" subgroup)it] + "it
where all variables are the same as in (5.1) and subgroupi takes the value one if
respondent i belongs to the sub-group of interest.
Table 5.4 shows the results of the sub-group analysis. It reports the estimates
for education groups (low, medium and high), for language uency (based on a con-
structed dummy variable indicating whether the respondents are uent in Italian),
for recent migrants (those who arrived earlier than the median number of years since
migration in the sample) and age (migrants over forty years of age).
The rst column in Table 5.4 present the raw di¤erence-in-di¤erences for the sub-
groups while columns (2) and (3) include covariates8 These results were estimated
8In column 2 we control for socio-demographic and migration characteristics as well as for vari-
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using triple interaction terms and predicting the marginal e¤ects at the means of
the covariates using third di¤erentials. Given our interest in the implications of our
results for the potential self-selection into (having intentions to) out-migration, it
is worth noting that hardly any sub-group e¤ects are statistically signicant. Most
e¤ects are much smaller than our baseline results for the whole sample.
The only group for which the impact is statistically signicant at 5 per cent is
that for low education. After the inclusion of covariates the magnitude of the e¤ect
for this group is above the one estimated for the whole sample being 13 percentage
points, with a corresponding p-value of .03. In other words, low educated migrants
were decreasing their intentions to settle in Italy on a medium to long term basis by
13 percentage points which given the base value of 70 per cent in the group, suggest
a reduction of settlement intentions by about 20 per cent. The implications for the
selection into settlement and out-migration are straightforward. The implied posi-
tive selection into settlement means that without accounting for out-migration any
predictions of the integration prospects of migrants in Italy will be biased upwards.
Even if out-migration intentions are not realized, those belonging to the lower edu-
cated might have less incentives to invest in specic skills or language and will face
a long term disadvantage.
Moreover, the described selection pattern is likely to reduce the potential gains of
return migration for the sending country. Piracha and Vadean (2010) have shown that
low skilled return migrants are less likely to engage in entrepreneurial activities than
skilled returners. The same holds true for failed migrants who leave the destination
country before they have reached their savings goal. For the case of Egypt, Marchetta
(2012) has demonstrated that migration experience also increases the survival rate
of entrepreneurial activities and by this generates a long-term contribution to em-
ployment creation. The fact that return migrants are negatively selected in terms of
education and leave the destination earlier is likely to reduce two main benets of
return migration: entrepreneurial take-up and sustainability of self-employment. It
is also very likely to impact on the saving behavior of migrants (Piracha and Zhu
2012) and eventually on both the magnitude and the use of remittances in the home
country (Piracha and Randazzo 2011).
Our data do not allow us to include a placebo period in the analysis. Since
the time period we are concerned with is very short, i.e. one month before and
after the Tor di Quinto events, it is highly unlikely that our di¤erence-in-di¤erences
results are due to some other events occurring in the same period. However, we
want to rule out the possibility that our estimated relationship between a shock in
anti-immigrant sentiments and settlement intentions may capture omitted factors
ables measuring integration. The results in column 2 are therefore comparable with the results in
column 4 of table 3.
137
that a¤ect for example both the choices over media consumption and the intended
duration of stay in Italy. Such factors could be related e.g. to unobserved a¢ nity
for the culture or local amenities in the destination country, or to preferences over
consumption in the region of origin which a¤ect migrants attitudes towards the
host society. We construct two types of falsication tests in order to increase the
condence that our results are not driven by such hidden biases due to omitted
characteristics. First, we perform the same di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis on our
treatment and control groups but using a "fake" outcome, i.e. an outcome known
to be una¤ected by the treatment (Rosenbaum 2002). Second, we use our outcome
of primary interest, settlement intentions in the destination country, but we dene
the treatment and control groups for the di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis such that
they are not a¤ected by the shock in public attitudes. In both cases we should nd
no signicant impacts. This would support our interpretation that the relationship
between a shock in native attitudes and settlement intentions is not coincidental and
unlikely to be driven by omitted variables.
We use rst three sets of variables that record the perception of Romanian mi-
grants with regard to the politico-economic situation in Romania before and after
the events. These variables cover: (i) the overall economic conditions in Romania, (ii)
the employment and labour market situation and (iii) the political context and the
functioning of institutions. The change in these perceptions should not be a¤ected
by the shock in native attitudes. For all three variables, we run the same models
as in equations (5.1) and (5.2) using the same controls but the perception variables
as "fake" outcome. The results are reported in Table 5.5 for both the DD e¤ects
(rst row) and the subgroup e¤ects using third di¤erences (DDD). None the e¤ects
is statistically signicant.
This means that in terms of outcomes that could not reasonably be caused by
a shock in native attitudes, our treatment and control groups are not statistically
di¤erent, which is what we would expect had the media exposure been assigned at
random.
Similarly, for the second set of tests, we change the denition of our treatment
using those who have negative perceptions on the situations in Romania as our "fake"
control group and those with neutral or positive perceptions as treatment while keep-
ing our main outcome of interest (settlement intention in the host country). The main
rational here is that people who have negative opinion on their origin country should
not revise their settlement intention following the Tor di Quinto event in comparison
to those who have no such negative opinions about their origin country. All three
outcomes (i.e. overall economy, labour market and political context) measuring neg-
ative perceptions of the situation in Romania are positively correlated to settlement












dependent variable: negative perception of situation in Romania
treatment group: without Mediaset exposure
control group: with Mediaset exposure
No mediasetpost .014 .025 .059
(.033) (.024) (.039)
No mediasetpostlow. educ. .040 -.023 .043
(.046) (.049) (.079)
No mediasetpostmed. educ. .058 .029 .058
(.051) (.050) (.051)
No mediasetposthigh educ. .130 .003 .045
(.144) (.063) (.105)
No mediasetpostlanguage .080 .021 .080
(uent in Italian) (.074) (.055) (.074)
No mediasetpostrecent mig. .003 .012 .004
(in Italy less than 3 years) (.053) (.043) (.053)
No mediasetpostover 40 -.036 -.006 .114
(older than 40) (.070) (.055) (.085)
Notes: The dependent variable takes the value one if the perceptions on the
evolution of economic conditions, the labour market situation and the
political context in Romania are respectively negative and zero otherwise.
Standard errors in parentheses.
The marginal e¤ects are from partial interactions in probit models.
For subgroups, these are estimated using third di¤erences.
Table 5.5: Falsication tests: una¤ected outcomes
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the perception variables to dene the treatment groups and keeping our outcome of
primary interest as dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 5.6 where
each column corresponds to one of the three denitions of treatment and control
groups and they show no signicance at all. We therefore do not nd an impact
of the shock in attitudes on settlement intentions when using alternate treated and











dependent variable: settlement intentions at destination
treatment group: negative perception on Romania (col. 1, 2 and 3)
control group: stable perception on Romanian conditions
Negativepost -.033 -.051 .022
(.050) (.058) (.045)
Negativepostlow. educ. -.045 -.008 .134
(.161) (.152) (.132)
Negativepostmed. educ. .019 .079 -.054
(.128) (.109) (.100)
Negativeposthigh educ. .038 -.125 -.026
(.169) (.132) (.128)
Negativepostlanguage .002 .059 -.038
(uent in Italian) (.130) (.119) (.102)
Negativepostrecent mig. -.025 -.099 -.047
(in Italy less than 3 years) (.118) (.108) (.094)
Negativepostover 40 -.030 .031 .003
(older than 40) (.171) (.163) (.147)
Notes: The dependent variable is settlement intentions in Italy (same as in tables 2-4).
Standard errors in parentheses.
The marginal e¤ects are from partial interactions in probit models.
For subgroups, these are estimated using third di¤erences.
Table 5.6: Falsication tests: una¤ected groups
The results from Tables 5.5 and 5.6 are consistent with the absence of bias in
our estimation. They support our hypothesis that changes in native attitudes have a
signicant impact on settlement intentions in the destination country and this is not
driven by omitted characteristics.
Finally, we investigate whether our results are a¤ected by di¤erent pre-trends.
Our identication strategy relies on the assumption that individuals in our treatment
and control group follow the same time trend behaviour in settlement intentions. In
other words, trends in settlement intentions are assumed to be the same for Mediaset
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and non-Mediaset watchers in the absence of the "Tor di Quinto" events. Evidence in
support of the parallel trends assumption comes from our additional results in Table 5
in which we use retrospective information on perceptions of the situation in Romania.
If our treatment and control group would have been characterized by di¤erent time
trends in settlement intentions, it would be very likely that the two groups also have
di¤erent time trends with respect to related outcomes. We therefore would expect to
nd signicant di¤erences between the two groups when looking at outcomes related
to settlement intentions that are likely to be una¤ected by the "Tor di Quinto" events.
However, we do not nd any signicant di¤erences in long run trends between the
two groups when looking at changes in perceptions on the evolution of economic
conditions, the labour market situation and the political context in Romania. This
speaks in favour of our assumption that trends in settlement intentions did not di¤er.
To provide more support for our parallel trends assumption, we combine our DiD
estimation with propensity score matching (e.g. Blundell and Dias 2009) and apply
the method suggested by Villa (2011). We do this rst without covariates replicating
the method for Table 5.2, but using weights based on the propensity score. The
corresponding results, reported in the appendix in Table C5, are very similar to the
estimates in Table 5.2. We do then the same exercise but conditioning on observable
characteristics, i.e. replicating Table 5.3, and obtain the estimates provided in Table
C6 in the appendix. The results are very similar to those reported in the last column
of Table 5.3. This is further evidence that the di¤erences in observable characteristics
do not cause bias and do not a¤ect the credibility of our parallel trends assumption.
5.6 Conclusions
The out-migration rate of foreign born after ve years of residency varies greatly
across the main destinations countries: e.g. it was on average 20 percent in the
US, 40 percent in the UK, and 60 percent in Ireland (Dumont and Spielvogel 2008).
The self-selection of return migrants leads to important compositional changes in
the cohorts of foreign born who remain at destination. These changes are crucial
for understanding both the economic assimilation of immigrants in the host societies
and the impact of return migration for the source countries. Lubotsky (2007) shows
that not accounting for selective return migration leads to overestimating the rate
of economic assimilation during the rst decade spent in the host country. There
is to date no conclusive evidence about what determines the selection into return
migration. After the 2008 economic crisis, several major destination countries saw a
surge in support for nationalist and populist parties. This led mainstream politicians
to adopt harsh anti-immigration positions. In this context, negative attitudes towards
migration can greatly inuence choices over return migration. However, the e¤ects
141
of native attitudes on out-migration decisions has not been studied extensively in the
empirical economics literature.
One novelty of our study lies in uncovering a signicant relationship between
changes in public attitudes and migrants settlement intentions. We exploit the
variation in media consumption among Romanian migrants in Italy and use data after
a unique shock in the attitudes of Italians towards Romanian migrants. Our results
indicate that Romanian migrants who have been a¤ected by the sharply hardened
native attitudes are less likely to plan to settle in Italy. We nd a reduction in
settlement intentions on average by more than 10 percent that can be attributed to
the change in nativesattitudes.
Two types of potential implications derive from our ndings: short-run e¤ects
on immigrantscurrent choices and long-run e¤ects on their socio-cultural integra-
tion in the host country. Due to the nature of our data, we identied in the paper
the current (short-term) impact of native attitudes on return intentions. This e¤ect
might fade away so that migrants not only settle at destination but also change their
return intentions over the migration biography. But our result remains socially and
economically relevant. Many of the choices made by migrants (like e.g. remittances,
investment in language acquisition, degree of interaction with natives) depend to a
larger extent on current, short-term plans than on future realizations of return in-
tentions (see e.g. Dustmann and Mestres 2010). The link we identify between native
attitudes and return intentions becomes even more important if native attitudes con-
tinuously deteriorate, like they did in most European receiving countries in the period
after the events we study. Recent Eurobarometer surveys show that immigration has
become by far the single most important concern of EU citizens (European Commis-
sion 2015). In this context, current (short-term) return intentions can persist and
even without being realized can impede immigrantsintegration, e.g. by diminishing
their direct interactions with natives (Danzer and Yaman 2013). Besides, looking at
o¢ cial Italian immigration data (Istat 2014) we nd some tentative evidence that
the 2007 events might have impacted on the actual outmigration ows of Romanian
citizens from Italy. The absolute number of Romanians leaving Italy in 2008 more
than doubled compared to the previous year (2007). No other immigrant community
in Italy experienced an increase in outows of a similar magnitude for this period.
Moreover, the number of Romanians leaving Italy continued to increase in subsequent
years, although the inows from Romania decreased steadily.
The impact we identify on return and settlement intentions is not coincidental.
And less skilled migrants are more a¤ected by the shock in attitudes than medium
and highly skilled migrants. The implications for destinations countries of immigrants
are straightforward if we believe that the e¤ect of native attitudes on settlement
intentions is not purely temporary in nature. Negative attitudes a¤ect migrants who
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have the lowest skills and therefore lowest earnings in a particular cohort. They will
face reduced incentives to invest in country specic skills or language. If they do
return, any predictions on the economic assimilation of immigrants will have to be
adjusted downwards to account for the negative selection into return migration. If
they stay in the host country, persistent return intentions will hamper their socio-
economic integration. The implications for the sending countries are manifold. The
recent tide in anti-immigrant feelings may induce more return migrants from the
lower end of the skill distribution in any immigrant cohort. This reduces the expected
benets from temporary migration. Changes in intended durations of stay may also
a¤ect both the magnitude and the use of remittances sent from abroad. This in
turn might reduce the potential growth inducing e¤ects of remittances in sending




Over the last two decades almost all CEE countries experienced massive labour out-
ows and signicant ows of return migration. The long-run welfare impacts of these
migration ows for the countries of origin are hardly predictable. The evidence over-
whelmingly suggests that migrants are positively selected from the population of the
sending countries with regard to age, education, productive skills, entrepreneurial
spirit, democratic and civic engagement. From the perspective of migrants them-
selves, migration is an opportunity to improve their standards of living. From the
perspective of the sending countries, the emigration of the young and most productive
workers is a loss and can be harmful for transition and developing economies. There
are two compensation mechanisms for this loss (besides the theoretical possibility of a
brain gaindue to virtuous educational incentives in the native population): remit-
tances and return migration. Remittances are an important channel through which
migration impacts on the sending country. After a small decrease during the economic
recession, remittances received by CEE countries from their migrants abroad contin-
ued to rise steadily (see table 6.1). Our analysis suggests that return migration has
also potentially considerable e¤ects for the socio-economic developments of sending
countries. While the positive impacts of remittances are less controvesial in the eco-
nomic literature, we do not yet fully understand if return migration can alleviate the
negative supply shock of emigration in the sending countries. For this, we would need
to assess the impacts of return migration accross areas such as employment, health,
education, inequality and democratisation. The present thesis addressed only a few
of these aspects. The next section (6.1) summarises our ndings with regard to the
labour market impacts of temporary migration in CEE. Section 6.2 presents some






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Our analysis of the selection of East European migrants and returnees suggests that
workers move in accordance with the wage premium they receive at destination (place
premium). Decisions to migrate and return are therefore consistent with an optimal
strategy to maximise lifetime income. The observed sorting of migrants across desti-
nation countries is therefore in line with the predictions of standard economic theory.
It is also remarkably concurring with qualitative evidence of both previous sociolog-
ical studies (which emphasise the role of migrant networks) and political science
research (which highlights the importance of selective migration policies).
The rationality of migration and return decisions allows us to assess the long-run
implications of temporary migration for sending countries. For the case of Romania,
despite the strong positive selection into initial migration, our results imply positive
long-run e¤ects due to return migration. The enhanced wage productivity of return
migrants increases the average wage level and the level of schooling through re-
migration and through incentives to invest in education. Our comparative analysis in
chapter 2 indicates that these ndings are can be generalised for other CEE countries.
The analysis for the case of Romania leads to the conclusion that return migrants
are strongly positively selected on observables and negatively selected on unobserved
characteristics, relative to non-migrants. Despite the inherent identication problems
given that migration and return decision are endogenous to education and labour
market outcomes, our data allow some guarded insights into the nature of selec-
tion on unobservable characteristics for returnees who worked and those who studied
abroad. With all the necessary caution, our ndings suggest opposite signs in the
selection on unobservables for work abroad and for study abroad. Migrants who
work abroad and return appear to have unobserved characteristics which are nega-
tively correlated with their subsequent wage productivity upon return. This means
that the omitted variables bias when controlling only for observables is negative and
simple OLS estimates will understate the premium for work experience abroad. On
the contrary, those who studied abroad and subsequently returned to work in Roma-
nia appear to possess unobserved characteristics which are positively correlated with
their labour market performance upon return. The omitted variable bias in OLS
regressions of wages on foreign education is therefore positive. Without adjusting
for selection on unobserved variables we overestimate the payo¤ to studying abroad.
For the case of Romanians educated abroad and working back home, correcting for
selection on unobservables renders the payo¤ to foreign education insignicant. Ob-
taining accurate estimates of the returns to studying abroad is of obvious importance
for understanding the mobility patterns of students (who studies abroad and who re-
turns afterwards?) and the potential long-term impacts of foreign education for the
sending countries.
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The results of chapter 5 complement these ndings by looking at return deci-
sions. We nd that the recent tide of anti-immigrant feelings in European destination
countries a¤ects migrantsintended duration of stay abroad. The e¤ect is more pro-
nounced at the lower end of the skill distribution in any immigrant cohort. From the
perspective of the sending country, a negative selection into return migration reduces
the expected benets from temporary migration. Changes in intended durations of
stay may also a¤ect both the magnitude and the use of remittances sent from abroad
(Piracha and Randazzo 2011). This in turn diminishes the potential growth inducing
e¤ects of remittances in migrantsregions of origin.
6.2 Implications and scope for further research
The economic literature has amassed ample evidence, models and empirical methods
to study the e¤ects of migration for receiving countries. But there remain still many
questions to be answered, in particular about the e¤ects of temporary migration
for the sending countries. In this context, it is important to understand the nature
of selection into return migration and the out-migration patterns of foreign born.
Both are crucial determinants of the long term impacts of migration for sending and
receiving countries.
How do migrants self-select from the population of the country of origin? How
do returnees in turn self-select from the cohorts of migrants residing abroad? The
methods used in this thesis to address such questions rely on a partial equilibrium
approach. It assumes that the selection of migrants and returnees is determined by
the relative income and skill distributions in the sending and destination countries
and that migration ows do not a¤ect these distributions. This last assumption
becomes questionable for large migration outows, like those experienced by some
CEE countries. As Borjas (2014, p.213) points out, we do not yet understand the
nature of selection in a general equilibrium context.
A wealth of recent evidence suggests that out-migration played a much more im-
portant role during the age of mass migration than was recognised until now (Ban-
deira et al. 2013, Abramitzky et al. 2013). The estimations carried out by Bandeira
et al. (2013) imply rates of return migration from the US of about 60 and 75 per
cent for each of the rst decades of the 20th century. This is double the magnitude
of previously reported out-migration rates. Will the closing of the current East-West
migration cycle bring about comparable rates of return migration to CEE countries?
A more general aim of future research could therefore be to reconcile the views that
mass migration had historically positive e¤ects on countries of origin but these will
not necessarily materialise for recent migration ows (see Bandeira et al. 2013).
Economic research can help understanding the impacts of temporary migration
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in a broader context. It can contribute to explain the migration-democracy nexus in
East European and Central Asian transition economies. Does international migration
act as a facilitator of institutional change in countries of origin or is it only an
outcome of the dissatisfaction with prevailing political and economic conditions?
Recent democratic backlashes in some East European countries conrms the relevance
of such questions. Over the last decade, all these countries experienced sharp changes
in the pace of their democratic change (as reected e.g. in their scores on indices of
democracy) as well as dramatic increases in emigration rates (reected e.g. in the
ratio of highly skilled leaving the country). Both processes, migration and democratic
consolidation, have profound implications for the economic development and the
integration of these countries in the global economy.
The interrelationship between migration and institutional change has received
little attention in either the economic research on migration or the democratisation
literature. Some earlier studies found that westbound migration from Eastern Eu-
rope in the 1990s has had minimal or no impact on the democratic consolidation
in post-communist countries (Morawska, 2001). Labour outows appeared as exit
strategies which deate potential protests against the hardships of economic trans-
formation. Migration provided work abroad and a source of income but this in turn
was only a negligible facilitator of democratisation. Future comparative economic
research can look for alternative explanations. It can reconcile previous studies by
tracing their contrasting ndings back to di¤erences in the nature of selection of mi-
grants and returnees. As our results suggest, such di¤erences in the type of selection
follow the predictions of the human capital model of migration. Even the standard
model provides therefore a solid foundation to ask if countries on di¤erent paths of
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Appendix A
Emigration indices based on
administrative data
Using analogous methods to those employed by Becker, Ichino and Peri (2004), we
construct two sets of indices: one based on years of schooling, the other on the ratio of
university graduates as indicators of the human capital content of emigration ows.
Another indices are based on the shares of di¤erent professional categories in the
total (sedentary) population and among the emigrants.
The rst set of indices uses years of schooling as the relevant measure to compare
the human capital of emigrants to that of the total populations. Formally, for an
aggregate equation like:
lnY gnt = 0nt + 1nthnt + "n (A.1)
where lnY gnt is the log of the geometric mean wage in country n at time t, and
hnt is the mean level of schooling in n at time t, the empirical evidence suggests
a proportional relation between log output per capita and education, measured by
years of schooling: Yt  eht. In order to capture the exponential impact of per
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with i and j indexing individuals who belong at time t respectively to the total
(Pt) and to the emigrant (Et) population1.
A second set of indices uses the share of tertiary graduates in the total working-age




1 t takes thus only positive values. If  t > 1 the human capital productivity of the average
emigrants is higher than that of the average stayers. In this case, emigration induces a per capita






whereby, GEt and G
P
t are the total number of tertiary graduates who emigrated in
period t and, respectively, stay put. Pt denominates again the resident (sedentary)
population and Et the total number of emigrants over period t. The corresponding





It is also possible to compute an index for comparing the ratios of lower educated












being the ratio of low educated (compulsory schooling) emigrants (lEt ) and residents
(lPt )
3.
A third set of indices captures the impact of emigration on the per capita dis-
tribution of professional skills. Using a standard classication of occupations (e.g.
ISCO) it is possible to distinguish the high skilled professionals in the total popula-
tion (SPt ) as well as the total number of emigrants in period t belonging to highly












Similarlly, an index evaluating the emigration rate of workers from professions





2Values of t above 1 indicate that the ratio of tertiary graduates is higher among emigrants than
in the sedentary population. Values below 1 suggest on contrary, that there are fewer graduates
among emigrants than among stayers.
3t > 1 signals higher shares of low educated among emigrants than non-migrants. t < 1
indicates that the share of low educated is smaller in the emigrant than in sedentary population.
4t > 1 implies that the ratio of highly skilled emigrants is larger than the corresponding ratio
of residents. t < 1 suggests on contrary, a lower ratios of highly skilled among emigrants than in
the resident population.
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where zEt and z
P










For these human capital indices we use data provided by the Romanian National
Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, henceforth INS data. The source of
these data are administrative registers and border crossing records, maintained by
the Romanian Ministry of Internal A¤airs6. These generate records on the individual
characteristics of emigrants. The data include all those emigrants who leave Romania
on a permanent or long-term basis, i.e. the persons who o¢ cially give up their
residence status in Romania in order to become long-term residents or citizens of
other countries. Because of unharmonised systems of reporting, all the data before
1995 were considered to be unreliable, so that the period covered by the constructed
data set is 1995-2001. Table A.1 provides an overview of the constructed data set
and the included variables. For each individual information on his socio-demographic
characteristics - like age, gender, ethnicity, education, profession, region of origin in
Romania (NUTS 3) - were reported together with the intended country of destination.
Despite their shortcomings, there are two arguments why the INS data might still
be appropriate for gaining some quantiable indicators of the Romanian brain drain.
First, permanent emigrants are the most relevant subjects for a brain-drain analysis:
the probability that their departure represents a permanent loss of human capital for
the country of origin is much higher than for all other types of emigration - which are
more likely to include return or circular migrations. Second, comparing the gures
obtained with INS data with estimates from other studies shows that the former
replicate rather well the generally observed trends of emigration from Romania. The
INS data reveal similar patterns of emigration to those reported in aggregate-level
studies - witness therefor are e.g. the SOPEMI country proles for Romania - as
well as in more dis-aggregated surveys: the data resemble e.g. the ndings obtained
by Diminescu and Lazaroiu (2002) from a large-scale community-level survey7.There
are also some plausible justications for this resemblance. One would be related to
the incentives to o¢ cially declare the settlement abroad while the mobility strat-
egy included from the beginning return migration. Given the facilities o¤ered for
repatriates, e.g. avoiding customs duties and taxes for repatriated assets, migrants
might temporarily give up their Romanian residence just to make use of these bene-
ts when returning. Such patterns have been documented e.g. for returning Turkish
guestworkers.
The corresponding data for the indices on occupational skills are extracted from
aggregated data of the Romanian labour force survey (LFS-AMIGO).We complement
5t takes values above 1 when the ows of emigrants include relatively more workers from low
skilled professions than in the non-migrant active population.
6A systematic overview of Romanian administrative statistics on international migration is pro-
vided by the INS:
http://www.unece.org/stats/documents/2001/05/migration/2.add.11.e.pdf.
7Both on national and, even more striking, on regional, i.e. county (NUTS3) level the emerging
destinations of temporary circular migrants revealed by Diminescu and Lazaroiu (2002) appear to




EU-15: each of the EU-member countries
CEE: Hungary, Bulgraria, Poland, Czech Republic
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Region of origin NUTS-3
Table A.1: Constructed administrative data set on Romanian migrants
these data with the distribution of occupational categories (ISCO-equivalent) in the
Romanian population, based on micro data from Luxembourg Income Study from
the Romanian Integrated Household Survey (henceforth LIS-RIHS data).
We estimate the indices for each country, overall and for aggregated destinations:
the EU, including the emigrants settling to the 15 EU member countries and, Over-
seas, including emigrants who settle to either US, Canada or Australia.
Results for indices on years of schooling
The rst set of indices refers to the human capital of Romanian emigrants relative to
the resident population.  captures the productivity impact of the per capita human
capital outows. The average years of schooling in the resident population (hPt ) are
the years of schooling indicators from the Barro-Lee data set and the corresponding
value from the LIS-RIHS data. The results were interpolated in order to cover all
the years 1995-2001. Table A.2 reports hEt and h
P
t as well as their di¤erence, 
h
t .
To estimate  using (A.2), we get the coe¢ cient  by averaging the results of
several regressions using the two available waves of the LIS-RIHS. For all possible
specications of earnings functions estimated with the 1995 and 1997 data of the
RIHS the results show that  2 (0:03; 0:08). Consequently, the value of  for (A.2)
is approximated to be  = 0:055.
For this value of  the corresponding indices  for the total emigration ows
are reported in Table A.2. Table A.3 helps to answer the question whether the
di¤erential of the mean years of schooling between emigrants and the total population
changed with the intended destination and over time. The answer is that it clearly
did, both over time and along di¤erent destinations. Table A.2 shows that, for the
period under investigation (1995-2001) the average education of emigrants grew with
almost one year of schooling over the average of the total population. Table A.3
in turn reveals that these di¤erentials were strongly varying over destinations. The
average emigrants targeting one EU country had received about 1.5 less years of
165
schooling than the average Overseas emigrants. For the EU itself, the pattern is
also highly diverse: the UK, followed by France in recent years, appears to have
attracted signicantly higher educated emigrants than e.g. Germany or Austria.
At the bottom part, the educational attainment of emigrants leaving to Italy and
Spain sharply declined in the late 1990s. In productivity terms, these trends are
reproduced in Table A.4, in which the values of the index  are calculated for the
main destinations.The value of  is higher than 1 for each of the destinations and
for all years observed. This is an indication that, over the whole period, Romanian
emigrants were on average better educated than the sedentary population and thus,
that the outows induced a loss of per-capita human capital in Romania.
Indices on Outows of Graduates
The index  gives the ratio between the shares of tertiary graduates in the emigrant
and in the sedentary population. Analogously,  gives the quotient between the
shares of lower educated persons - counted as those who leave school after achieving
the compulsory level of education - among emigrants and among the total population.
 and  use the INS data for emigrants and Barro-Lee estimates for the total popu-
lation. We extrapolate the trend of the Barro-Lee estimates, adjusted to the values
obtained from RIHS: the observed ratio of tertiary graduates in the RIHS sample is
averaged with the ratio from the Barro-Lee data and then used for estimating the
values of  and  for the missing years. Table A.5 and Table A.6 show the variation
of respectively  and  across selected destinations.
The most striking feature of the time trends for  remains however the large dif-
ference between the Overseas destinations and those belonging to the EU. The bulk
of highly educated emigrants is clearly attracted by the US, Canada and Australia
who encourage their immigration rather than by EU-countries, most of whom de-
signed comparatively more restrictive immigration policies towards the highly skills.
Whereas the trend for the Overseas destinations is constantly growing, the averaged
 for the EU-countries is slowly declining at a conspicuously lower level.
To compute the indices  and  like in equations (A.5) and (A.6), we use infor-
mation on the occupations of emigrants extracted from the INS data. These include
equivalent occupational categories to that of the International Standard Classication
of Occupations (ISCO-88). We matched the data on the occupations of emigrants
to data on the occupational skills of the total population. For years which were
not covered by the RIHS, we used aggregate data from the Romanian Labour Force
Survey (LFS - AMIGO).
The index  relates the ratio of highly skilled (ISCO-88 categories 1, 2 and 3,
i.e. managers and senior o¢ cials, professional and, technicians and associate profes-
sionals) among the permanent emigrants to the ratio of highly skilled in the total
population. Analogously,  measures the quotient between the shares of low skilled
emigrants (ISCO-88 categories 8 and 9, i.e. plant and machine operators and, el-
ementary occupations) and the equivalent share of low skilled among the resident
population.
Table A.7 presents the shares of highly and of lower skilled for both the emigrant
and the total population as well as the corresponding values of  and  for the
investigated years. Table A.8 and Table A.9 decompose then the  and  values,
respectively, by the main destinations. The di¤erences between destinations appear








t   hPt  t
1995 11.0321 9.375 1.6571 1.0954
1996 11.0800 9.402 1.6780 1.0966
1997 11.1529 9.429 1.7239 1.0994
1998 11.3665 9.456 1.9105 1.1108
1999 11.2936 9.483 1.8106 1.1047
2000 11.9165 9.510 2.4065 1.1415
2001 12.1050 9.537 2.5680 1.1517
Source: own calculation; INS, Barro-Lee and LIS-RIHS data
















1995 1.4036 0.9647 2.4954 2.7805 2.1311 0.9449 3.7547 2.8190
1996 1.2858 0.8357 2.2310 1.3899 1.2826 0.8061 3.4371 2.7785
1997 1.3135 1.0269 1.9712 1.1832 2.0152 0.8571 2.4610 2.8570
1998 1.5401 1.1573 1.9006 1.8773 2.4894 0.8451 2.4282 2.7532
1999 1.3451 0.9789 1.4592 0.0836 2.2632 0.6523 2.7312 2.7645
2000 1.9353 1.4890 2.0794 0.9545 2.9164 1.3855 3.6900 3.3173
2001 1.8799 1.6644 1.8847 0.8486 2.4167 1.9017 3.5275 3.3408
Source: own calculation; INS, Barro-Lee and LIS-RIHS data
Table A.3: Indices on years-of-schooling-di¤erentials, by destinations
di¤erence between overseas and European destinations appear even more stringent
when looking at the values of the index . The values of  for emigration ows towards
overseas destinations are relatively small and clearly declining to values bellow 1, i.e.,
for this countries, the ratio of low skilled is smaller among the emigrants than in the
total sedentary population. For the EU-average emigrants,  is also declining but
comparatively with a lower slope and almost twice as high values than those for
overseas emigrants. Germany displays high values of both the  and  index over
the whole period. This pattern is also conrmed by the German administrative data:
compared to the German population, immigrants from Eastern Europe in general
appear to have a much atter distribution of skills than their native counterparts,
i.e. more unskilled and at the same time relatively more highly skilled workers.
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Year  eu  ger  ita  spa  fra  aus  uk  overseas
1995 1.0802 1.0544 1.1471 1.1652 1.1243 1.0533 1.2293 1.1677
1996 1.0732 1.0470 1.1305 1.0794 1.0730 1.0453 1.2080 1.1651
1997 1.0749 1.0581 1.1145 1.0672 1.1172 1.0482 1.1449 1.1701
1998 1.0884 1.0657 1.1101 1.1087 1.1467 1.0475 1.1428 1.1634
1999 1.0767 1.0553 1.0835 1.0046 1.1325 1.0365 1.1620 1.1642
2000 1.1123 1.0853 1.1211 1.0539 1.1739 1.0791 1.2250 1.2001
2001 1.1089 1.0958 1.1092 1.0477 1.1421 1.1102 1.2141 1.2017
Source: own calculation; INS, Barro-Lee and LIS-RIHS data








1995 0.1642 0.079 2.0795 0.2378 0.242 0.9828
1996 0.1757 0.081 2.1702 0.2439 0.238 1.0249
1997 0.1753 0.083 2.1124 0.2295 0.234 1.0192
1998 0.1661 0.085 1.9542 0.1805 0.230 0.7852
1999 0.1945 0.087 2.2360 0.2100 0.226 0.9292
2000 0.2293 0.089 2.5772 0.1619 0.222 0.7294
2001 0.2709 0.091 2.9773 0.1507 0.218 0.6917
Source: own calculation; INS, Barro-Lee and LIS-RIHS data
Table A.5: "Brain drain" indices based on educational attainment
Year eu ger ita spa fra aus uk overseas
1995 1.0317 1.2864 0.4744 0.3023 0.8390 1.0748 0.3537 0.7109
1996 1.1436 1.3643 0.6174 0.9609 1.2098 1.2214 0.3216 0.6960
1997 1.1012 1.2989 0.6538 0.8925 0.8524 1.2509 0.9017 0.6522
1998 0.7804 1.0136 0.5651 0.5401 0.6732 0.5867 0.6664 0.6722
1999 0.9878 1.2807 0.8474 0.6110 0.7883 0.8698 0.7259 0.7296
2000 0.7805 1.2419 0.5930 0.3295 0.4510 1.2178 0.3556 0.5362
2001 0.7340 1.1333 0.6359 0.5733 0.4953 1.0712 0.3719 0.5788
Source: own calculation; INS, Barro-Lee and LIS-RIHS data









1995 0.1806 0.0829 2.1795 0.3673 0.1539 2.3867
1996 0.1931 0.0831 2.3238 0.3720 0.1535 2.4235
1997 0.1921 0.0833 2.3070 0.3777 0.1530 2.4688
1998 0.1820 0.0835 2.1806 0.2894 0.1525 1.8977
1999 0.2035 0.0837 2.4314 0.2611 0.1520 1.7181
2000 0.2413 0.0839 2.8769 0.2874 0.1515 1.8974
2001 0.2752 0.0841 3.2731 0.2676 0.1510 1.7722
Source: own calculation; INS, LFS-AMIGO and LIS-RIHS data
Table A.7: "Brain drain" indices based on occupational skills
Year eu ger ita spa fra aus uk overseas
1995 1.6665 1.4914 1.3024 1.2651 2.8017 0.9380 5.2099 4.3245
1996 1.6294 1.4365 1.1666 1.4030 1.8207 0.9469 3.8001 3.9782
1997 1.5619 1.5670 0.9781 1.0637 2.6887 0.9365 3.1939 4.0290
1998 1.3345 1.3422 0.7337 0.8926 2.7604 0.5981 2.5350 3.7438
1999 1.5060 1.5879 0.8358 0.0568 2.7637 0.8935 3.6402 4.0932
2000 1.6874 2.0062 0.9904 0.1744 2.5635 1.6333 4.5480 4.6533
2001 1.3891 2.2834 0.7601 0.1544 2.0545 2.6344 4.4991 4.9834
Source: own calculation; INS, LFS-AMIGO and LIS-RIHS data
Table A.8: Emigration indices, high occupational skills by destinations
Year eu ger  ita spa fra aus uk overseas
1995 2.5632 2.9560 1.7406 1.1727 2.1824 2.8834 1.3652 1.3466
1996 2.7861 3.1037 2.4509 2.8629 2.8436 2.9689 2.1196 1.4413
1997 2.9259 3.1222 3.2181 2.2338 2.0128 3.3332 2.3385 1.3643
1998 2.1503 2.6017 2.4035 1.9957 1.3176 1.4564 1.7231 1.3626
1999 2.0320 2.4455 2.4177 0.9711 1.2760 1.6728 1.0793 1.2104
2000 2.4118 3.0888 2.9151 0.7512 0.9790 2.8847 1.4764 1.0065
2001 2.4836 2.8304 3.4360 1.2901 1.1728 2.4586 1.1634 0.9371
Source: own calculation; INS, LFS and LIS-RIHS data
Table A.9: Emigration indices, low occupational skills by destinations
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Appendix B
Maps: regional distribution of
migrants and returnees
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Figure B.1: Emigration rate to Germany, 2002
(Data from Migration Census, Diminescu and Lazaroiu 2002)
Figure B.2: Emigration rate to Italy, 2002 (Data from Migration Census, Diminescu
and Lazaroiu 2002)
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from 15 to 25%
from 10 to 15%
from 7 to 10%
from 4 to 7%
Figure B.3: Rate of return migration at county level, 2003 (NDS data)
from 40% to 50%
from 35% to 40%
from 30% to 35%
from 15% to 30%
Figure B.4: Average rate of migration intentions, 2003 (NDS data)
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from 30% to 50%
from 20% to 30%
from 15% to 20%
from 5% to 15%





Figure B.6: Average reported wages by county, (in RoL, NDS data)
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Appendix C
Additional material for chapter 5
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C.1 Description of variables
Variable Denition
Age Constructed using the self-reported year of birth
Woman Dummy based on self reported gender
Low education Low level of education
Medium education Medium level of education
High education High level of education
Ethnic Roma Dummy based on self-reported ethnicity
Informally employed Self reported employment status
Log wage / month Log of net monthly wages
Hours work / day Number of hours usually worked per day
HH income / month Net monthly household income
Years in Italy Years spent in Italy since arrival
Fluent in Italian Self reported prociency in Italian
Minority religion Dummy based on self-reported religious a¢ liation
Overall trust Answer yes to "Most people can be trusted"
Negative Roma Has negative a attitude towards Roma
Dont migrate Romanians should not come to Italy anymore
Worsening opinion Italian attitudes worsened in recent years
Deportation justied Agrees with proposed deportation after "Tod di Quinto"
No Italian contacts Has no contacts (friendships) with Italians
Poor health Self reported poor health status
Tied migrant Migrated following a family member
Migration negative Negative attitude towards migrating to Italy
Roma neighbour Does not want Roma people as neighbours
Annual remittances Usual amount of remittances send home per year
Owns house in Ro. Owner of a house/at in Romania
Owns land in Ro. Owner of land in Romania
Share for.reign born* Share of for. born in respondents region of residence
Share Ro. migrants* Share of Ro. mig. in respondents region of residence
Unempl. rate* Unemployment rate in respondents region of residence
Note: * from o¢ cial Italian statistics (Istat).
Table C.1: Characteristics of Romanian migrants in Italy
C.2 Results from xed and random e¤ects models
For our dependent variable, "settlement intentions in Italy", we have valid observa-
tions for 1,063 Romanian migrants included in our sample. Table C2 provides the
number of observations for each group and period (based on retrospective answers).
Table C3 describes the variation of our dependent variable ("settlement intentions
in Italy"). We use the panel dimension of the data in our DiD method. In addition,
Table C4 provides the results of panel models with individual xed and random









Non-Mediaset 565 565 1,130
Control group
Mediaset 498 498 996
Total 1,063 1,063 2,126
Table C.2: Number of observations
Settlement intentions Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
overall .577 .494 0 1 N = 2,126
between .453 0 1 n = 1,063
within .196 .077 1 T = 2
Table C.3: Variation in settlement intentions
The random e¤ects model reported in table C4 includes all covariates from Table
5.3, column 5 in chapter 5.
Fixed e¤ects Random e¤ects
Post x Non-mediaset -.0975 -.0999
(.002) (.022)
Observations 2,126 2,126
Notes:The dependent variable is settlement intentions in Italy.
It equals one if migrants plan to stay in Italy on a medium or long term basis with no
concrete plans to return in the next twelve months.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table C.4: Variation in settlement intentions
176











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment group
Non-Mediaset .664 (.021) .464 (.021) -.200 (.022)
[N = 1; 130]
Control group
Mediaset .645 (.022) .542 (.059) -.102 (.041) -.098 (.042)
[N = 996]
Notes: The table reports results from Kernel-based Propensity Score Matching DiD.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Total observations (N) include valid pre- and post- answers for n=1,063 migrants.











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment group
Non-Mediaset .618 (.059) .416 (.059) -.202 (.030)
[N = 1; 100]
Control group
Mediaset .586 (.059) .484 (.059) -.102 (.040) -.100 (.042)
[N = 982]
Notes: The table reports results from Kernel-based Propensity Score Matching DiD.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Total observations (N) include valid pre- and post- answers for n=1,041 migrants.
Table C.6: Combined Matching DiD with covariates
Table C7 lists those covariates used in our model for which we had statistically
signicant di¤erences between the treatment and control groups (as reported in Table
5.1). We show the distribution of these variables before and after our matching
procedure. After the matching procedure, the means of the pre-treatment variables
become very similar for the two groups (the means are exactly the same for the
other variables from Table 5.1 not shown here). There are no statistically signicant
di¤erences between migrants exposed and those not exposed to Mediaset. We obtain
the same results using standardised means.
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